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The aim of this paper is to look at how the world community can offer protection to “climate 
refugees”. Although migration in the face of natural or human made disasters is not a new 
trend, there are signs of increases in natural disasters, and further, estimations of a high 
number of people being forced to move due to the effects of climate change. Today, there is 
no international regime for the protection of those who are forced to flee due to the effects of 
environmental or climate change. The research question is therefore: How can states and the 
world community protect “climate refugees”?  
 To figure out how “climate refugees” can best be protected the paper first looks at 
definitions of “climate refugees” and terms linked to this concept, “environmental refugee”, 
“climate migrant” and “environmental migrant”, in academic texts. There currently exist no 
universal definitions of these terms, and the thesis shows how different terms are used in the 
same context.  I use the definitions of the terms and the typology of forced versus voluntary 
migration to show how the terms could be defined based on why people are moving (effects 
of climate change or environmental change), whether or not the movement is internal or 
cross-border, and the extent of force involved in the movement. 
 As there are no protection mechanisms for people forced to move cross state borders 
due to climate or environmental change, it could be argued that there is a human rights “gap”. 
On the other hand, population movement can lead to sovereignty issues. Human rights and 
sovereignty are discussed, in relation to each other, in relation to migration/population 
movement and in relation to climate change. This discussion is used to evaluate the proposed 
alternatives for protection mechanisms for persons that have to move due to the effects of 
climate change.  
The thesis presents a broad range of proposed alternatives for protection mechanisms 
for people forced to move due to climate change: convention-related alternatives, regional 
alternatives, proportional migration, a global insurance scheme, and community relocation. It 
is hard to say which one would offer the best protection. The reason for this is due to the 
problems of generalization: the effects of climate change are not expected to be the same 
across the globe, and there might be needed different strategies in different regions. The 
generalization problem could, however, be an argument for claiming that regional alternatives 





There are several people who have helped me in different ways during the preparation and 
writing of this thesis.  
First, I would like to thank the Climate Crossroads-project, for the scholarship and for 
letting me attend conferences where I got fruitful comments and inputs on drafts of this paper. 
I would also thank Climate change: media, politics and society (Climps) for letting me present 
my draft and later chapters, of the thesis.  
I owe a big thank to my supervisor Siri Gloppen, for seeing both me and my paper.  
Further, I would like to thank Karen McNamara at the University of the South Pacific 
and Julia Edwards at the Pacific Conference of Churches for taking the time to discuss the 
topic with me while I was in Fiji.  
The work reported on in this publication has benefited from participation in the 
network Rights to a Green Future, which is financed by the European Science Foundation. 
And I am grateful for being able to attend the Rights to a Green Future Conference in 
Bucharest in the fall of 2011.  
I want to thank my family and friends for taking my mind of the thesis when I needed 
it. And especially my mom and dad, thank you for always supporting and encouraging me. 
And I am forever grateful for the help I got when I had to move out of my apartment during 
the final stages of this thesis.  
To all of the inhabitants of Ullaloftet: Thanks for a great year! Writing this thesis 
would never been the same without the interruptions and discussions.  
Lasse, without you I am not sure if this thesis would have existed. Thank you for 
studying for exams together with me, and giving me feedback on papers, during 300 credits 
and almost five years.  
 
Dina-Kristin Topphol Midtflø 





Table of Contents 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. iii 
Tables and Figures .................................................................................................................. vi 
Chapter 1 - Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Topic and Research Question ........................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Why Study Protection for “Climate Refugees”? .............................................................. 1 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis ...................................................................................................... 2 
Chapter 2 - Methodology ......................................................................................................... 4 
2.1 Content Analysis ............................................................................................................... 4 
2.2 Conceptualization ............................................................................................................. 5 
Chapter 3 - Background: Climate Change and Migration/Displacement .......................... 8 
3.1 The Refugee Convention and People Fleeing from Climate Change ............................... 8 
3.2 Environmental Change and Climate Change .................................................................... 9 
3.3 Migration as a Survival Strategy .................................................................................... 11 
3.3.1 Mitigation vs. Adaptation? ....................................................................................... 14 
3.4 The Typology of Forced vs. Voluntary Migration ......................................................... 16 
3.5 Internal Displacement ..................................................................................................... 18 
Chapter 4 - How “Climate Refugees” and “Environmental Refugees” have been Defined
 .................................................................................................................................................. 20 
4.1 Definitions of “Environmental Refugees” ...................................................................... 20 
4.2 Definitions of “Climate Refugees” ................................................................................. 23 
4.3 Critique of the terms Climate Refugee and Environmental Refugee ............................. 26 
4.4 Migrants – Environmental Migrants and Climate Migrants ........................................... 30 
4.5 Some Thoughts on these Definitions .............................................................................. 33 
4.6 Conceptualization ........................................................................................................... 34 
Chapter 5 - Theory:  Migration, Human Rights and Sovereignty ..................................... 41 
5.1 Human Rights ................................................................................................................. 41 
5.1.1 Human Rights and Climate Change ......................................................................... 44 
v 
 
5.1.2 Inter-generational Rights.......................................................................................... 49 
5.2 Sovereignty ..................................................................................................................... 50 
5.2.1 Human Rights and Sovereignty – A New Sovereignty?  ......................................... 52 
5.2.2 Sovereignty and Migration....................................................................................... 55 
5.2.3 Harm, Responsibility and Sovereignty .................................................................... 60 
Chapter 6 - Alternatives for Protection Mechanisms ......................................................... 63 
6.1 Convention-Related Solutions ........................................................................................ 64 
6.1.1 Could the Definition of Refugees cover People Migrating Because of the 
Environment? .................................................................................................................... 64 
6.1.2 Protocol to the UNFCCC ......................................................................................... 66 
6.1.3 A New Convention .................................................................................................. 68 
6.1.4 Is Convention-Related Alternatives Workable Solutions? ...................................... 70 
6.2 Regional Alternatives ..................................................................................................... 74 
6.2.1 Regional Agreements ............................................................................................... 74 
6.2.2 Modification of Existing Migration Networks......................................................... 76 
6.2.3 Is Regional Alternatives a Workable Solution? ....................................................... 78 
6.3 Proportionate Migration ................................................................................................. 79 
6.3.1 Is Proportionate Migration a Workable Solution? ................................................... 80 
6.4 Global Climate Change Insurance .................................................................................. 82 
6.4.1 Is a Global Climate Change Insurance a Workable Solution? ................................. 84 
6.5 Community Relocation ................................................................................................... 85 
6.5.1 Community Relocation: A Lesson from the Pacific? .............................................. 86 
6.5.2 Is Community Relocation a Workable Solution? .................................................... 88 
Chapter 7 - Summary, Discussion and Concluding Remarks ............................................ 91 
7.1 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research .......................................................... 94 









Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 - Definitions of “Environmental Refugees” .…………………………..p. 21 
Table 2 - Definitions of “Climate Refugees” …………………………………...p. 24 
Table 3 - Definitions of “Environmental Migrant” and “Climate Migrant” ……p. 31 
 
Figure 1 - Voluntary vs. Forced Movement, Terms Used by Other Authors …..p. 37 















Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Topic and Research Question 
At COP
1
 17 in Durban in December 2011 the President of the Republic of Nauru, Sprent 
Dabwido, speaking on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States (Pacific SIDS) 
stated that:  
“Already, communities in our islands have been forced to flee their homes to escape 
rising seas, and unless bold action is taken, much of my region could be rendered 
uninhabitable within our grandchildren’s lifetimes” (Dabwido, 2011). 
This thesis looks closer at how we define those forced to migrate because of climate 
change, especially the use of the terms “climate refugee” and “environmental refugee”, and at 
proposed protection mechanism in relation to this kind of migration. My research question is:  
How can states and the world community protect “climate refugees”?  
Is the Refugee Convention outdated, or would an inclusion of climate as a ground for 
refugee status lead to a dilution of the refugee-concept? And what exactly is a “climate 
refugee”? As will be shown, there are no clear-cut answers. The latter question will be the 
central focus of the first part of this thesis. Here the aim is to give an overview of the concepts 
used, especially “climate refugee” and “environmental refugee”. In the last part to the thesis I 
proceed to discuss the argument pro and con including those who flee for climate related 
reasons into the Refugee Convention and scrutinize other proposed alternatives to protection 
mechanisms for “climate refugees”. By gathering definitions and proposed alternatives I hope 
to draw a picture of some of the challenges relating to this topic, and of the potential, and 
problems, related to some of the most prominent alternatives for protection.  
1.2 Why Study Protection for “Climate Refugees”? 
“Climate Refugee” is a commonly used term, but is not judicially correct. Climate change is 
not among the grounds for refugee status included in the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (“the Refugee Convention”), nor is there any protocol under the 
Convention that includes climate change as a factor that could lead to refugee status. On the 
other hand, over the next decades millions of people are expected to migrate due to climate 
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 Conference of Parties (to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)).  
2 
 
change (see Myers, 2002, Tegart et al., 1990). The lack of protection mechanisms combined 
with high estimates of people in need of protection makes the research question “‘important’  
in the real world” (see King et al., 1994:15).  
Further, McAdam (2010b:2) argues that, while scientists have been considering the 
impacts of climate change for many years, social scientists have come to the area relatively 
late.  Due to this I will argue that the research topic makes a contribution to social science 
literature, first and foremost as description of the field.  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
A methodology chapter follows this introduction. Chapter 3 provides the context and 
background information for the study. It explains how people can be forced to move due to 
the effects of climate change, and presents arguments for only focusing on cross-border 
migration. It includes estimates of “climate refugees” and “environmental refugees”, and 
discusses the complexity of estimating this kind of migration. The chapter also includes a 
discussion of the Refugee Convention, and refugee theory, and introduces a typology of 
forced vs. voluntarily migration, which (although not included in the Refugee Convention) is 
used in several of the definitions of “environmental refugees” and “climate refugees” and 
which will be central to  my own conceptualization of the terms (in chapter 4). Further, the 
chapter looks at the difference between environmental changes and climate change, and the 
arguments for keeping them separate, and it looks at the argument that someone should be 
held responsible for climate related damages with migration as a consequence. I bring this 
discussion with me when moving to chapter 4.  
It is estimated that most people who flee for climate related reasons will remain inside 
their home country. I acknowledge the need for special protection regimes for those internal 
displaced by climate change. When I have chosen to focus on external migration or cross-
border migration, it is partly for practical reasons; to focus on both internal and external 
movement would be beyond the scope of this paper. Also there is an important theoretical 
distinction. For those who remain in their home country protection mechanisms are, at least in 
principle in place. They should be protected by the state, and if the home state does not offer 
this protection they could be protected by the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement and get protection as Internal 
Displaced Persons (IDPs). However, to the extent that the proposed protection mechanisms 
include both internal and external migration, I will to some degree include both. 
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While there is not a mono-causal relation between climate change, disasters and 
displacement there is a clear link (Kolmannskog, 2009:5-6). In chapter 4 I look closer at the 
differences between “traditional refugees”, meaning those who are covered by the Convention 
and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, and those often referred to as 
“climate refugees”. There is no universal definition of the term “climate refugee” or the 
related terms “environmental refugee”, “climate migrants”, and “environmental migrants”. I 
show how these terms have been used and defined, and how complex the debate is.  
Since people who migrate because of climate or environmental changes are not 
considered refugees under the Refugee Convention, they do not have the same rights as 
refugees – and states do not have asylum obligations for the people concerned. This could 
lead to human rights problems. On the other hand, the proposed alternatives or helping 
mechanisms could lead to sovereignty issues. Chapter 5 presents theoretical perspectives on 
sovereignty challenges arising in connection with external movement due to climate change.  
The theory on human rights and sovereignty in this chapter gives a basis for analyzing the 
alternatives to adaptation proposed in chapter 6 of the paper.  
Chapter 6 explores proposed options for protection mechanisms for climate refugees. 
The options (or alternatives) include, among others,  the creation of an optional protocol to the 
United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (see Biermann and 
Boas, 2010); a new treaty or convention relating to the rights of climate refugees  (see 
Docherty and Giannini, 2009); and regional agreements or "neighbor agreements" (see 
Williams, 2008). While I have not come across many articles arguing explicit for an extension 
of the Refugee Convention to also include "climate refugees” there are some (see Conisbee 
and Simms, 2003)
2
, this alternative has been criticized by several authors because it could 
lead to a dilution of the Convention (see for example Williams, 2008, Biermann and Boas, 
2010). Chapter 7 synthesizes the discussions in the previous chapters and offers some 
concluding remarks.  
                                                          
2
 Further, in 2006 the government of the Maldives organized a meeting of representatives of governments, 
environmental and humanitarian organizations, and UN agencies on the issue of protection and resettlement of 
“climate refugees”. Delegates at the meeting proposed an amendment to the Refugee Convention that would 
extend the mandate of the UN refugee regime to include «climate refugees», according to Biermann and Boas 




Chapter 2 - Methodology 
Since there are no existing mechanisms that are targeted purely to help or assist people who 
have to move due to climate- or environmental change, a statistical analysis of which one 
gives the “best” protection is not possible. Therefore, existing literature is the source of this 
study. The texts or literature used is found by searching scholarly databases and by finding 
other relevant texts in already scrutinized literature. This way of selecting texts is similar to 
“snowballing”, but instead of using people I use texts.  
2.1 Content Analysis 
In chapter 4 I look at how the term “climate refugee” has previously been defined and used. In 
the analysis I include the related terms “environmental refugee”,” climate (change) migrants”, 
“environmental migrants”. These terms are all closely linked to the concept of climate 
refugee, and some of them are often used in parallel to or instead of climate refugee. 
I use content analysis to establish how these terms are used in scientific articles (social 
science). Qualitative content analysis demands a systematic review of documents for 
categorization of the content and recording of data relevant to the issue of the current study 
(Grønmo, 2004:187). The recording/collection of data takes place partly in parallel with data 
analysis. The selection of texts can also take place during data collection. As more and more 
texts are studied, analyzed and interpreted, new light will be shed on the research question, 
and the researcher get a growing understanding of other texts that are relevant and fruitful for 
the analysis (Grønmo, 2004:187). In other words, the plans for the research made in advance 
might be changed during the research. Grønmo (2004:189) writes that precisely because the 
collection of the data is based on this flexibility, it is important to keep in mind the target for 
the research and the purpose of the data collection. The research question is then the reference 
point.  
The research question provides the basis for two types of clarifications when it comes 
to data collection (Grønmo, 2004:189). One regards the topics to prioritize during the 
collection of data, what the researcher should look for when going through the content of the 
texts. In my case this is the terms listed above, with “climate refugee” as the main focus, but 
also the related terms that I have chosen to include in the analysis. The definitions and usage 
of  these terms is relevant to create a picture of the field. It is, for example, interesting to see 
how definitions of environmental- or climate migrants differs from that of climate- or 
environmental refugees.  
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The other clarification regards what kind of texts that are relevant for the research 




Texts for the analysis were collected as described above. As more and more texts were 
studied, analyzed and interpreted, my understanding grew of which other texts that would be 
relevant and fruitful for the analysis (Grønmo, 2004:187). Besides finding relevant texts by 
looking at what literature others have engaged, I searched for texts using the following 
keywords: “climate refugees”, “environmental refugees”, “climate migrants” and 
“environmental migrants”.
4
 The main aim of chapter 4 is to map how the mentioned concepts 
are defined, which provides a better basis for understanding and forming the terms for further 
analysis later in the chapter. When looking at the proposed helping or protection mechanisms 
in chapter 6 I have tried to find proposed alternatives that gives some kind of protection to 
people that have had to cross state borders due to climate changes (and/or environmental 
changes), which means that the authors not necessarily use the terms presented in chapter 4. It 
would be impossible to include all the proposed definitions of the terms, and it is not the aim 
of the chapter either, the goal is simply to get an understanding of what, or who, are included 
in these definitions.  
2.2 Conceptualization  
Sartori (1970) stress the danger of “conceptual stretching”, when trying to deal with “the 
travelling problem” in comparative politics. He points out that the wider the world under 
investigation, the more we need conceptual tools that are able to travel (Sartori, 1970:1033-
1034). Sartori argues that so far, comparative politics scientists have followed the line of least 
resistance, which means broaden the meaning, and thereby the range of application of the 
conceptualization at hand. He calls this process conceptual stretching.  He agree that we need 
“universal” categories, concepts that are applicable to any time and place, but claims that 
nothing is gained if these universals turn out to be “no difference” categories leading to 
“pseudo-equivalence” (Sartori, 1970:1035). Further, this universals need to be empirical 
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However, some of the used texts are linked institutions like the UN and the IOM. Initially I also wanted to 
include Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The reason for not including them is simply that I did not 
find definitions of “climate refugees” or “environmental refugees” in any of the NGO-reports consulted.  
4
 Further, keywords such as “climate change displacement” have also been used, and of course also more general 
keywords such as “climate change” and “environmental change” and the like.  
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universals, in spite of their “all-embracing very abstract nature” they must be amenable to 
empirical testing (Sartori, 1970:1035).  
Definitions are not necessarily operational. According to Sartori (1970:1045) the 
definitional requirement for a concept is that its meaning is declared, while operational 
definitions are required to state the conditions by means of which a concept can be verified 
and measured. We can distinguish between definition of meaning and operational definition, 
operational definitions implement, but do not replace, definitions of meaning. There must be a 
conceptualization before engaging in operationalization. My focus will first and foremost be 
on declaration of meaning.  
 Adcock and Collier (2001:530) depict the relationship between concepts and 
observations in terms of four levels. At the first and broadest level is the background concept, 
which encompasses the constellation of potentially diverse meanings associated with a given 
concept. On the next level is the systematized concept, which is the specific formulation of a 
concept adopted by a particular researcher or group of researchers. The systematized concept 
is usually formulated in terms of an explicit definition. At the third level are indicators, which 
are also routinely called measures and operationalizations. This level includes any systematic 
scoring procedure, ranging from simple measures to complex aggregated indexes. It includes 
not only quantitative indicators but also the classification procedures employed in qualitative 
research. In qualitative research these are the operational definitions employed in classifying 
cases (Adcock and Collier, 2001:531). At the fourth level are scores for cases, which include 
both numerical scores and the result of qualitative classifications. I will primarily focus on the 
second level.  
Adcock and Collier (2001) writes that in dealing with the choices that arise in 
establishing the systematized concept, researchers must avoid three common traps. First, 
researchers should not misinterpret the flexibility inherent in these choices as suggesting that 
everything is “up for grabs” (Adcock and Collier, 2001:532). It is important to recognize that 
a real choice is being made, but it is no less important to recognize that this is a limited 
choice. Second, researchers should avoid claiming too much in defending their choice of a 
given systematized concept.  Adcock and Collier (2001:532) argues that it is more productive 
to recognize that scholars routinely emphasize different aspects of a background concept in 
developing systematized concepts. Rather than making sweeping claims about what the 
background concept “really” means, researchers should present specific arguments, linked to 
the goals and contexts of their research, that justify their particular choices. A third problem 
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occurs when researchers don’t provide a “fleshed-out” account of their systematized concepts 
(Adcock and Collier, 2001:532). A fleshed-out account requires not just a one-sentence 
definition, but a broader specification of the meaning and entailments of the systematized 
concept.  
These are problems that I must be aware of when dealing with the concept of climate 
refugees. Thus, in this thesis, I will use content analysis with something similar to snowball 
sampling of text for analysis. I do this being mindful of Sartori’s warning of conceptual 
stretching and Adcock and Collier’s discussion of the three common traps when establishing 
systematized concepts.  
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Chapter 3 - Background: Climate Change and 
Migration/Displacement 
In this chapter I will try to put the research question in a context. The first part will explain 
why “climate refugees” are not considered as refugee under the Refugee Convention. Further, 
I look closer at migration and climate change, the difference between environmental change 
and climate change, the typology of forced and voluntary movement, and how those that 
move internally in their home country in theory shall be protected by either their own state or 
UNHCR.  
3.1 The Refugee Convention and People Fleeing from Climate Change  
The Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees («the Refugee Convention») 
of 1951 came as a result of the large flow of people fleeing in Europe after 1945 (Cooper, 
1998, Williams, 2008). The Convention was originally limited to persons fleeing events 
occurring before 1 January 1951 and within Europe. Later, it has been subject to only one 
amendment in the form of a 1967 Protocol, which removed the geographic and temporal 
limits of the 1951 Convention and gave the Convention universal coverage (UN General 
Assembly, 1951, UN General Assembly, 1967). The convention have what some refers to as a 
rather restrictive definition of “refugees”  (see for example Cooper, 1998, Hugo, 1996). It 
states that the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who: 
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his [sic] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself [sic] of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his [sic] former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UN General 
Assembly, 1951:Artcle 1A).  
This definition has at least three aspects; there must be a well-founded fear of persecution; the 
reason for the persecution must be either race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion; and the person must be outside the country of 
his/her nationality or unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country. 
Change in the climate or the environment, as reasons for fleeing, are not mentioned. There are  
regional instruments with broader definitions of refugees, but none of these explicitly grant 
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refugee status for reasons of environmental or climate change (Kolmannskog, 2008:25). The 
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
(Organization of African Unity, 1969) and the American Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 
(Americas - Miscellaneous, 1984) recognize events that seriously disturb public order.
5
 
However, as Cooper (1998:497) points out, none of the definitions in these conventions were 
expanded to include “environmental refugees” or will be able to give “environmental 
refugees” proper protection when crossing state borders. Although these conventions have a 
broader definition of refugees, none explicitly grant refugee status for environmental or 
climate change (Kolmannskog, 2008:25).  
3.2 Environmental Change and Climate Change 
Rather than making an exhaustive definition of how environmental changes and climate 
change are to be understood in the context of this paper, I will try to show how those who 
define environmental refugees or climate (change) refugees uses the terms, and what they 
emphasize. While some of the definitions referred to in chapter 4 have an exhaustive list of 
what they consider as environmental changes or climate change (see for example Biermann 
and Boas, 2010), others do not explicitly have a definition of these terms (see for example 
Docherty and Giannini, 2009). Some of the definitions have a marked division of climate 
change and environmental changes (see for example Biermann and Boas, 2010), while others 
grasp both climate change and environmental changes (see for example Myers and Kent, 
1995).  
While some scholars mix up the concepts of environmental and climate change, I have 
chosen to include them both, but still keeping them separate. The reason for this is a question 
of responsibilities. Who is responsible for people migrating or being displaced because of 
environmental changes, and who is responsible when people migrate because of the effects of 
climate change? The answer to the responsibility question might differ between 
environmental changes and climate change.   
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Article 1.1 in the OAU Convention set out the same definition of a refugee as the UN Refugee Convention, 
while Article 1.2 adds that “The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole 
of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek 
refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality”. While the Article 3 of the American 
Cartagena Declaration states that “(…) it is necessary to consider enlarging the concept of a refugee (…) Hence 
the definition or concept of a refugee to be recommended for use in the region is one which, in addition to 
containing the elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, includes among refugees persons who 
have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, 
foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have 
seriously disturbed public order”. 
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Article 1A in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC, 1992), defines climate change as: “a change of climate which is attributed directly 
or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which 
is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”. Human 
activity is one of the important components here. Docherty and Giannini’s (2009) argument 
for looking at people who move across state borders because of climate change is exactly 
because climate change is “an anthropogenic phenomenon for which humans should be held 
morally and legally responsible”.  Biermann and Boas (2010:63) argues that politically it is 
“essential to specify climate refugees because of the link of this type of migrants with the 
overall climate regime and its emerging debates on liability, compensation, equity, and 
common but differentiated responsibilities”. And further, while people who migrate due to 
other types of environmental degradation, for example industrial accidents or disaster 
unrelated to human activity, requires equal levels of care and protection through national 
governments and the international community, they should be dealt with by different 
institutions (Biermann and Boas, 2010:64).  
However, environmental disruptions that are not climate change can also be caused by 
human activities. Examples of environmental disruptions caused by human activities includes 
industrial accidents and development projects (Hugo, 2010). The difference is, among others, 
that climate change is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that “alters the global 
atmosphere”, while a nuclear accident or a factory disaster is a single event where it might be 
easier to identify who is responsible. The causal link is evident, although those responsible 
might not respond in a desirable manner.
6
 Environmental disasters might in other words have 
regional causes and be felt on an regional level, climate change, on the other hand, has global 
causes, yet the effects might be felt on regional levels. At the same time, it might be hard to 
see a clear causal link.  
Kolmannskog (2009:6) refers to IASCs (Inter-Agency Standing Committee) typology 
when explaining how climate change can lead to displacement. Sudden-onset disasters, slow-
onset disasters, sea-level rise and conflicts
7
 due to climate change can all lead to 
displacements. Kolmannskog (2009:7) further points to the increase of certain diseases and 
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As an example, Cooper (1998:514) argues that the Chernobyl nuclear explosion is an example of government 
negligence and inaction, which further led to an environmental crisis and wide-scale environmental refugees.  
7
 For a discussion on climate change and conflicts, see for example Hartmann (2010).  
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epidemics, and displacement linked to measures to mitigate or adapt to climate change
8
.  
Sudden-onset disasters includes storms and floods, while slow-onset disasters includes 
drought, further, sea-level rise can also be regarded as a slow-onset disaster (see Hugo, 
2010:11).  
If one assumes that climate change is anthropogenic, which the UNFCCC does, then 
shouldn’t humans (i.e. states) be held responsible? This is one of the questions that arise in the 
context of climate justice. In 2002 the first Climate Justice Summit took place in Hague, at the 
same time as the Sixth Conference of the Parties (Agostino and Lizarde, 2012). The Climate 
Summit’s mission stated that:  “climate change is a rights issue. It affects our livelihoods, our 
health, our children and our natural resources” (Agostino and Lizarde, 2012:90).  The 
movement for climate justice focuses on issues related to ethics, equity and human rights in 
relation to the climate change debate (Agostino and Lizarde, 2012:90).  In the past years there 
have been increased talking about climate justice among grassroots activists, environmental 
organizations, policy makers, governments, UN delegates, and trade associations (Lohmann, 
2008:364). Those calling for climate justice demand reorganization of the disproportionate 
burden on countries of the South, as well as the historical responsibility of industrialized 
nations in the level of emissions that have contributed to the current problem of climate 
change (Agostino and Lizarde, 2012:90). 
3.3 Migration as a Survival Strategy  
There has been talk about the effect climate change can have on migration and displacement 
for a long time, “environmental refugees” and “climate refugees” are terms often used in 
academic as well as media discussions. Yet, the first large-scale conference
9
 on climate 
change and displacement took place in 2011.  
As many scholars have pointed out (see for example Hugo, 1996, Westing, 1992, 
Cooper, 1998, Keane, 2004, Kolmannskog, 2008, McAdam, 2010b) migration on a permanent 
or temporary basis in the face of natural or human made disasters is not a new trend. People 
have moved, both temporarily and permanently, during periods of drought and other 
environmental change (Kolmannskog, 2008:6). 
                                                          
8
 An example of the last category is biofuel projects and forest conservation that could lead to displacement if it 
is not carried out with respect for the rights of indigenous and local people. This might be linked to other 
environmental disasters, as discussed above, such as factory disasters/accidents. 
9
 The Nansen Conference – Climate Change and Displacement in the 21
st
 Century, held in Oslo 6-7 June 2011. 
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What several point to as a new thing, however, is how fast the environment is 
changing (see for example Wijkman and Timberlake, 1984, Cooper, 1998). Kolmannskog 
(2009:5) writes that the overall trend shows that the number of recorded natural disasters have 
increased, from approximately 200 to over 400 per year, over the past two decades.  
According to Kolmannskog (2009:5), the majority of these are climate-related disasters, that 
is disasters which climate change can influence both in terms of frequency and severity. 
Climate-related disasters includes the meteorological (for example storm), the hydrological 
(for example flood), and the climatological (for example drought) (Kolmannskog, 2009:5).   
However, in addition of being incorrect in legal terms, Kolmannskog (2008:4) argues 
that the term “climate refugee” “implies a mono-causality that one rarely finds in human 
reality”. This argument about the complexity of migration is also referred to by other scholars 
(see for example McGregor, 1994, Myers and Kent, 1995, Kibreab, 1997, Keane, 2004, 
McNamara and Gibson, 2009:478, Hartmann, 2010:238, Siyoum, 2011). It is likely that 
climate change will contribute to increased forced migration, but since it is not possibly to 
completely isolate climate change as a cause, it will be difficult to stipulate numbers. 
According to Kolmannskog (2008:4) we will, at best, only have “guesstimates” about the 
possible form and scope of forced migration related to climate. Hartmann (2010:238) writes 
that even on islands and atolls threatened by rising sea-level , decision to migrate can be a 
result of many more factors than climate change alone. She points to a study showing that 
socio-economic pressure from lack of employment and development opportunities as well as 
other kinds of environmental changes are the main drivers of migration away from Kiribati 
and Tuvalu, the role of climate change must be viewed together with these processes.  
Nevertheless, there do exist estimates of people moving due to climate- and 
environmental change. In the first assessment report from 1990 Working Group 2 of the 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that climate change can lead to 
significant movements of people (Tegart et al., 1990:3). The reasons for this movement 
include flooding due to sea-level rise and storm surges of costal lowlands, like Bangladesh, 
China and Egypt, as well as small island states.  A one meter sea-level rise by 2100 would 




Kolmannskog (2009:6) points to a study by OCHA-IDMC
10
  which shows that there 
were 20 million people displaced due to climate-related sudden-onset disasters (such as floods 
and storms) in 2008. Estimating the number of people displaced due to slow-onset disasters, 
such as drought, are harder, but according to the OCHA-IDMC study, more than 26.5 million 
people were affected by 12 droughts in 2008.   
Myers (2002) estimate that there already in 1995 were 25 million “environmental 
refugees”
11
 worldwide. Out of these, roughly five million were located in the African Sahel, 
four millions located in the Horn of Africa, included Sudan, seven millions in other parts of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. This makes Sub-Saharan Africa the “prime locus of environmental 
refugees” (Myers, 2002:609). Today, Myers argue, the number is much higher. At least six 
million people deserve to be regarded as “environmental refugees” in China, there are one 
million new “environmental refugees” in Mexico each year, and finally there are those people 
who are displaced involuntarily due to public works projects, like large dams, which are 
increasing by 10 million worldwide every year. Myers (2002) claims that “when global 
warming takes hold” there could be as many as 200 million people “overtaken by sea-level 
rise and coastal flooding, by disruptions of monsoon systems and other rainfall regimes, and 
by droughts of unprecedented severity and duration”.  It should, however, be mentioned that 
Myers have gotten some critique on his numbers, despite Myers himself describing the 1995 
estimate of 25 million “environmental refugees”  as “cautious and conservative”  (see Myers, 
2002:611). Gemenne (2011:43) argues that Myers estimates of the number of “environmental 
refugees” does not rely on any specific methodology. Myers rather makes an estimate based 
on the number of internally displaced people in each region, and on the basis of these numbers 
Myers makes an estimate of the proportion that could have been displaced due to 
environmental disasters (Gemenne, 2011:43).  This last estimate is based on reports and 
observations of environmental degradation in the considered region, but no attention is given 
to an examination of the linkages between environmental change and migration, Gemenne 
(2011:43) argues. That way Myers assumes that all people displaced in an area affected by 
environmental changes have been displaced solely because of these changes.  
                                                          
10
 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the International Displacement Monitoring 
Centre of Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). 
11
 Defined as “people who could no longer gain a secure livelihood in their homelands because of drought, soil 
erosion, desertification, deforestation and other environmental problems, together with the associated problems 
of population pressure and profound poverty. (…) many being internally displaced” (Myers 2002:609). 
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Further, what is important to note is that these estimates includes internal displaced as 
well as people who cross state borders (and Myers estimate only include 
internalmigration/displacement). There are, however, estimates on external displacement as 
well. According to Gain and Bari (2007:50) studies shows that about 40 million people in 
Bangladesh will become “environmental refugees” due to one meter sea level rise, and they 
state that “[t]he victims of the rise of sea level naturally become environmental refugees in 
India and this may lead to political tensions” . However, both Myers and Gain and Bari 
estimates are estimates of “environmental refugees”, and while it is sea-level rise due to 
climate change that are the push factor in Gain and Bari’s case, Myers includes both climate 
and environmental causes for displacement. 
While it is predicted that most of those migrating will still reside in the country of 
origin (see for example Kolmannskog, 2009), this essay will have its main focus on 
international migration. The reason for this is that internal migrants are first and foremost the 
home states responsibility, and if the state fails to offer this protection the UNCHR can in 
some cases intervene as I will come back to later. Internal migration will be included where it 
is natural, and some of the alternatives presented in chapter 6 also include internal migration.  
3.3.1 Mitigation vs. Adaptation?  
Mitigation and adaptation are at present the two dominant approaches to addressing climate 
change (Loughry, 2010:230). This is exemplified by the UNFCCC (1992), who identifies two 
responses to climate change: mitigation of climate change by reducing greenhouse-gas 
emissions and enhancing sinks, and adaptation to the impacts of climate change (Klein et al., 
2007:748). The IPCC defines mitigation as “[a]n anthropogenic intervention to reduce the 
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases” (Klein et al., 2007:750), or as Loughry 
(2010:231-232) puts it; “[i]t is about the implementation of policies that reduce greenhouse 
gas emission and enhance natural and purpose-built “sinks” that can store carbon-containing 
compounds for indefinite periods of time”. Adaptation is defined by the IPCC as 
“[a]djustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli 
or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (Klein et al., 
2007:750). In this context adaptation normally refers to a process or action in a system which 
helps the system better cope or manage with changing condition, stress, risks and 
opportunities (Loughry, 2010:230). Simply put, climate change mitigation means the 
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reduction of future emissions of greenhouse gases, while climate change adaptation means 
ways to adapt or coping with the effects of climate change. 
 McNamara and Gibson (2009) interviews ambassadors to the UN from Pacific island 
states, and from these interviews it seems that there exist a fear that adaption will mean giving 
up on mitigation. According to McNamara and Gibson (2009:480) the ambassadors they 
interviewed avoided to look at migration as an solution to rising sea level, as this could send 
the message that they had given up on mitigation measures. Although migration may be seen 
as an adaptation strategy, that don’t necessarily mean that one is giving up on mitigation.  
As discussed above, migration in the face of disasters is far from a new thing, and has 
been used as an adaptation strategy. McLeman and Smit (2006) refers to research done in 
Africa which shows that populations in rural areas have adopted strategies to cope with 
recurring drought that incorporate migration. In Western Sudan male household members 
have often migrated to Khartoum in search for wage labor when low rainfall prevent 
agricultural production, and in dryland areas of Ethiopia migration is undertaken by families 
during times of drought after other measures have been exhausted (McLeman and Smit, 
2006:33). Understood in this way migration is, and has been, an adaptation strategy.  
 Barnett and Webber (2010) and de Moor (2011) argues that in many cases migration 
enhances the sustainable development of both sending and host states. Migration can 
contribute positively to adaptation to climate change, in particular through the way it can 
build financial, social and human capital (Barnett and Webber, 2010:38). Facilitating legal 
migration for persons affected by environmental degradation is both a way to prevent forced 
displacement and the suffering it generates, and a way to relieve pressure on vulnerable 
regions. If migration due to climate change is managed effectively, humanitarian crisis could 
be minimized and conflicts avoided (de Moor, 2011:93). However, this view of migration as a 
positive form of adaptation does not include involuntary resettlement. If people are to some 
degree forced to move in response to climate change, and the movement is an outcome they 
would rather avoid, then this movement should be considered as “impacts of climate change” 
rather than adaptation, Barnett and Webber (2010:50) argues. They emphasize that migration 
will work best as adaptation if people move voluntary, in the situations where the people are 
their own decision makers (this is also emphasized by de Moor (2011) and Warner (2010)).   
With that said whether or not migration could be seen as an adaptation strategy or not 
is not agreed on, and governments do not generally view migration as an adaptation strategy 
or alternative (Warner, 2010:403). Warner (2010) argues that different kinds of 
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environmentally caused movement differs in whether they can be perceived as adaptation 
strategies or not, as discussed above. While some forms of environmentally induced migration 
might be adaptive, other forms of forced migration and displacement might indicate a failure 
of the social-ecological system to adapt (Warner, 2010:403).  
Although migration may in some instances be seen as an adaptation strategy, that 
don’t necessarily mean that one is giving up on mitigation.  As the IPCC point out, mitigation 
and adaptation are not contradictory (see Klein et al., 2007). Further, this paper should not be 
seen as an argument for adaptation rather than mitigation, the goal is simply to explore 
proposed alternatives to adaptation to one of the consequences of climate change, namely 
population mobility.    
3.4 The Typology of Forced vs. Voluntary Migration 
Black (2001) calls for more theory in the growing field of refugee studies. He claims that the 
definition, as put down in the Convention from 1951 is devoid of any deeper academic 
meaning or explanatory power:  
“by conveying academic respectability, the uncritical use of the term in scholarly 
literature can contribute to the perception of the naturalness of the category of refugees 
and of differential policies towards those who do and those who do not qualify for the 
label. The simple acceptance by social scientists of a legal definition might have some 
justification were this definition legally uncontested; yet as the burgeoning field of 
refugee law amply demonstrates, this is far from the case” (Black, 2001:63). 
Despite clinging on to the judicial/policy-based definition of refugee, Black (2001:64) argues 
that there are still far from a clear consensus on what the term should or should not include. 
This is shown by the academic work that argues for an extension of the refugee definition to 
include other types of forced migrants, thus potentially enlarging the field of refugee studies 
as well. Black (2001:64) claims, however, that this work often appears to have an agenda 
based much more in the extension of policy definitions than in any deeper academic attempt 
to understand in a more comprehensive way the situation or distinctiveness of refugees as 
opposed to other kinds of migrants. Attempts to promote the use of other terms in academic 
literature seem to represent a struggle to ensure that these terms are also incorporated into 
concrete policy initiative. Black (2001:64-65) point to internally displaced persons and 
environmental refugees as terms that have been tried to be promoted like this. What the new 
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categories have in common, he writes, is the development of academic literature based less on 
theoretical reflection about what constitute a refugee, and more on the documentation of 
empirical examples of displacement, often led by researchers based within policy 
organizations that are directly concerned with responding to particular types of displacement. 
By empirically extending the concept, which Black warns about, one risks conceptual 
stretching, which Sartorti (1970) warns about. 
Nevertheless, there are theories in the field of refugee studies. One is the typology of 
forced vs. voluntary migration (Black, 2001:65). Hugo (1996) shows that this distinction 
between voluntary and forced migration is not as easy as it might appear. He points to Speare 
(1974) and Amin (1974) who have two different ways of looking at the voluntary vs. non-
voluntary element.  Speare (1974:89) writes that in the strictest sense migration can be 
considered to be forced only when a person actually is physically transported from a country 
and has no opportunity to escape from those who are transporting him. In this way, movement 
under threat contains a voluntary element, as long as there is an option to escape to another 
part of the country, go into hiding, or to remain and hope to avoid persecution. On the other 
hand, Amin (1974:100) writes, in the context of migration in Western Africa, that even 
though there might seem to be an alternative, the reality is often that there are not. Hugo 
(1996:107) therefore argue that population mobility is best viewed as being arranged along a 
continuum ranging from totally voluntary migration to totally forced migration.  
Hugo (1996) is not alone in looking at it as a continuum. Bates (2002) claims that the 
two most important features of the term “environmental refugee” is the transformation of the 
environment to one less suitable for human occupation and the acknowledge that this causes 
migration. When looking at the difference of refugees and migrants, her focus is on external 
compulsion as the trigger for fleeing. She illustrates this by a continuum, where people who 
have no control over their relocation represent the left-hand end of the continuum, designated 
as “involuntary” (Bates, 2002:468). It is in the “involuntary” end of the spectrum that we find 
environmental refugees. In the middle, described as “compelled” we find environmental 
migrants, while at the right side migrants, characterized by voluntary migration.    
In the end, even if scholars go beyond the traditional definition of refugees as stated in 
the Refugee Convention, persons migrating because of climate change, environmental 
changes, natural disasters, and so on are still not recognized as refugees in international law, 
even though there might be an element of force.  
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3.5 Internal Displacement 
In this paper the focus will first and foremost be on external displacement, people displaced or 
migrating outside their own home state. However, when looking at definitions this distinction 
is often not clear. The usage of “refugee” and “migrant” does not necessarily imply that the 
one describes external movement and the other internal movement. For that reason I have 
chosen to include both “migrant” and “refugee” when looking at definitions. Further, the 
alternatives presented in chapter 6 of the paper are sometimes directed at both internal and 
external migration.  
People internally displaced because of climate change are covered by what the 
UNHCR calls IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) (UNHCR, 2011). UNHCR's original 
mandate does not cover internally displaced persons, but because of the expertise on 
displacement, they have for years helped millions of internally displaced persons (UNHCR, 
2011). In 1998, the Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement were adopted. IDPs might be 
displaced for much of the same reasons as refugees, but have not crossed state borders, and 
are still situated in their home state. UNHCR emphasizes that internally displaced persons 
remain under the protection of their own state / government, although this state may be the 
cause of the migration. As citizens, they have rights and protection enshrined in human rights 
conventions and international humanitarian law.  
According to a report by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), written by 
Kolmannskog (2009:8), two-thirds of all people who are displaced because of persecution, 
war and conflict remains within their own country. UNHCR Guiding Principles of Internal 
Displacement has no formal legal status, and Williams (2008:511) writes that concerns about 
state sovereignty and the fear of intervention by international organizations was tempered by 
the requirement that projects carried out by UNHCR must be at the request of the Secretary-
General or a main body of the UN, and in addition the state concerned must give their 
consent. In other words, assistance from UNHCR offers no sovereignty issues, at least in 
theory. Mills (1998:108-109) shows how UNHCR in many ways has become a migrant 
management organization, helping states maintain sovereign control over their borders and 
territory. On the other hand, he emphasize that international agencies may be able to engage 
in humanitarian incursions on state sovereignty once they have gained access to a country.  
Further, Kolmannskog (2009:11) writes that although there is a normative framework 
for internally displaced persons, there are some fundamental problems related to this. States, 
which has the primary responsibility for the people within its borders, are often unwilling or 
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unable to protect displaced persons, and in some cases denies the execution of international 
protection and support services with regard to the principle of national sovereignty and non-
interference.  
Having now discussed some important issues one must be mindful of when 
considering definitions of refugees and climate change, I will in the next chapter move on to 
look at definitions of “climate refugees” and “environmental refugees”. 
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Chapter 4 - How “Climate Refugees” and “Environmental 
Refugees” have been Defined 
The aim of this study is to look at how the world community can offer some kind of 
protection to “climate refugees”. Seeing that there are no universal definition of the term 
“climate refugee”, and neither any universal definitions of the related terms “environmental 
refugee”, “environmental migrant” and “climate migrant”, I chose to look closer at how the 
terms have been defined.
12
 By looking at these definitions I hope to create a broader 
understanding of what this kind of movement constitute. And further, what a potential 
protection regime or mechanism must be aware of. I will bring these definitions with me 
when moving on to the last part of this chapter, where I will try to conceptualizing these 
terms.  
4.1 Definitions of “Environmental Refugees” 
The term “environmental refugee” seems to be the oldest one, and the definitions of this term 
also include people who move due to climate change. Therefore I chose to start with this term. 
Table 1 sums up the definitions presented here. Some of them are old and often cited, like El-
Hinnawis (1985), others are of newer date, like Aminzadeh (2007). 
According to Tyssing (2010) and Biermann and Boas (2010), El-Hinnawi (1985) was 
the one who “popularized” the term “environmental refugees” when he used it in a UN 
Environment Program (UNEP) report in 1985.
13
 El-Hinnawis (1985:4) definition of 
“environmental refugees” is shown in table 1. He explains that by “environmental disruption” 
in this definition is meant “any physical, chemical and/or biological changes in the ecosystem 
(or the resource base) that render it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human 
life” (El-Hinnawi, 1985:4). As El-Hinnawi (1985:4) himself point out, this definition of 
environmental refugees does not cover people displaced for political reasons or by civil strike, 
nor does it cover people migrating purely on economic grounds. 
                                                          
12
 There are of course examples of scholars who neither use “refugee” nor “migrant” when discussing people 
who move due to climate- or environmental changes. Byravan and Rajan (2006, 2009, 2010) for example 
distinguish between “climate migrants” and “climate exiles”.  To include more terms would, however, make this 
part of the study larger than necessary. When choosing to look at those who use the term refugee to describe 
population movement due to climate- or environmental change it is partly the usage of the term is in some way 
or another connected to the term as used in the Refugee Convention.  
13
 This is not to say that El-Hinnawi (1985) was the first to use the concept. Black (2001:65) writes that ever 
since Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute first wrote about ecological refugees in the 1970s, the notion of 
environmental refugees has periodically appeared as an issue demanding the attention of academics researchers 
and policymakers. According to McNamara and Gibson (2009:477) the term environmental refugee dates back 








“(…) people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily 
or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or 
triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the 
quality of their life”.   
Jacobson (1988:37-38) “Environmental refugees have become the single largest class of displaced 
persons in the world. They fall into three broad categories: those displaced 
temporarily because of a local disruption such as an avalanche or earthquake; 
those who migrate because environmental degradation has undermined their 
livelihood or poses unacceptable risks to health; and those who resettle because 
land degradation has resulted in desertification or because of other permanent and 
untenable changes in their habitat”. 
Suhrke (1993:9-13) “If it is to have a meaning at all, the concept of environmental refugee must refer 
to especially vulnerable people who are displaced due to extreme environmental 
degradation.”  
“Environmental degradation will give rise to two kinds of population outflows: 
environmental migrants and refugees. The latter have little or no resources to 
cope with deepening degradation; in other words, they constitute those who are 
already the most marginalized and impoverished in their own society. It follows 
that relative to the population as a whole, they would not be very numerous”. 
Myers and Kent  
(1995:18-19) 
Persons “who can no longer gain a secure livelihood  in their homelands because 
of environmental factors of unusual scope, notably drought, desertification, 
deforestation, soil erosion, water shortages and climate change, also natural 
disasters such as cyclones, storm surges and floods”. 
Bates (2002:468) “People who migrate from their usual residence due to changes in their ambient 
non-human environment”.   
Aminzadeh (2007:256) 
 
“persons displaced by the environment. An environmentally displaced person is 
1) one who leaves his or her home and seeks refuge elsewhere, and  2) does so 
for reasons relating to the environment”. 
 
According to El-Hinnawi (1985:4-5) there are three broad categories of environmental 
refugees. First, there are those who have been temporarily displaced because of an 
“environmental stress”. These environmental refugees return to their “habitat” when the 
environmental disruption is over and the area is rehabilitated to its original state. This is 
usually situations where people are relocated because of natural hazards such as earthquakes 
or cyclones or an environmental accident. Secondly, there are those who have to be 
permanently displaced and re-settled in a new area, they are displaced because of permanent 
changes, generally man-made, that affect their original “habitat” (El-Hinnawi, 1985:5). The 
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third category of environmental refugees are those individuals or groups of people who 
migrate from their original “habitat”, temporarily or permanently, to a new one within their 
own national boundaries, or cross state borders, in search of a better quality of life. The main 
reason for this type of migration is that the resource base in their original “habitat” has 
deteriorated to such a degree that it can no longer meet peoples basic needs (El-Hinnawi, 
1985:5). 
El-Hinnawi’s (1985) definition does not emphasize whether the migration is internal 
or external. As illustrated by the third category of environmental refugees, he does not 
separate between migration within or outside of national borders.   
Jacobsen (1988) does not present a clear definition, but she illustrates what can be the 
causes of environmental migration, and according to Myers and Kent (1995:17) this is her 
definition (see table 1). Jacobsen (1988) does not differentiate between internal and external 
displacement, she discuss both people migrating inside of Mauritania and the US and people 
migrating from Bangladesh to India.  
Another of the often cited definitions, together with Jacobsen (1988) and El-Hinnawi 
(1985) is Myers and Kent (1995) (see table 1). They first limit the definition to those who 
“can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their homelands”, in other words, those who leave 
their homelands. However, the last part of the definition, “people feel they have no alternative 
but to seek sustenance elsewhere, whether within their own countries or beyond”, seem to 
include internal displaced as well as persons external displaced by environmental disruptions. 
Myers (2002:609), who uses the same definition in his article from 2002, makes this clear 
when he writes that “[n]ot all of them have fled their countries, many being internally 
displaced”. Furthermore, while El-Hinnawi’s (1985) definition emphasize that the migration 
is forced, the element of force is not mentioned in Myers and Kent’s (1995) definition (see 
table 1).   
Biermann and Boas (2010:62) argues that the breadth of these definitions (those of  El-
Hinnawi, 1985 and Myers and Kent, 1995) make it impossible to specify or quantify climate-
related migration. However, Suhrke (1993:9) writes that  “if it is to have a meaning at all, the 
concept of environmental refugee  must refer to especially vulnerable people who are 
displaced due to extreme environmental degradation”. Suhrke (1993:13) distinguishes 
between environmental migrants and environmental refugees, the latter having little or no 
resources to cope with deepening environmental degradation (see table 1). Those who migrate 
before the situation becomes so desperate that they have no choice, Suhrke (1993) refer to as 
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environmental migrants. Environmental refugees constitute those who are already the most 
marginalized and impoverished in their own society.  
Bates (2002) has a vague working definition in her paper on environmental refugees, 
shown in table 1. She explains that this definition remains vague in order to incorporate the 
two most important features of environmental refugees, which is the transformation of the 
environment to one less suitable for human occupation and the acknowledge that this causes 
migration (Bates, 2002:468-469). When looking at the difference between refugees and 
migrants, she refers first to the Refugee Convention, but then turn the focus to external 
compulsion as the trigger for fleeing. She illustrates this by a continuum, where people who 
have no control over their relocation represent the left-hand end of the continuum, designated 
as “involuntary” (Bates, 2002:468), as discussed in chapter 3. 
Aminzadeh (2007) uses the concept of climate refugees without any further reflections 
of the concept, and from Aminazdeh’s definition of environmental refugee it is not clear 
whether the “displaced person” have to leave their homeland or just their home to be labeled 
as environmental refugees (see table 1). But the way Aminazdeh (2007:244) uses the term 
“climate refugee”, for example by stating that “[c]limate refugees from some Pacific island 
states are already seeking shelter in neighboring countries”, indicates that she is referring to 
cross-border migration when using this concept, and this might also be the case for 
“environmental refugee”.  
Seeing that the definitions have the push-factor of environmental change in common, 
but that the definitions is quite unlike the “traditional definition” of a refugee in the Refugee 
Convention, by for example including both internal and cross-border movement, this study 
now move on to see how the term “climate refugee” have been defined. 
4.2 Definitions of “Climate Refugees” 
While there is a somewhat consensus on who popularized the concept of “environmental 
refugee”, who, how, and at what time the concept of “climate refugee” was popularized is not 






Table 2 - Definitions of “Climate Refugee” 
Author Definition 
Biermann and Boas 
(2010:67) 
“people who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near future, because 
of sudden or gradual alterations in their natural environment related to at least one 
of three impacts of climate change: sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and 
drought and water scarcity” 
Docherty and Giannini 
(2009:361) 
“an individual who is forced to flee his or her home and to relocate temporarily or 
permanently across a national boundary as the result of sudden or gradual 
environmental disruption that is consistent with climate change and to which 
humans more likely than not contributed” 
McNamara and Gibson 
(2009:475) 
“those forced from their homeland because of climate change” 
 
Though McNamara and Gibsons (2009:475)  definition seems like a simple definition, 
compared to others definitions in table 2, it set a lot of limitations on the use of the term. As 
far as I can see there are three core elements of this definition. First, it emphasize that the 
migration is forced, not voluntarily. Second, by stating that climate refugees are forced from 
their homelands, they limit the definition to only count for persons who move cross state 
borders. Third, it only applies to persons displaced because of climate change. They do not 
have a clear definition of what climate change is
14
; however, not having a definition of effects 
of climate change is not necessarily a bad thing, as I will show later in this section.   
Biermann and Boas (2010:62) argues that “lack of conceptual clarity and consensus is 
a key problem that hinders research on climate refugees”. They distinguish between the term 
“environmental refugee” and “climate refugee”, the former concept being a larger 
phenomenon. Their definition includes both sudden and gradual alteration in the natural 
environment of the persons migrating, and by not limiting the definition to cross-state 
migration it also includes both external displacement and IDPs, as shown in table 2. Further, 
Biermann and Boas (2010:62) have an explanation of what they mean by climate change 
included in the definition of climate refugee, which actually might limit the definition as 
shown below. An interesting part of this definition is where they write that climate refugees 
are people who have to leave their habitats “immediately or in the near future” (emphasize 
added) (Biermann and Boas, 2010:67). The other definitions I considers include persons who 
                                                          
14
 However, neither the concept of climate change or the definition of climate refugees is the main focus of the 
paper, nevertheless, they write that “[r]ising global surface temperatures are predicted to cause changes in the 
atmospheric circulation, create a more active hydrological cycle, and increase the water holding capacity 
throughout the atmosphere” (McNamara and Gibson, 2009:475). 
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have left their home, but not those who leave their home in the near feature. This definition 
could, in other words, include people who have not yet left their “habitats”.  
Docherty and Giannini (2009:376-372) writes that their definition of climate refugees 
tries to address the shortcomings of Biermann and Boas definition.
15
 They claim that 
Biermann and Boas definition is too wide, when including both displacement cross state 
borders and IDPs, and at the same time too restricted in their focus on climate change, as their 
definition does not take into account the possibility that advances in science could enable 
more accurate determination of which events are caused by climate change (Docherty and 
Giannini, 2009). Docherty and Gianninis (2009) definition, as shown in table 2, includes six 
elements that must be met for a refugee to be considered a victim of climate change: forced 
migration, temporary or permanent relocation, movement across national borders, disruption 
consistent with climate change, sudden or gradual environmental disruption, and a “more 
likely than not” standard for human contribution to the disruption” (Docherty and Giannini, 
2009:372). What is, and what is not, climate change is left open on purpose, so that no future 
climate changes will be excluded from the definition.  
Williams (2008) looks at how “climate refugees” can be recognized in international 
law, and favors regional agreements as a mechanism for protection. Williams (2008:520) 
emphasize that one of the key challenges in securing protection for those affected by climate 
change displacement lies with the definitional complexities of the term, taking into account 
previous attempts to define environmental refugees. Despite this, or maybe because of this, 
she does not present a clear definition of what she labels as climate change refugees, neither 
does she refer to any clear definition of environmental refugees. However, Williams 
(2008:517-518) adds to the problems surrounding attempts to create an international 
agreement on “climate change refugees” that the present legal terminology distinguishes 
between transborder (refugees) and internal displacement (IDPs), while most of the literature 
on climate change and environmental refugees make no differentiation between internal or 
external displacement. A system that recognize the idea of “climate change displacement” at 
an international level, while leaving the detail of agreement and degree of engagement (and 
hence the definition) to regional groupings, appears more responsive and appropriate to the 
problem, according to Williams (2008:520).  
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 They cite Biermann and Boas definition in working paper from 2007, but this definition is the same as in the 
paper by Biermann and Boas from 2010 referred to here.  
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While claiming that it is best if it is up to the regional groupings to agree upon a 
definition or understanding of the term, Williams (2008:522) have some ideas on how states 
could identify “climate change refugees”.  It might be, she argues, possible to propose one 
definitional approach that still allows a certain degree of flexibility. Williams (2008:522) 
illustrates a “sliding scale”, an climate change continuum, which can be used to recognize 
“climate change refugees” and the correlating levels of protection that is needed. In any case, 
a definition of “climate change refugees” should address both the displacement and the causes 
of displacement (Williams, 2008:523). 
I find that there are several who use the term without any clear definition, like 
Aminzadeh (2007) referred to in the section concerning “environmental refugees”.
16
 This 
might be because she sees it as a category of environmental refugee, which she defines, or it 
could be a mix-up between the concepts. Biermann and Boas (2010:62) writes that the notion 
of environmental refugees includes climate refugees, based on Myers and Kents (1995)  and 
Myers’ (2002) usage and definition of the term. They also claim that many studies leave the 
term undefined, or rely on broader concepts when trying to analyze “climate refugees”. They 
concludes that there does not exist a consensus definition of climate refugee. As shown above 
this seems to be a problem with the concept of environmental refugee as well, even though a 
lot of those writing about environmental refugee refers to either Myers and Kent (1995), El-
Hinnawi (1985) or Jacobsen (1988).  
4.3 Critique of the terms Climate Refugee and Environmental Refugee 
Not being judicial correct terms, the use of the term climate refugee and environmental 
refugee have gotten some critique.  
Bates (2002) point to some of the critique of the term environmental refugee, 
especially of El-Hinnawi’s (1985) definition. She writes that his definition makes no 
distinction between refugees who flee volcanic eruptions and those who gradually leave their 
homes as soil quality decline, which leads critics to question the usefulness of the term, since 
there would be a lot of people classified  as environmental refugees (Bates, 2002:466). As 
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the numbers of climate or environmental migrants are expected to rise in coming years due to climate change 
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affected countries”. Although no clear definition is presented, from what Roy writes about climate refugees we 
see that they are migrating because of climate change and sea-level rise, and that they leave their homeland to 





table 1 shows, Bates herself define “environmental refugee” as “people who migrate from 
their usual residence due to changes in their ambient non-human environment”, which in itself 
might be just as “open” as El-Hinnawis (1985) definition. Bates refers to three other key 
problems in the current
17
 literature on environmental refugees. First, studies of environmental 
refugees have focused mostly on Africa and Asia, and mostly ignoring other regions. Second, 
detailed case studies of conditions that actually produce environmental refugees are rare. 
Third, scholars inclined towards international law, security concerns, and broader questions of 
migration resist the term of “refugee”. Bates (2002:466) argues that these weaknesses all 
arise, at least partly, from the “uncritical acceptance of El-Hinnawi’s vague conceptualization 
of environmental refugees”.  
Bell (2004:137), who refers to El-Hinnawi’s (1985) definition of environmental 
refugees as a standard definition, reflects upon some of the critique of the term; that the term 
oversimplifies the causes of forced migration, that there are no evidence of very large 
numbers of people being displaced by environmental disruption, and that it is a strategic 
mistake to use the label/term “environmental refugees” because it might encourage receiving 
states to treat refugees  in the same way as “economic migrants” to reduce their responsibility 
to protect and assist. In Bell’s (2004:138) opinion, none of these criticisms provides adequate 
reason for not using the concept. First, he argues, the label “environmental” identifies a 
particular mechanism of displacement and broadens the category of “refugees”. It does not 
exclude closer scrutiny of the causes of “population-displacing environmental displacement” 
(Bell, 2004:138). Second, the evidence of the number of people being displaced by 
environmental disruption is contested, and if the number may increase in the future we should 
start consider our responsibility. Third, Bell (2004:138) argue that the claim that using the 
term “environmental refugees” should make it more likely that all refugees would be regarded 
as “economic migrants” is unlikely.  Bell have, however, gotten some critique for his use of 
the term. Biermann and Boas (2010:62) uses Bell’s (2004) paper as an example of  studies 
who rely on broader concept when trying to analyze what perhaps should be referred to as 
“climate refugees”. They write that Bell, “while focusing in his work ‘on one cause of 
environmental disruptions, namely, global climate change,’ seems to draw on the much 
broader UNEP concept of environmental refugees [El-Hinnawi’s (1985) definition] without 
further differentiation” (Biermann and Boas, 2010:62). 
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 Current is here referring to the 1990s.  
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Hartmann’s (2010:237-238) critique is also three folded, like Bates critique, but 
Hartmanns critique is coined at the concept of “climate refugees”. First, even though climate 
change is likely to cause displacement, the extent of this displacement will not only depend on 
how much the temperature rises and affects sea-levels and other events, but also on the 
existence and effectiveness of adaption measures that help individuals and communities cope 
with environmental stress (Hartmann, 2010:237). Whether or not such measures are in place 
depends on political economies at local, national and international levels, but this is often left 
out of the discussion of “climate refugees”, Hartmann (2010:237-8) claims. Secondly, 
migration is too complex to be labeled simply as environmental or climate-induced (as 
discussed in chapter 3). Third, the term “climate refugee”, like the term “environmental 
refugee”, could undermine the rights of “traditional refugees”. Hartmann (2010:238) explains 
that at the same time as it has become popular to apply the label refugee to any group of 
forced migrants, immigration enforcement agencies have fractioned the traditional refugee 
category by creating “a hierarchy of asylum seeker eligibility in order to restrict admission”. 
Kibreab (1997:21) writes that the concept of environmental refugee is increasingly 
used by states to justify restrictive refugee policy. He accuse academics for using the term 
uncritically, instead of questioning the conceptual and legal foundation of the term, and in so 
doing they unintentionally contributes to the hardening of attitudes and policies against 
involuntary migrants (Kibreab, 1997:21). Further, he claims that with few exceptions most of 
the available literature fails to “emphasize the multi-causality of displacement, which has led 
to confusion and, ultimately, the resort to poorly defined and legally meaningless terms, such 
as ‘environmental refugees’” (Kibreab, 1997:21). 
Further, McGregor (1994:128) claims that the conceptual problems arise from the 
problem of separating environmental causes from political and economic causes of flight. It is 
not analytically useful to separate “environmental” from “political”, “economic” or “ethnic” 
causes of migration. The decision to flee is much more complex than “a simple 
‘environmental’ push” (McGregor, 1994:128). Legal and institutional problems arise because 
refugees currently receive protection that goes beyond the assistance given to disaster victims 
(McGregor, 1994:128). While it is important to highlight environmental problems and the link 
with migration, in so far as the term “environmental refugee” merges the idea of disaster 
victims and refugees, it use brings with it the danger that key features of refugee protection 
could be undermined and the lowest common denominator adopted, according to McGregor 
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(1994:128). States might use the term in the same way as “economic migrant” to reduce their 
obligation to protect and assist.  
According to McGregor (1994:128), one of the consequences of reducing the 
complexity of “real situations” is that the concept of “environmental refugee”  can reinforce 
images of a “Malthusian squeeze”; “[b]ased on generally inaccurate conceptions of the 
relation between population change and environmental resource use, Malthusianism 
commonly underlies current literature on population and the environment in the Third 
World”. Such ideas can contribute to the paranoia of “fortress Europe”
18
, and hence restrictive 
asylum politics. Hartmann (2010:234), in the context of “climate refugees” and conflict, 
claims that for those familiar with the environmental security field, and particularly neo-
Malthusian models of environmental conflict developed in the 1980s and 1990s, climate 
refugee and conflict narratives “seem very much like old wine in a new bottle”.  She refers to 
what she calls degradation narratives;  
“Drawing on old colonial stereotypes of destructive Third World peasants and herders, 
degradation narratives go something like this: population-pressure induced poverty 
makes Third World peasants degrade their environments by over-farming or over-
grazing marginal lands. The ensuing soil depletion and desertification then lead them 
to migrate elsewhere as ‘environmental refugees’, either to other ecologically 
vulnerable rural areas where the vicious cycle is once again set in motion or to cities 
where they strain scarce resources and become a primary source of political 
instability” (Hartmann, 2010:234). 
Hartmann (2010:234) claims that the degradation narrative has proved particular popular in 
Western policy circles because it kills a number of birds with one stone: 
“it blames poverty on population pressure, and not, for example, on lack of land 
reform or off-farm employment opportunities; it blames peasants for land degradation, 
obscuring the role of commercial agriculture and extractive industries and it targets 
migration both as an environmental and security threat”.  
Hartmann (2010:234) writes that after the Cold War, growing interest in sustainable 
development and alternative visions of security increased the authority of the degradation 
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 See discussion in chapter 5.  
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narrative, in particular, concern began to mount about the dangers posed by so-called 
“environmental refugees”.  According to Hartmann (2010:234-235), the assumption that 
population pressure is one of the main precipitating causes of environmental degradation and 
resulting migration is central to the concept of “environmental refugees”. Spinning climate 
change as a security threat is likely to undermine, rather than strengthen, serious efforts to link 
climate change mitigation and adaption to development efforts that reduce poverty and 
promote equity (Hartmann, 2010:239). 
Further, McNamara and Gibson  (2009) show how ambassadors at the UN, from the 
Pacific islands, resist the category of climate refugees, fearing it will lead to a break with the 
continuing as sovereign state. This is a discussion I will go deeper into in chapter 5.  
4.4 Migrants – Environmental Migrants and Climate Migrants 
What becomes clear when looking at definitions of “environmental refugees” and “climate 
refugees” is that most of them include both internal and cross-border movement, which is a 
marked difference from the Refugee Conventions definition of a refugee, which only includes 
cross-border movement. This is one of two reasons to look at the terms “environmental 
migrant” and “climate migrant”, if the terms “environmental refugee” and “climate refugee” 
also include internal movement, then what distinguish them from “environmental migrants” 
or “climate migrants”? The second reason for taking these terms into the study is that not all 
scholars will use the term refugee to describe movement due to climate- or environmental 
changes, due to its non-judicial nature. There are some who prefer to use the term “migrant”, 
instead of “refugees” when referring to people displaced or migrating because of 
environmental or climate change (see for example Hugo, 1996).  What is worth noting is that 
while “environmental migrants” is a fairly often used concept there are few examples of usage 
of “climate migrants”. There is several discussing climate migration, but few instances where 
the term “climate migrant(s)” is used. As with the terms above, “environmental refugees” and 
“climate (change) refugees”, the term is often used without a concrete or clear definition. 
There are no “common and generally agreed upon” definition of environmental migrants, 
according to Siyoum (2011). Table 3 sums up the definitions of environmental migrants and 
climate migrants I have looked at. As with the definitions above, there is in most cases not a 




Table 3 - Definitions of “Environmental Migrant” and “Climate Migrant” 
Author Definition 
Suhrke (1993:13) “[those who] migrate before the situation becomes so desperate as to yield no 
choice. Using conventional terms, they would be environmental migrants”. 
Swain (1996:965-966) “are forced to move away from their homes as a result of the loss of their livelihood 
and/or living space because of environmental changes (natural as well as 
anthropogenic) and who are forced to migrate (temporarily or permanently) to the 
nearest possible place (within or outside the state boundary) in search of 
sustenance”. 
Hugo (1996:108) “migrants who are forced to flee their home areas by the onset of (or fear of) a 
natural calamity or disaster, would incorporate the first two categories of Olson's 
classification of external compulsions to migration listed above [physical danger 
(e.g., floods, volcanic eruptions, etc.) and economic insuffiency  (e.g., frought, 
famine)], and covers not only the migrations initiated by the sudden and violent 
onset of floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc., but also the "silent violence" 
(…) of drought, famine and the onset of severe food shortage associated with the 
gradual degradation of environments”. 
IOM/Naik (2009:253) “persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive 
changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are 
obliged to leave their habitual homes, or chose to do so, either temporarily or 
permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad”. 
Byravan and Rajan 
(2010:242) 
“the victims of SLR [sea-level rise] attributed to climate change” (…) “includes all 
those who are displaced because of the effects of climate change” 
 
 Byravan and Rajan (2010) reserve the term “climate migrants” for those displaced by 
sea level rise. In addition to climate migrants they also use the term “climate exile”. Both the 
terms describes “the victims of SLR [sea-level rise] attributed to climate change” (Byravan 
and Rajan, 2010:242). The difference is that climate migrants include everyone who have to 
move due to sea-level rise, while “climate exile” represents a special category of climate 
migrants “who will have lost their ability to remain well-functioning members of political 
societies in their countries” (Byravan and Rajan, 2010:242). A further difference is that while 
most climate migrants will be IDPs, or have the opportunity of returning to their countries or 
regions of origin if/when adequate adaptation measures are taken, climate exiles will be 
forced to become “permanently stateless in the absence of other remedies” (Byravan and 
Rajan 2010:243). Byravan and Rajan’s focus on sea-level rise makes the definitions 
somewhat different from the other definitions. For instance, in their definition of “climate 
refugees” Biermann and Boas (2010) list three impacts of climate change that could lead one 
to be characterized as an “climate refugee”, sea-level rise is one of them, while others, like 
Myers and Kent (1995), points to examples but no exhaustive list.  
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Another of the few examples I have found of the usage of “climate migrants” is by 
Roy (2010). Roy (2011:30) does not have a clear definition of environmental or climate 
migrants, or climate refugees which he also uses, but states that “[t]he international migration 
policies do not adequately support the protection of environmental or climate migrants”. From 
what Roy (2011:30) writes it seems that climate refugees are migrating because of climate 
change and sea-level rise, and that they leave their homeland to seek refuge elsewhere, and 
that environmental or climate migrants becomes climate refugees when they cross state 
borders.  This leaves Roy (2010) as one of the few who separate migrants and refugees based 
on whether they are internal or external.  
Suhrke (1993) differentiates between environmental refugees (see table 1) and 
environmental migrants (see table 3). Those who migrate before the situation becomes so 
desperate that they have no choice, Suhrke (1993:13) refer to as environmental migrants, as 
shown in table 3. Suhrke (1993:13) expects the number of environmental migrants to be much 
larger than the numbers of environmental refugees.    
Swain (1996:965) criticizes Suhrke for confusing environmental migrants with 
“economic migrants”, and to avoid this confusion he argue that it is important to draw a clear 
line between economic and environmental migrants.  Economic migrants are those who move 
to economically better off regions in search for themselves and their family, Swain 
(1996:966) stresses that economic migrants are voluntarily migrating, while there are an 
element of force in environmental migration. The element of force is also clear in Swain’s 
definition, as seen in table 3. 
Hugo (1996:108) writes that since the term environmental refugees, despite gaining 
wide usage, are not officially recognized by national governments or international agencies, 
the term environmental migrants is preferable (see table 3). Hugo (1996:108) further writes 
that refugees, as defined by the Refugee Convention, are distinguished from environmental 
migrants “by the fact that the overt force impelling migration is conflict or the threat of 
conflict (…) it has human rather than environmental origins”. He stress that this refers to the 
immediate cause which triggers the forced migration, not necessarily the deeper underlying 
long-term determinants, as many natural disasters have their roots in long-term political, 
social, economic or agricultural practices or policies (Hugo, 1996:109). In both types of 
forced migration, external pressure are essential in initiating migration, the migration would 
not have occurred without the sudden introduction of particular external forces.  
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Both Swain (1996) and Hugo (1996) emphasize that the migration is forced, thus to be 
defined as an environmental migrant by their definitions the migration should not be 
voluntarily. In Suhrke’s (1993) view, however, environmental refugees are forced, while 
environmental migrants migrate before the situation becomes so bad that they are forced to 
relocate. As we see, the same term is located at different spots at the “forced vs. voluntarily” 
continuum. Tyssing (2010:21) chose to use Bates’ (2002) definition in her paper (see table 1), 
but at the same time she chose not to use the term “refugee” since this is not a legal correct 
term. She uses instead the term “forced environmental migrants”
19
. The migrant term has, 
according to Tyssing (2010:15), an aspect of free will, but this aspect is not present to the 
same degree when people are “fleeing”  for environmental reasons. Tyssing (2010:15) is not 
satisfied with using the term migrant when referring to this group of people, but claims that 
the term nevertheless makes it clear that they are forced to flee because of environmental 
changes and at they are not to be confused with those who are characterized as refugees by the 
Refugee Convention.  
Siyoum (2011), who states that a universal definition of environmental migrants are 
missing because of a lack of consensus among researchers and academics, refers to the 
International Organization for Migrations (IOM) (see Naik, 2009:250) definition of 
environmental migrants (see table 3). This definition also includes an element of force, by 
stating that the migrants are “obliged” to leave their homes. In Siyoum’s (2011) context, 
environmental degradation in Ethiopia, he claims that environmentally induced migration 
took place in two forms; spontaneous migration and assisted migration. Spontaneous 
migration is in most cases temporary, in times of stress, people affected by drought and 
environmental degradation are inclined to migrate to places that offer employment 
opportunities, or to places where they have relatives (Siyoum, 2011:66). Assisted migration 
takes place in the form of resettlement programs (Siyoum, 2011:67).  
4.5 Some Thoughts on these Definitions 
What seems to be clear is that most of the definitions of “environmental refugee” and “climate 
refugees” do not take into account that the person referred to as a refugee must be displaced in 
another state than her/his homeland, if the term “refugee” is to be used in its conventional 
meaning. Some of the definitions of climate refugees do include this element (see McNamara 
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and Gibson, 2009, Docherty and Giannini, 2009), but none of the definitions of environmental 
refugees.   
However, it is not said that the term “refugee” cannot be applied to persons not fitting 
into the Refugee Convention. Article 1A states that “[f]or the purposes of the present 
Convention, the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who [definition]” (emphasize added) 
(UN General Assembly, 1951). With that said, persons who do not migrate beyond state 
borders, who are still in their own homelands, are the states responsibility. If the state cannot, 
or will not, offer protection for its citizens they can be protected as IDPs by the UNHCR, as 
discussed in chapter 3. 
While some have an exhaustive list of what constitute effects of climate change (see 
for example Biermann and Boas, 2010), others shows examples of effects of climate change 
but choose to not include this in the definition (see for example Docherty and Giannini, 2009). 
What all the definitions have in common is of course that “climate refugees”, “environmental 
refugees” and “environmental/climate migrants” describes people who move from one place 
to another due to environmental changes/disruptions, which might or might not include 
climate change. Further, a lot of the definitions include force as an element, which is an 
element I will look closer at in the next section.  
4.6 Conceptualization  
As discussed in chapter 3, one of the theories in the field of refugee studies is the typology of 
forced vs. voluntary migration (see Black, 2001:65). This typology is not included in the 
Refugee Convention’s definition of the term.  The IOM defines forced migration as:  
“the non-voluntary movement of a person in order to escape armed conflict, a situation 
of violence, violation of his or her rights, a natural disaster or a man-made disaster. 
This term applies to refugee movements and forced exchanges of populations between 
states” (Naik, 2009:252).  
This typology could also be useful when discussing environmental- and climate-related 
migration and displacement. Penz (2010:153) argues that what distinguishes refugees in 
general from the broader category of migrants is that they are forced to move. He further 
argues that this means that there can be “war refugees”, “famine refugees”, “development 
refugees” and possibly “poverty refugees”. Those who fit the definition of the Refugee 
Convention, Penz (2010:152) choose to refer to as “convention refugees”. In this context 
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“climate change refugee” is one category of forced migration among many categories. 
However, as Penz points to, it is crucial to clarify what it means to be forced to move.  
As the arguments of Speare (1974) and Amin (1974) shows, what should be regarded 
as forced is not necessarily clear. While Speare (1974) argues that in its strictest sense 
migration is only forced when a person is physically transported from a country and has no 
opportunity to escape, Amin (1974) argues that in some cases the reality is that there are no 
alternatives, although it might seem like there are.  In Penz (2010) view forced migration can 
take the form of compulsion, threat or harm. The first one, compulsion, can include evictions, 
compulsory evacuations and deportations (Penz, 2010:153). Penz links the second, threat, to 
“Convention refugees” who escape from certain dangers just as those who flee war, famine, 
disease and so on. And finally, people can be forced to move when deprived of necessities to 
such an extent that not moving would be unreasonable option. Penz illustrate threat and harm 
with an example; “If a family’s house and crop have been burned down by someone 
determined to grab the property, that may be sufficient to force the family to leave. No further 
threat may be needed” (Penz 2010:153).  Penz argument is hence closer to Amin’s than to 
Speare. When related to climate change, Penz (2010:153) argues that most of the impacts of 
climate change fall under actual harm sufficient to force people to move, and further, people 
might move in anticipation of such harm or the expectation of future recurrence of already 
experienced harm.  
Following the uncertainty of forced vs. voluntary exemplified by Speare and Amin, 
Hugo (1996, 2010) choose to use a continuum with the typology forced vs. voluntary 
movement when discussing environmental migration. Bates (2002) does the same when 
discussing “environmental refugees”, where, as discussed in chapter 3, people who have no 
control over their relocation represent the left-side of the continuum, designated as 
“involuntary”. In this end of the spectrum we find environmental refugees. In the middle, 
described as “compelled” we find environmental migrants, and at the right side migrants, 
characterized by “voluntary migration” (Bates, 2002:468). While voluntary movement is 
characterized by the decision to relocate by the person/family that relocates, forced or 
compelled migration is characterized by external forces (Bates 2002:467).  In this context, 
both “environmental migrants” and “environmental refugees” are characterized as being 
forced or compelled to relocate by external forces.  While not all of those who define 
environmental/climate (change) migrants/refugees choose to do this by referring to a 
continuum, there are several who use “forced” to categorize the migration. El-Hinnawi (1985) 
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(environmental refugee), Shurke (1993) (environmental refugee), Docherty and Giannini 
(2009) (climate refugee) and Swain (1996) (environmental migrant) are among those who 
emphasize that the migration is forced. 
 Renaud et al. (2007) refer to the International Association for the Study of Forced 
Migration’s (IASFM) explanation of forced migration as a “a general term that refers to the 
movements of refugees and internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well 
as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, 
famine, or development projects” (FMO, 2012). With this as a backdrop, Renaud et al. 
(2007:11-12) chose to define “forced environmental migrant” as “a person who ‘has’ to leave 
his/her place of normal residence because of an environmental stressor (…) as opposed to an 
environmentally motivated migrant who is a person who “may” decide to move because of an 
environmental stressor”. Renaud et al. (2007:14) see limitations in applying the definition of 
the Refugee convention to those displaced because of environmental changes, and especially 
the criteria of fear of persecution. Therefore, they chose to retain the usage of the term 
“refugee” in the context of their essay to characterize “people precipitously fleeing their place 
of residence because of an environmental stressor regardless of whether or not they cross an 
international border”. To sum this up, Renaud et al. (2007) distinguishes between 
“environmentally motivated migrants”, “environmentally forced migrants” and 
“environmental refugees”.  The first category, environmentally motivated migrants, are those 
who choose to leave a deteriorating environment (Renaud et al., 2007:29). Environmentally 
forced migrants have to leave in order to “avoid the worst”. While environmentally motivated 
migrants might move on a temporary or permanent basis, environmentally forced migrants 
often migrate on a permanent basis (Renaud et al., 2007:29-30). The difference between 
environmentally forced migrants and environmental refugees is that the latter have no choice 
about when to move. This is illustrated by events as floods and extensive droughts. 
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Figure 1 – Voluntary vs. Forced Movement, Terms Used by Other Authors 
 
 
Figure 1 sums up some of the uses of forced vs. voluntary discussed above. As can be 
seen the same term might refer to different degrees of voluntary or forced movement. In this 
figure I have not graded the terms after how much force the definitions includes, but rather 
put the terms at the continuum in response to whether or not the term includes force. 
Furthermore, it is only those who propose several terms or the usage of a continuum which 
are included in this figure.  Seeing that there are several who argue for the use of a continuum, 
and even more who argue for “evaluating” the migration based on whether it is forced or not, 
I will argue that this is useful.  
As the definitions in this chapter  shows, there are also some who base the terms they 
use on what people are migrating from. What all the definitions have in common is of course 
that they include people migrating/moving from environmental or climatic disruption. But 
there are those who specify what environmental or climatic disruptions the definition is based 
on.  Examples include Biermann and Boas (2010) who emphasize that “climate refugees” 
leave because of “sea-level rise, extreme weather events, drought or water scarcity”, and 
Myers and Kent`s (1995) who emphasize drought, desertification, soil erosion, water 
shortages and climate change, and natural disasters such as cyclones, storm surges and floods 
in their definition of “environmental refugee”. I will not, however, make an exhaustive list of 
environmental and climatic disruptions, following Docherty and Giannini`s (2009) argument 
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that advances in science could enable more accurate determinations of which events are 
caused by climate change.  
Nevertheless, I will argue that it is useful to distinguish between climatic causes and 
more general environmental causes for migration, following the discussion in chapter 3. An 
important question is whether the term “refugee” is useful or not.  Arguments against using 
“refugee” to describe people moving because of climate- or environmental changes includes 
the fact that it is not a judicial correct concept (see for example Hugo, 1996) and fear that it 
will do more damage than good (see for example  McGregor, 1994 and Kibreab, 1997). 
Further, one could argue that there are danger of “conceptual stretching”, following Satori’s 
(1970) argument that one should be careful about broadening the meaning of a term. In this 
specific case it would be unfortunate if the concept of “refugee” became too broad. Using the 
conventional meaning of the term it should by its nature describe people (limited in numbers) 
in dire need of protection. But I will argue that the terms “environmental refugee” and 
“climate refugee” imply that they are different from “conventional refugees”.    
Further, the term “refugee” is useful in describing people moving because of external 
pressure. Following Docherty and Giannini (2009), I will argue that if the term “refugee” is to 
be used, it should describe external movement, meaning movement across state borders. 
Additionally, following the discussion of forced vs. voluntary movement, climate- and 
environmental refugees should be characterized by forced external movement. Those forced 
to move, but who still stay in their home country are the responsibility of that state. If the state 
is not able to offer protection, they should be protected under the UNHCRs Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement, as discussed in chapter 3. As such, if it is necessary to 
make a distinction between IDPs displaced by climate or environmental disruptions and IDPs 
displaced because of other disruptions, they could be called “climate displaced” or 
“environmental displaced”. Whether or not this distinction is necessary is outside the scope of 
this study. However, taking into account that many of the alternatives for protection or help 
mechanisms presented in chapter 6 focus on both internal and external movement, and that it 
is estimated that the largest number of those who would have to move will still be located in 
their home country, this distinction might be necessary. Internal voluntary movement and 
external voluntary movement is coined as migration (following Bates, 2002, see figure 1). It is 
this migration that Barnett and Webber (2010) sees as adaptation to climate change, as 
discussed in chapter 3. Figure 2 sums up the terms.    
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Figure 2 – Movement due to Climate- or Environmental Change 
 
Following figure 2, a proposal of a definition of climate refugee could be “a person 
who is forced to leave her/his homeland, temporarily or permanent, due to slow or rapid 
effects of climate change”, and a definition of an environmental refugee: “a person forced to 
leave her/his homeland, temporarily or permanent, due to slow or rapid environmental 
changes”. In both definitions it should be added that the state/government has failed to offer 
the protection needed, and in such a way that people are forced to leave the country.   
Taking into account that using the term “refugee” might do more damage than good 
(See Kibreab, 1997, McGregor, 1994), and following Adcock and Colliers (2001) argument 
that one should not claim to much in defending the choice of concept, and what concepts 
really “means”, I acknowledge that it might not always be fruitful to use the  terms “climate 
refugee” and “environmental refugee”. However, “refugee” in this context emphasize that the 
movement is both forced and external, and that help/protection is needed. Moving the 
discussion towards help mechanisms in chapter 6, I will argue that it is useful to define 
concepts in accordance with the help mechanisms.  
At present there are few help mechanisms available for those displaced by climate or 
environmental changes, but there are several proposed alternatives. And as chapter 6 shows, 
those proposals includes concepts and definitions of people who moves because of climate 
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change. If one of these alternatives are adopted, then there must also be adopted a set of 
terms/concepts to declare who should be protected under that institution. This, however, is 
more likely to happen the other way around. Today we have the terms, but no clear definition 
and no clear helping mechanisms. Although there could be pitfalls in using the terms refugee, 
the greatest of them being that it is assumed that they already get the help needed, it sends a 
strong message that this situation is urgent and that it is a rights-situation.  
The definitions stated above would need an operationalization if they were to be used 
in accordance with helping mechanisms, for example a new convention. As Sartori (1970) 
argues, it is important that concepts are amenable to empirical testing, which of course would 
be necessary for a convention or protocol to be operating effectively. Because of this, I chose 
to use the terms the authors themselves uses when I present the proposed alternatives for help 
mechanisms in chapter 6. Most of the alternatives have their “own” terms and definitions of 
these terms, which includes different components. For example, Biermann and Boas (2010) 
propose a protocol to the UNFCCC and their definition of “climate refugees” includes both 
internal and external movement, while Docherty and Giannini (2009) who propose a new 
treaty or convention includes only external movement in their definition of “climate 
refugees”. Byravan and Rajan (2006, 2009, 2010), who propose a form of proportionate 
migration, use the terms “climate migrant” and “climate exiles”, both of which  demand that 
people move or are threatened by sea-level rise due to climate change. Therefore, it would be 
a mistake to use the term “climate refugee” or “environmental refugee” with my own 
definition of the terms when discussing these alternatives. The alternatives must be 
understood in the context they are meant.   
What this discussion first and foremost show is how complex these terms are. What 
one author calls “environmental migrant” might be called “environmental refugee” by another 
one. By using the term “refugee”, whether in its judicial form in the Refugee Convention or to 
describe people who have to move due to climate change, one sends a strong signal that the 
movement is done out of necessity. And hence, that protection is needed. On the other hand, 




Chapter 5 - Theory:  Migration, Human Rights and Sovereignty 
Seeing that there at present is no protection mechanism available for people who are forced to 
move due to climate change, i.e. “climate refugees”, I will argue that this could be seen as a 
human rights “gap”. Those forced to flee cross-border have no more rights than people who 
voluntarily cross state borders. Those internal displaced have the same right as every other 
citizens in that country, although there might be need for more protection and helping 
mechanisms for internal displaced as well, as many of the proposed alternatives in chapter 6 
point out.  
Further, cross-border movement can lead to sovereignty issues. Here I will focus on 
two approaches to sovereignty and migration, which could roughly be divided into the 
“receiving” states sovereignty and the “sending” states sovereignty. Borders establish the 
categories of citizen and alien, and are central to the theory and practice of sovereignty, which 
further is exemplified by the use of border patrols and passports. (Mills, 1998:95).  On the 
other hand, McNamara and Gibson (2009) and Barnett and Adger (2003) points at the 
sovereignty of low-lying atoll states, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, which are in danger of 
becoming “sending” states if the predictions of rising sea-level come true.  
I start this chapter by looking at human rights more general, the implications climate 
change have for human rights, and inter-generational rights which is a rights issue that 
sometimes arise when discussing climate change and rights. I then move on to discussing 
sovereignty. It is useful to see sovereignty in relation to human rights, and of course migration 
as discussed above. The last part of this chapter is concerned with the concepts of harm, 
responsibility, and sovereignty. 
5.1 Human Rights 
Freeman (2002:78) claims that political scientists neglected human rights between the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration in 1948 and the mid-1970s, with the exception of some 
descriptive studies. Freeman (2002:78) thinks that this negligence can be explained by two 
main influences on the discipline, realism and positivism. Realism because it taught that 
politics was overwhelmingly the pursuit of power, and that ethical considerations, such as 
human rights, played a marginal role (Freeman, 2002:78).  Positivism because it taught that 
social scientists should not include ethical judgments in their work, because ethical judgments 
were unscientific and subjective. This situation began to change in the 1970s, and especially 
during the period of the Carter presidency in the USA, as human rights were becoming part of 
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reality of international politics. Freeman (2002:4) points out that the human rights-field needs 
social scientists, and states that “we cannot understand the gap between human-rights ideals 
and the real world of human-rights violations by sympathy or legal analysis”.
20
 To understand 
this gap it requires investigations by various social sciences of the causes of social conflict 
and political oppression, and of the interaction between national and international politics. 
While the UN introduced the concept of human rights into international law and politics, the 
field of international politics is dominated by states and other powerful actors who have 
priorities other than human rights (Freeman, 2002:4). 
The idea of universal rights first became an important issue in international relations 
among states after the Second World War
21
 (DeLaet, 2006:5, Freeman, 2002:33). In 1948 the 
UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that identifies a 
wide range of political and economic fundamental human rights. Article 1 of the Declaration 
states that: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” 
(UN General Assembly, 1948). Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there have 
been a number of conventions. A quick glance shows that a number of conventions and 
international agreements are ratified by a large part of the world's countries (Globalis, 2012a). 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966a), 
which entered into force in 1976 has been ratified by 164 states, while the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966b) has been ratified by 
160 states. The Convention on the Status of Refugees is ratified by 144 states (Globalis, 
2012b).  As Morsink (1999:x) puts it: “At the end of the twentieth century there is not a single 
nation, culture or people that is not in one way or another enmeshed in human rights 
regimes”.  
According to Caney (2010:164) there are four main components of human rights. The 
first one is “Humanity”, which states that human rights refer to those rights that persons have 
by virtue of being humans. Human rights are understood as rights that persons have 
independently of any social convention
22
 or social practice, rights that persons have in virtue 
of their humanity, and not because of the nation or state into which they were born or any 
                                                          
20
 “The gap” is here referring to the gap between the “promises” or rights of the 1948 declaration, and 
conventions, and the real world of human-rights violations.  
21
 This is not to say that the idea of human rights first occurred in the 1940s, for a discussion on the history and 
philosophical origins and sources of human rights, see for example DeLaet (2006) and Freeman (2002).  
22
 However, as shown above, the human rights regime operates mainly through conventions.  
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action that they have performed. The second component is “Moral thresholds”, this means 
that human rights represent basic moral thresholds below which people should not fall 
(Caney, 2010:164). The third component is “Universal protection”, human rights represents 
the entitlements of each and every individual to certain minimal standards of treatment 
(Caney, 2010:165). Further, human rights generate obligations on all persons to respect these 
basic minimum standards. Here Caney (2010:165) refer to the Article 1 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which states, as shown above,  that: “[a]ll human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. The last component is “Lexical priority”, which 
means that human rights constrain the pursuit of other moral and political ideals, and if there 
are a clash between not violating human rights on the one side and promoting welfare on the 
other, not violating human rights should take priority (Caney, 2010:165).  
Human rights could be divided into different “categories”, one is the distinction 
between positive and negative rights. A positive human right is formulated as a “right to”, 
examples include the right to life, the right to food, and the right to education (see for example 
Caney, 2010:165, DeLaet, 2006:21). Negative rights, on the other hand, requires inaction on 
the part of the state, and hence is coined as “freedom from”.  “Freedom from” includes for 
example freedom from torture and freedom from discrimination.  Reality is, however, often 
more complicated than a simply distinguishing between these two categories.
23
 Further, there 
is a distinction between collective and individual rights. Collective rights often framed as 
“peoples” rights, while individual rights are framed as “persons” rights.  
Further, according to Mills (1998:40) there are certain human rights that have achieved 
the status of “jus cogenes”, meaning that they are principles or norms from which there can be 
no derogation. This includes prohibition against genocide, torture and slavery, Mills claims. 
No state can violate these principles, regardless of whether or not they have explicitly bound 
themselves by these principles (Mills, 1998:40). This might, however, seem more like a 
theoretical ideal than an empirical fact. Meron (1986:3) emphasize that the hierarchical 
terminology in international human rights is of a practical importance in resolving conflicts 
between norms. But, except for in a few cases (like the right to life or freedom from torture), 
                                                          
23
 The category of negative rights often is used to refer to civil and political rights, and the positive rights to 
economic and social rights.
 
When using “negative rights” about civil and political rights it is assumed that these 
rights simply require the state abstaining from acting in a manner that abuses rights, and, when using “positive 
rights” to describe economic and social rights it is believed that these rights require positive state action to 
achieve their fulfillment), this might be misleading (DeLaet, 2006:21-22). DeLaet (2006:21) emphasize that 
states might actually have to take concrete actions to fulfill basic civil and political rights. Although it is true that 
governments often need to take action to ensure that the basic economic and social rights are met, there are also 
times when inaction on the part of a government may better serve these ends, DeLaet (2006:22) argues.  
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to choose which rights are more important than other rights is rather difficult (Meron, 
1986:4). Which rights are more important are of course fraught with personal, cultural and 
political bias. Further, even well-established rights, such as the prohibition of systematic 
racial discrimination presents problems when regarded as “jus cogenes” (Meron, 1986:16). 
An example is the Apartheid regime in South Africa, which ended in 1994, years after Meron 
wrote this article.  
5.1.1 Human Rights and Climate Change  
In 2008 UNs Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on human rights and climate 
change. This resolution states that the Human Rights Council is “Concerned that climate 
change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities around the 
world and has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights” and further that the 
Human Rights Council “Recognizing that climate change is a global problem and that it 
requires a global solution” (italics in original) (Human Rights Council/OHCHR, 2008). In the 
Human Rights Council’s third resolution on human rights and climate change, how climate 
change can affect human rights is more elaborated; the  Human Rights Council  
“Emphasizing that climate change-related impacts have a range of implications, both 
direct and indirect, for the effective enjoyment of human rights, including, inter alia, 
the right to life, the right to adequate food, the right to the highest attainable standard 
of health, the right to adequate housing, the right to self-determination and the right to 
safe drinking water and sanitation, and recalling that in no case may a people be 
deprived of its own means of subsistence” (italics in original) (Human Rights 
Council/OHCHR, 2011). 
  Caney (2010:166) points to three key human rights that climate change jeopardizes. 
These are the right to life, the right to health, and the right to subsistence.
24
 Caney (2010:166) 
argues that all the rights are formulated in a modest way, to show that “one does not need to 
rely on more controversial or ambitious conceptions of human rights in order to see how 
climate change jeopardize human rights”. 
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 This list of rights is in no way exhausted, and Caney (2010:169) mentions as an example that one might argue 
that there is a human right not to be forcibly evicted, and that climate change violates this because people from 




The right to life is extracted from the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966a:Article 6.1), which states that “[e]very human being 
has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life”. Caney (2010:166) rephrase this to “Every person has a human right not 
to be ‘arbitrarily deprived of his life’”. This is framed as a negative right; it does not make the 
claim that persons have a positive right to have their life saved from all kinds of threats.  
Climate change is projected to result in an increased frequency of severe weather events, such 
as tornadoes, hurricanes, storm surges, and floods, as well as flooding and landslides, which 
can be devastating and lead to a direct loss of life (Caney, 2010:166-167). In virtue of this, 
Caney concludes that the current anthropogenic climate change violates the human right to 
life. 
The right to health can be found in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966b) and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UN General Assembly, 1989). In both, the right to health is framed as the right to 
attain the highest standard of health, Caney (2010:167) however, trying to keep to basic and 
modest rights, rephrase it as “[a]ll persons have a human right that other people do not act as 
to create serious threats to their life”. This does not require people to maximize the health of 
all, and it does not affirm a positive right to health, but rather a negative right that persons do 
not harm the health of others. Climate change is predicted to bring with it several health 
effects, like the increase of the number of people suffering from diseases and injury from heat 
waves, floods, storms and droughts, and increases of the number of people at risk of dengue 
and malaria (Caney, 2010:168). Caney therefore concludes that human-induced climate 
change clearly results in a variety of different threats to the human right to health.  
The third right in focus here, the right to subsistence, Caney (2010:168) frame as “[a]ll 
persons have a human right that other people do not act so as to deprive them of the means of 
subsistence”. This right is, as the others, portrayed as a negative right, and is more modest or 
basic than the corresponding rights in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Climate change will 
challenge this right in several ways: temperature increases will lead to drought and thereby 
undermine food security, sea-level rise will involve loss of land to the sea and thus hit 
agriculture badly, flooding will lead to crop failure, and extreme weather events will also 
destroy agriculture (Caney, 2010:168). 
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What is of special interest in the context of climate change and human rights is the 
argument Caney (2010:169) makes that if the impacts of climate change were entirely the 
result of natural phenomena and were not traceable to human causes then the preceding 
arguments would not succeed. This is important because the rights are framed in a way that 
means that humans have a right to not have other people deprive them their rights. Put in 
another way, the right to life says that persons have a human right that other people do not 
deprive them of their lives, and so if persons lose their life because of purely natural causes, 
then this right is intact (Caney, 2010:169). The threats to life, health, and subsistence as 
results of climate change, are seen by Caney (2010:169) as threats that are the products of the 
actions of other people. 
 McAdam and Saul (2010:9) argues that international human rights law is important to 
climate-induced displacement for three reasons. The first is that it sets out a minimum 
standard of treatment that states must provide to persons within their territory or jurisdiction, 
and it provides a means of determining which rights are endangered by climate change and 
which national authorities that have the primary responsibility for responding to the rights at 
risk (McAdam and Saul, 2010:9). Secondly, human rights law might provide a legal basis on 
which protection can be sought (and granted in another state). Thirdly, if relocation should 
occur, human rights law requires minimum standards of treatment in the host state, and is 
therefore relevant to the legal status afforded to those displaced (McAdam and Saul, 2010:9). 
McAdam and Saul (2010:9) emphasize that the effects of climate change potentially impinge 
upon the enjoyment of the full range of internationally protected human rights. Climate 
changes and disasters affect basic human rights such as the right to food and the right to 
water, rights that can be necessary components of the right to life (McAdam and Saul 
2010:10).   
In the extreme case of “disappearing” island states, rights of political participation, 
voting and political freedoms suffer if island states should disappear, as well as the ability of 
affected states to fulfill their obligations to provide for social, economic, and cultural rights, 
such as housing, health care and education (McAdam and Saul 2010:10). And further, in the 
case of “disappearing” of island states, and the resulting permanent displacement of their 
inhabitants, the fundamental right to self-determination is threatened; a breach of the link 





 McAdams and Saul (2010:9) writes that self-determination is difficult to 
realize unless "special regimes for people in exile" is adopted, which is unthinkable. An 
example of “special regimes for people in exile” could be if for example Tuvalu's people had 
formed an autonomous region within Australia's state borders if a majority of Tuvalu's 
population emigrated there after their government had "disappeared". There are several 
examples of governments in exile in history, however, as McAdam (2010a:116) points out this 
has traditionally operated on the assumption that it is a time-bound alternative which enables 
a government to operate outside its territory until it once again becomes possible for that 
government to reassert its control in its own territory. Functions that governments have 
performed while in exile includes treaty making, maintaining diplomatic relations, and 
conferring immunities, privileges and jurisdiction over nationals. Further, the government in 
exile idea is premised on there still being an identifiable population over which the 
government has jurisdiction (McAdam 2010a:117). However, in the context of the “sinking 
state” scenario of small island states the government would be in exile because the territory is 
not inhabitable anymore, and as such most of the population would probably already have left 
as well. In this scenario the population of the state has already moved to other sovereign 
states, and hence must follow the laws of the new state. The role of the home state becomes 
the same as the jurisdiction that any state can exercise with respect to its nationals abroad 
(mostly diplomatic protection). McAdam (2010a:117) predicts that over time, the function of 
the government will wane.   
Further, the issue of whether or not individuals would be covered by the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons in this kind of extreme context, is not clear. 
According to McAdam (2010a:119), existing international law lacks uniform practice in 
satisfactorily resolving the issue when a state ceases to exist. The  Convention Relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons (UN General Assembly, 1954)
26
 do not deal with the eventuality of 
literal, physical statelessness. Further, the precise point at which a state loses its legal identity 
as a state is unclear, according to McAdam (2010a:106). She refers to the Article 1 of the 
1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and duties of States to define, or formulate, 
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  Self-determination in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 1:  
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.  
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to 
any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, 
and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.  
26
 Article 1 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons define a stateless person as "a person 
who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law". 
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statehood (McAdam, 2010a:110). This formulation includes four elements: defined territory, a 
permanent population, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states. McAdam (2010a:110) writes that while all four criteria would seemingly have to 
be present for a state to come into existence, the lack of all four may not necessarily mean the 
end of a state. The reason for this is the established strong presumption of continuity of 
existing states. Since the establishment of the UN Charter in 1945 there have been very few 
cases of extinction of states and virtually none of involuntary extinction (McAdam, 
2010a:110-111). So called failed-states continue to be recognized as states, even when they in 
reality don't function as a state according to the Montevideo Convention. 
However, UNHCR's institutional mandate to prevent and reduce statelessness includes 
de facto statelessness as well (McAdam, 2010a:120). In the context of “sinking island states” 
the UNHCR has argued that even if the international community were to continue to 
acknowledge a state's on-going existence as a state, despite sign that it no longer met the full 
criteria of statehood, its population could be regarded as de facto stateless (McAdam 
2010a:120). The population in this scenario would be likely to find themselves in a situation 
that is similar  to a situation where the statehood have ceased,  according to UNHCR (2009)  
Another interesting question in the context of Pacific island states is if there would still 
be sea territory, even if the islands should actually sink. McAdam (2010a) does not directly 
reflect upon this, although the discussion implicitly gives a “no” to the above question. It is 
worth some consideration, discussion and explanation when discussing territory and 
population. Take Kiribati as an example. With one island and 32 atolls spread across three 
island groups its territory is rather small, especially considering that a large part of its 
population is located on the main atoll, Tarawa (Globalis, 2012c). However, Kiribati has a 
rather large sea territory, and what will happen to this territory if the atolls should sink into the 
sea?  Paskal (2007) point out that legally speaking a country’s ocean territory is determined by 
its land territory, as set out in the UNs Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). It would 
therefore be important for such states to find stronger “protector states” to defend them both 
diplomatically and militarily, Paskal (2007) argue. 
This discussion is of course highly related to the discussion of sovereignty later in this 
chapter. However, before moving on to this discussion I will have a quick glance on what is 
referred to as “inter-generational rights”, which is another aspect of climate change and 
human rights.  
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5.1.2 Inter-generational Rights 
When the IPCC in 1990 argued that a one meter sea-level rise by 2100 would “render some 
island states uninhabitable, and displace tens of millions of people” (Tegart et al., 1990:4), it 
touches questions of the rights of future humans. When discussing “climate refugees” there is 
almost always a generational dimension. Much of what is written about the topic refers to 
events likely to happen in the future, like “sinking” island states. This is not to say that 
climate change is not happening now, and that people are not relocating, migrating or being 




 (2009) estimates that 
20 million people were displaced due to sudden onset-climate-related disasters in 2008), but a 
lot of the information and articles is focusing on what is likely to happen in the future. And in 
this sense a lot of what is written, implicit if not explicitly, discuss intergenerational issues. 
Further, the international agreements on climate change, like the UNFCCC (1992), 
obligate states to take action to reduce greenhouse gases. Article 2 states the objective of the 
Convention as  
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level 
should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner” (UNFCCC, 
1992:Article 2).  
Although it does not set out a specific date for this, the goal is to “save the world” before it’s 
too late, and hence make it sustainable for future generations. 
According to Weiss (2008:618) climate change is likely to produce profound effects 
on the way we live, now and in the future. She  states that: “No longer can we ignore the fact 
that climate change is an intergenerational problem and that the well-being of future 
generations depends upon actions we take today” (Weiss, 2008:616). Climate change, partly 
induced by human activities, raises serious issues of justice between the present generation 
and future generations, and between communities within future generations (Weiss 
2008:619). The present generation, when using the planet's resources for its own, may pass on 
many of the cost to future generations in the form of climate change and the need to adapt to 
such change. Weiss (2008:620) argues that we, as the present generation, have certain 
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 The International Displacement Monitoring Centre. 
28
 The UNs Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
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obligations to future generations which must guide the strategies which we chose to address 
the issue of climate change. Unless this is recognized, we will benefit ourselves at the expense 
of the future generation. 
Today, the obligation towards future generations are to some extent recognized, as 
exemplified by the UNESCO Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations 
Towards Future Generations (1997). The obligations of the present living generation towards 
the future generations is one thing, rights for future generations another. Weiss (2008:619) for 
example claims that “[i]f we only have obligations to future generations, we may act from a 
sense of nobleness oblige toward them. If, on the other hand, future generations have rights, 
people living today must consider their interests, examined from their perspective, in the 
action we take today”. However, while Weiss (2008:619) argues that future generations 
should have rights, other claim that they should not. Feinberg (2009) argues that the only 
beings that can have rights are those that have interests, while Beckerman and Pasek (2001) 
argues that future generations may well have rights when they come into existence, but these 




Above I discussed how it is not clear whether or not small Pacific island states will be able to 
function as states should their territory “disappear”, which further leads to sovereignty issues. 
As I discussed initially in this chapter this is one of the sovereignty issues related to climate 
change and population movement. To look closer into this I choose to start with an 
clarification of what sovereignty is.   
Sovereignty can be defined as the exclusive right states have to decide over their own 
citizens and be free from external interference (DeLaet, 2006:3). The classic explanation is, 
according to Montgomery (2002:5) that sovereignty allows the state to get “the last word”. 
Sikkink (1993:413) writes that “[t]raditionally, (...) State Sovereignty has meant that the state 
‘is subject to no other state, and has full and exclusive powers within its jurisdiction’”. 
Krasner (1993:142) defines sovereignty as a system of political order based on territorial 
control. He argues that the defining principle of the sovereign state system is that external 
actors do not have authoritarian power in the given territory. In his book “Sovereignty: 
Organized Hypocrisy”, Krasner (1999) look at four different ways in which the term 
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sovereignty have been used; international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, 
domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty. International legal sovereignty is 
concerned with establishing the status of a political entity in the international system. The 
basic “rule” for this type of sovereignty is that recognition is extended to territorial entities, 
states, that have formal juridical independence (Krasner, 1999:4,19). The rule for Westphalian 
sovereignty is the exclusion of external actors from the territory of a state. In this context the 
sovereignty is violated when external actors influence or determine domestic authority 
structures (Krasner, 1999:20). Domestic sovereignty involves both authority and control, both 
the organization and effectiveness of political authority (Krasner, 1999:4). Interdependence 
sovereignty is concerned with control, more specific with the capacity of a state to regulate 
movement across borders. In this context the inability to regulate the flows of goods, persons, 
ideas, diseases and pollutants across territorial borders has been described as a loss of 
sovereignty (Krasner, 1999:12). These various kinds of sovereignty does not necessarily 
covary, a state can have one but not the other, according to Krasner (1999:4). Further, the 
exercise of one kind of sovereignty can undermine another kind of sovereignty.  
According to Mills (1998:11) there are two aspects of state sovereignty, the external 
and internal. Internally, states have the supreme authority or control within their own borders. 
The link between the internal and the external aspect of state sovereignty is the principle of 
non-intervention (Mills, 1998:12). At the end of World War II and the founding of the United 
Nations the non-intervention principle became an international norm according to Mills 
(1998). Externally, states have the right to engage in the international community, through 
trade, taking part in diplomatic conferences and similar activities. In theory, every state is 
considered equal in relation to all other states. However,  Mills (1998:12) argues that this is a 
misleading assumption, since many states, including “mini-states” like Samoa and Monaco, 
don’t have the same opportunities as bigger states, like the USA or France, to participate in 
international activities.  
Krasner (1993:142) claims that sovereignty, in addition to the non-intervention 
principle, consists of the norm of self-help. Self-help means that every sovereign state has the 
right to pursue an independent foreign policy in whichever way that gains the state.   
Without going to deep into the different kinds of sovereignty, it seems clear from this 
that the traditional concept of sovereignty have an external and internal dimension (see for 
example Sikkink, 1993, Krasner, 1993, Mills, 1998, DeLaet, 2006). There are those who 
claim, however, that this sovereignty is challenged by a new understanding of sovereignty. 
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Whilst some argue that human rights are in fact challenging traditional sovereignty (see Mills, 
1998), and as a result we see a new sovereignty emerging, other argues that it is time that we 
let human rights, and people in general, form a new sovereignty (see Sikkink, 1993). Because 
of this, I will argue that when looking at human rights and sovereignty it is fruitful to also 
look at them in relation to each other, which I will do in the next section.  
5.2.1 Human Rights and Sovereignty – A New Sovereignty? 
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Mills (1998:12) argues that the principle of non-intervention erode because of the increasing 
focus on human rights. The most fundamental issue regarding sovereignty is that of the 
relation of individuals to sovereign entities and their rights contained in this relationship 
(Mills, 1998:36). Further, why people have rights beyond what the state grants them could be 
investigated from two different perspectives, according to Mills (1998:36-37). A constructive 
reading of human rights tells us that the rights can be derived from the social purpose of the 
institutions against which they are arrayed, namely the state (Mills, 1998:39). Theoretically, 
in this view, states exists for the well-being of their inhabitants, the primary function of states 
is that of their protection (Mills, 1998:36). On the other hand, a positive approach tells us 
what rights people have as a result of state practice rather than state purpose. Mills (1998:39) 
writes that a positive approach is useful as a complement to a constructive approach in two 
ways, the first reason being that most people, and especially state elites, that look at the issue 
of human rights do not employ a constructivist analysis. Rather, they tend to look at what 
conventions have been signed, what declarations have been agreed to, and what treaties are in 
force when looking at the application of human rights law. Secondly, turning to these various 
sources of human rights law allow us to get a better sense of how human rights might be 
enumerated and how they might be carried out in practice (Mills, 1998:39). 
If states can be bound by international agreements, part of their sovereignty has been 
eroded, according to Mills (1998:40), who points to Article 21(3) in the The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (UN General Assembly, 1948) which states that “[t]he 
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government”.  As Reisman (1990:869) 
puts it “International law still protects sovereignty, but – not surprisingly- it is the people’s 
sovereignty rather than the sovereign’s sovereignty”. International law is still concerned with 
the protection of sovereignty, but in its modern sense the object of protection is not the power 
base of a tyrant, but rather the continuing capacity of a population freely to express and effect 
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choices about the identities and policies of its government (Reisman, 1990:872). In this 
context the Chinese Government’s massacre in Tiananmen Square to maintain the political 
order against the wishes of the people was a violation of Chinese Sovereignty, and the 
Ceausescu dictatorship was a violation of Romanian sovereignty. The concept of “Popular 
sovereignty” goes as far back as the French Revolution, according to Benhabib (2007:21). 
Popular sovereignty  reflects the idea that people are both subjects and objects of the law, they 
are makers as well as obeyers (Benhabib, 2007:21). The state must be responsible to the 
people (Mills, 1998:42). 
In this view the people, not the governments, are sovereign. According to Mills 
(1998:40-41), this statement is problematic, but helps us to understand that individuals are 
subjects of international law in a way they were not when sovereignty was first conceived, 
and that states have lost some of their standing. The dividing line between international law 
and the domestic is becoming increasingly blurred, and as this line erodes the principle of 
non-intervention which has been the link between the internal and external dimension of 
sovereignty correspondingly weakens (Mills, 1998:41). The international community which 
recognizes human rights has a right to violate the principle of non-intervention. 
Mills is not alone in emphasizing a new understanding of sovereignty. Sikkink 
(1993:415) writes that human rights are not an alternative to sovereignty, but that they 
contribute to a future model in which the understanding of sovereignty has changed in relation 
to specific matters that are deemed important enough that the international community limits 
the scope of the “sovereign authority”. Furthermore, she writes that the change of sovereignty 
also occurs in other areas, such as the environment, emergency relief and protection of 
minorities. In that sense, human rights is more than just an exception to the rule of 
sovereignty, they are part of the international issues that make a modified (or altered) 
understanding of sovereignty becoming more accepted and practiced (Sikkink, 1993:415). 
 DeLaet (2006), on the other hand, looking at the status quo, claim that sovereignty 
always trumps human rights. State sovereignty is an obstacle to human rights, precisely for 
the reason that universal human rights represents an attempt to develop rights that go across 
the state borders (DeLaet, 2006:3). Sovereign states can violate human rights with the 
argument that it is necessary to ensure state sovereignty, which often happens, according to 
DeLaet (2006:62). This is also evident in the declarations and conventions. Article 29 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that human rights can be restricted, 
among other things, to preserve the security of a democracy. 
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 Keith (1999) has studied whether the ratification of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights actually leads to a difference in states' protection of human rights. 
To determine this, she looks at 178 countries over a period of 18 years. Her conclusion is that 
it is probably too optimistic to expect that being a full member of an international convention 
would lead to observable improvements (Keith, 1999:112). One of the reasons she points out 
is that the implementation mechanisms of the Conventions are too weak and is based on the 
expectation that the states themselves should follow up on human rights. Thus, states that are 
aware of these shortcomings conclude that there is little risk of their sovereignty if they ratify 
a convention (Keith, 1999:112). On the other hand, Hathaway (2007:612-613) finds that states 
with robust domestic politics may be reluctant to ratify the conventions simply because these 
conventions can make a difference. She claims to find clear evidence that states with strong 
domestic institutions and a poor will to preserve human rights are less willing to ratify 
conventions than states with weaker institutions with the same level of human rights 
(Hathaway, 2007:613). 
According to Krasner (1999:125) some human right conventions are inconsistent with 
what he refer to as Westphalian Sovereignty. Further, coercive practice, for example 
economic sanctions to promote human rights, violates International Legal Sovereignty. 
Human rights are, however, only one more incarnation of a long standing concern in the 
international system, which is consistent with Sikkink’s (1993) arguments above. In this view 
human rights is understood more generally as a problem linked to the relations between rulers 
and ruled. Other examples that could be placed in the same “category” as human rights 
includes issues of religious toleration which were prominent in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries and minority rights in the nineteenth and early seventeenth century (Krasner, 
1999:125). Human rights accords in the late twentieth century have been conventions, and 
compliance and enforcement mechanisms have tended to be weak (Krasner, 1999:126). 
Westphalian Sovereignty has never been an absolute practice, and in Western Europe most 
rulers have never enjoyed full autonomy with regards to the treatment of their own subjects. 
In this way, the issue of human rights is only the latest example of a “long-standing tension 
between autonomy and international attempts to regulate relations between rulers and ruled” 
(Krasner, 1999:126).   
Sovereignty’s standing in the relation between states and in the relation between states 
and the citizens of the state is a rather well discussed topic. Despite claims that it is time to 
redefine the traditional concept of sovereignty we still see that it is a norm in international 
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relations. One example, related to migration, is the fact that UNHCR cannot help IDPs unless 
the state in question agrees to this. On the other hand, we see that human rights can actually 
make a difference in some aspects of states sovereignty (see for example Hathaway, 2007).  
Whether human rights has changed the traditional notion of sovereignty, or the time is right to 
change the meaning of the term so that it fits into the human rights regime is unclear. 
However, it seems that while human rights might influence sovereignty, sovereignty can still 
limit the exercise of human rights.  I will now move on to discuss how sovereignty relates to 
migrants and refugees.  
5.2.2 Sovereignty and Migration 
NcNamara and Gibson (2009) interviews with Pacific island UN-ambassadors shows that they  
fear for their states sovereignty if there in the future will be a policy discourse that legitimize 
displacement of people because of climate change.  IPCC notes that the actual sea-level rise 
poses a threat to the low-lying Island atolls states of Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tokelau and the 
Marshall Islands (Adger et al., 2007:736). Barnett and Adger (2003) argues that both the 
sovereignty of low-lying atoll states and the human rights of the people living there are at risk. 
Barnett and Adger (2003:327) not only argues that climate change poses a sovereignty 
problem for low-lying atoll states, but that the reason for this is that climate change put 
sovereignty at risk because of the way it might impact on human welfare and human rights. 
Small atoll states have a high degree of ethnic homogeneity combined with a high population 
density, which further means that there is little political distance between the people and the 
“nation-state” (Barnett and Adger, 2003:327).  
Bhabha (1996:3) argues that refugees crystalize the conflict between the belief in 
universal human rights and the sovereignty of nation sates.  Judgments dismissing an asylum 
application can in some cases adopt a language of cultural relativism or respect for the state 
sovereignty as a tool for limiting refugee admission numbers (Bhabha, 1996:11).  
On the other side is the hosting or receiving state’s sovereignty. The sovereignty issues 
surrounding hosting states are far more discussed than that of the “sending state”. Borders 
establish the categories of citizen and alien, and are central to the theory and practice of 
sovereignty (Mills, 1998:95). This is exemplified by the use of border patrols and passports. 
Benhabib (2007:20) claims that the condition of refugees and asylum seekers has not 
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benefitted from the spread of “cosmopolitan norms”.
31
  While their numbers are increasing 
worldwide, most liberal democracies after September 11, 2001, and even before then, has 
shifted toward criminalizing the refugee and asylum seeker  either as lying to gain access to 
economic advantages or as a potential security threat, according to Benhabib (2007:20). When 
looking at Mills, writing in 1998, we see that this seem to have started before 2001. Mills 
(1998:95) argue that we define individuals in terms of citizenship instead of humanity, and 
that this allows us to discard human rights in favour of citizen rights. Although sovereignty is 
perceived to give states the right and the ability to maintain exclusive sovereign control over 
their borders, the reality is different. Mills (1998:95) claims that a closer look at empirical 
realities, as well as commitment to human rights and a recognition that states are not natural, 
absolute entities and thus that borders do not circumscribe the only possibility for community 
and protection of rights, will provide a view of borders which are not as impermeable as the 
traditional concept of sovereignty would suggest. What seems most threatening to states and 
people within state borders is the flow of people (Mills, 1998:96). There is a growing 
consensus in the community of states to lift border controls for the flow of capital, 
information, and services, but when it comes to immigrants and refugees states asserts their 
sovereign right to control its border (Sassen, 1996:9,15). But even as states are increasing 
their efforts to control their borders, they are losing ground (Mills, 1998:96).  
The emergence of a kind of “Fortress Europe” as a way of keeping out unwanted 
asylum seekers and others from the EU, and other changes in Western “border-politics”, has 
served to undermine two basic and interrelated principles of international refugee law: non-
refoulment and asylum, according to Mills (1998:103-105). Further,  Mills (1998:106) claim 
that the very fact that states feel they must take such actions demonstrate how important 
borders are for the practice of sovereignty and how much borders are not what they once 
were. Freedom of movement, as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 
General Assembly, 1948:Article 13 and 14) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966a:Article 12), ends at the border, at least for 
many Western states. In the face of these efforts to minimize international refugee protection, 
UNHCR has been accused of helping states maintain sovereign control of their border (Mills, 
1998:108-109). At the same time, Mills (1998:122) argue that the movement of people calls 
into question the concept of sovereignty as anywhere near an absolute principle, if states 
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cannot control who enters and stays then it would seem that one of the building blocks of 
traditional conceptions of sovereignty is called into question. Further, actions by international 
actors, such as UNHCR, have resulted in incursion on state sovereignty and increasing 
recognition by those organizations that borders should not be the barrier that they have been. 
If states did possess absolute sovereignty, then they could decide who can and cannot become 
members, expel members, and prevent them from leaving (Mills, 1998:123). 
In the view above, controlling state borders and who enters the territory is a central 
principle of sovereignty. Dauvergne (2004) claims, on the other hand, that worldwide 
regulation of migration is a relative new invention. Dauvergne (2004) argues that migration 
law, which refers to the domestic law or laws which regulate the entry and stay of foreigners 
in a state, is transformed into the new last bastion of sovereignty. As globalizing forces 
challenge and transform sovereignty, the place of migration law in the nation are altered 
(Dauvergne, 2004:588). According to Dauvergne (2004:588), this challenge leads prosperous 
and powerful nations
32
 to imprint even more strongly than before a sense of “self”, a sense of 
identity and of essential “nation-ness”, onto the text of their migration laws.  
 Dauvergne (2004:589) show how worldwide regulation of migration was an invention 
of the twentieth century. This means that nation states and the system of international law and 
sovereignty managed for three centuries without comprehensive migration regulations 
(Dauvergne, 2004:589). According to Dauvergne (2004:593), there is a discernible trend in 
which people are more important to sovereignty than they were in the past. Further, this 
enhanced role for control over people in accounts of sovereignty contributes to an explanation 
of contemporary migration laws. Dauvergne (2004) looks at how three contemporary 
migration law phenomena, refugee flows, illegal immigration, and the “international pursuit 
of the best and brightest migrants”, challenges sovereignty.  
All in all, Dauvergne (2004) concludes that the Refugee Convention impinges very 
little on essential sovereignty. There are four reasons for this, the first one being that when a 
nation commits itself to the Convention it does so as a sovereign act (Dauvergne, 2004:597). 
The state, or nation to use Dauvergne’s term, chooses voluntarily to respect the Conventions 
provisions, including the implication that some refugees will have permission to remain. The 
second reason is that nations make legal, public and political efforts to limit the number of 
people who will be protected under the Refugee Convention (Dauvergne, 2004:597). Third, 
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the non-refoulment provision, the only one which affects the nations sovereign capacity to 
admit or expel anyone except nationals, constrains the nations with the most sovereignty the 
least. Of potential candidates for refugee status currently in the world, a comparatively small 
number are in prosperous Western states, and Dauvergne (2004:597) argues that it is 
primarily in relation to these nations that refugee status is regarded as a somehow unfair 
advantage, akin to immigration status. It is for these Western nations that the formally equal 
notion of national sovereignty is most powerfully deployed in a globalized world. The last 
reason is that prosperous nations, like Canada and Australia, have begun backing away from 
some of the Conventions provisions without consequences. This leads Dauvergne (2004) to 
the question of what accounts for the role that refugee matters play in the growing “moral 
panic” about migration. Dauvergne (2004:598) finds that the answer got two parts. The first is 
that in the absence of any other constraint in the migration realm, potential protection against 
refoulement stands as a beacon to “desperate” individuals around the world who might seek to 
better their life chances. The second is that precisely because sovereignty is increasingly 
focused on control over population movements, the movement of refugees is much closer to 
the core of nations understandings of their own essence and power than before (Dauvergne, 
2004:598).  
Dauvergne (2004) findings related to the Refugee Convention is in contrast to the 
arguments of Bhabha (1996:3), who writes that “[r]efugees crystalize the conflict between 
two founding principles of modern society: the belief in universal human rights which inhere 
all individuals by virtue of their common human dignity, and the sovereignty of nation 
states”. Bhabha (1996) focuses, however, on another aspect of sovereignty than Dauvergne 
(2004) does. Bhabha (1996) shows how important the origin states sovereignty have been in 
asylum application cases. All decisions about the relationship between personal identity and 
national/ethnic origin confront asylum adjudicators with the central paradox of refugee 
protection: it undermines the ideal of sovereign nation states (by providing non-national 
protection) while at the same time reinforcing the division of the globe into nation states as a 
whole (by insisting on the necessity of state protection) (Bhabha, 1996:10). Further, Bhabha 
(1996:11) points out that the decisions upholding an asylum applicant’s claim of persecution 
may contain culturally arrogant, and even racist, descriptions of the state of origins policies, 
but on the other hand, judgments that dismiss the asylum application may adopt the language 
of cultural sensitivity or respect for the state sovereignty as a device for limiting refugee 
admission numbers. An example is a case from Canadian Refugee Appeals Board, where a 
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woman and her daughter applied for refugee status on the ground that if the woman returned 
to China she would be forcibly sterilized, seeing that she had two children.  The Board denied 
the application, with the argument that  
“(…) It [forced sterilization] is not a policy born out of caprice, but out of economic 
logic (…) The possibility of coercion in the implementation of the policy is not 
sufficient (…) to make it one of persecution. I do not feel it is my purpose to tell the 
Chinese government how to run its economic affairs” (Bhabha, 1996:22).  
By reasoning that a sovereign state can legitimately resort to such measures as compulsory 
sterilization the board defined its responsibilities to individual asylum applicants variable 
standard, determined by the individual’s nationality, according to Bhabha (1996:22). In this 
case, the individual woman’s body was considered legitimate site of state control in China, 
although such control would be considered unlawful in Canada. And, hence, Chinese 
sovereignty was more important in this case than the rights of the individual.
33
  
If we go back to Dauvergne’s (2004:598) discussion, illegal immigration is, in contrast 
to refugees/the Refugee Convention, “an affront to sovereignty because it is evidence that a 
nation is not in control of its borders”. Although it is difficult to be certain that illegal 
migration is on the increase, as a response to perceived or real growth of illegal migration, 
and to the increase in smuggling and trafficking that is intertwined with it, the nations of the 
prosperous worlds are cracking down , according to Dauvergne (2004). Nations assert their 
“nationness” by cracking down on illegal migration.
34
 Legal crackdowns needs to be 
understood in the context of the threats globalization presents to nation states (Dauvergne, 
2004:600). With decreasing capacity in economic policy and trade realms, in military matters 
and corporate management, cracking down on illegal migration represents a strong assertion 
of sovereign control. Further, not only does  refugees and illegal migrants occupy much of the 
same space in our collective imagination, but the Refugee Convention provides no right to 
enter for those who seek to claim refugee status, which means that some people seeking this 
status enter illegally (Dauvergne, 2004:601). Thus the current crack down on illegal migration 
cracks down on refugees as well.  
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story than “state”, because this “nationness” attunes to both power and identity.    
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When it comes to “The Best and the Brightest”, Dauvergne (2004:604) claims that the 
challenge that the recruitment of skilled migrants poses to sovereignty is “the structure of the 
internationalised economy to which they are recruited and the impermanence with which they 
remain”. While this kind of immigration is good politics in receiving states, it’s a direct cause 
of brain drain in less prosperous nations (Dauvergne, 2004:603). Seeing that this kind of 
migrants were recruited based on their economic value, it is likely that they find themselves 
admissible to others as well. Further, this makes it harder for those in a marginal situation. 
Through much of the twentieth century migration mirrored economic goals, this economic 
migration is not possible any longer since it is now looked upon as “mere economic migrants” 
or “bogus refugees” (Dauvergne, 2004:604).  
McNamara and Gibson  (2009) show how ambassadors at the UN, from Pacific island 
states, resist the category of climate refugees. In this setting climate refugees are explained as 
“those forced from their homelands because of climate change” (McNamara and Gibson, 
2009:475). McNamara and Gibson (2009:480) writes that the ambassadors they interviewed 
avoided to look at migration as a solution to rising sea level, because this would have sent the 
message that they had effectively given up on mitigation measures to avert future impacts of 
climate change. The ambassadors seemed to think that talk of climate refugees is geopolitical 
damaging to Pacific states. The vision for the future legitimizing the category of climate 
refugees is based on Pacific islands (as weaker, marginal nations) having to adapt in the most 
extreme way to problems created by large, polluting nations (rather than those polluting 
nations curbing their own emission as “the solution”), according to McNamara and Gibson 
(2009:481). In contrast, Pacific nation ambassadors envision a future as self-determining 
nation-states, and thus, strongly resist media/policy discourses that legitimize their possible 
future displacement en masse. In other words, it’s not only a question of climate change 
mitigation, but also a question of sovereignty.  
5.2.3 Harm, Responsibility and Sovereignty 
Penz (2010), in the context of responsibilities to “climate change refugees”, find the focus on 
the obligation not to harm, and further, when harm is done, the remedial obligation to provide 
compensation, the most useful focus in the context. With respect to climate change, the 
“harm” is the damaging consequence of climate change, and where harm is not avoided, 
compensation is required (Penz, 2010:162). Could the harm responsibility be applied 
internationally? Sovereignty could be one problem, but according to Penz (2010:162-163) the 
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principle of state sovereignty was designed to make harm across borders unacceptable. And 
even though war has certainly not disappeared  as a threat to humanity, climate change has 
come to match it as a “major worldwide threat” (Penz, 2010:163). The reason for climate 
change “matching” war as a worldwide threat, claims Penz, is not only because of the broad 
range of impacts, and the possibility of severe impacts, but also the danger of climate-induced 
environmental conflicts leading to war.  To the extent that sovereignty remains a useful 
protective norm, protection against harm to countries through alteration of the global 
commons is required for the self-determination and self-government of countries, according 
to Penz (2010:163). Penz therefore claims that the right to non-interference, the external 
aspect of sovereignty, now needs to cover human-caused invasion by destructive 
environmental processes. In this scenario, climate change constitute a violation of an 
environmentally redefined conception of sovereignty (Penz, 2010:163).  
Restitution to harm simply requires living conditions equivalent to those before the 
damaging climate change events, but whether this is best accomplished by international 
migration or not is a separate question, according to Penz (2010:164). He adds that only when 
adaptation in the affected place is impossible or exorbitantly expensive is migration a 
preferable adaptation option.  
In tort law, harm does not have to be intended for it to be considered tortious and thus 
requiring compensation (Penz, 2010:164-165). And since climate change can be considered as 
a “colossal, planetary accident”, it fits well into the tort law framework, according to Penz 
(2010:165). One question is whether it is the negligence or whether it is clear causation that 
makes the harming party responsible. When looking at whether those who have caused and 
continue to cause climate change acts negligent, a distinction has to be made between those 
who caused climate change in the past (before the greenhouse effect and the human 
contributions to its intensification were known), and the more recent past, present and future, 
following its recognition (Penz, 2010:165). Earlier contributors cannot be deemed to negligent 
because of the lack of knowledge of the consequences. However, it is not clear at which point 
it should be treated as negligent. This and other shortcomings can be used as arguments 
against applying the negligence criterion.  
Penz (2010:165) claims that even if damaging behavior should not be deemed 
negligent it has typically benefited the party with causal responsibility, which is a strong 
argument for using the application of strict liability. Benefiting from greenhouse-gas-emitting 
activities applies to all countries, but not equally. Some states have been and continue to be 
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net beneficiaries of this process and there will be net losers. Stemming from this argument, 
Penz (2010:166) presents the “benefit criterion” of responsibility and liability as an alternative 
to the application of the mere causal criterion of strict liability. In this scenario a greenhouse 
gas emitter is liable if the emitter benefits.  
However, both the causal criterion and the benefit criterion runs into certain 
difficulties if they were to be applied strictly (Penz, 2010:166). Determining what benefits 
were/are derived from atmosphere-damaging activities would be challenging, and to 
distinguish what proportion of economic growth is due to production and consumption 
unrestrained by controls on greenhouse gas emission requires comparing an actual growth 
with a hypothetical one (Penz, 2010:166). The causal criterion runs into problems when it 
comes to assess the magnitudes of aggregative impact, there are differences between regions 
and countries, and what can be wholly attributed to greenhouse gas emission.  Further, it 
would be hard for the poorest and most marginalized states to pursue compensation for 
climate change damage on a case-by-case basis if the model of tort law were to be made 
applicable in international law (Penz, 2010:167). This could be seen as an alternative similar 
to those presented in the next chapter; however, it is included here to give a discussion of the 
concepts of harm and responsibility. Harm is used as an argument for the alternative presented 
by Conisbee and Simms (2003) and Byravan and Rajan (2010). Penz, still focusing on harm, 
propose a somewhat different approach, a global climate change insurance scheme, as a 
solution, which I will get back to in the next chapter. 
 In this chapter I have looked at human rights and sovereignty in relation to population 
movement. In the next chapter I will look closer at some proposed alternatives for 
helping/protection mechanisms for “climate refugees”, by using this discussion of human 







Chapter 6 - Alternatives for Protection Mechanisms 
In this chapter I will discuss some of the proposed alternatives for protection mechanisms for 
people who are forced to migrate due to climate change (in some instances also for those who 
are forced to move due to environmental changes, like Cooper’s (1998) proposal).  
As chapter 3 shows, climate or environmental disruptions are not included in the 
definition of a refugee in the Refugee Convention. There are, however, states which have 
included environmental reasons for protection in their alien acts. Sweden has recognized that 
complementary protection might be necessary for a person who “is unable to return to the 
country of origin because of an environmental disaster” (see Swedish Aliens Act 2005:716, 
2005:Chapter 4, Section 2). Similar, Finland’s Alien Act states that: 
“[a]n alien residing in Finland is issued with a residence permit on the basis of 
humanitarian protection, if there are no grounds under section 87 or 88 for granting 
asylum or providing subsidiary protection, but he or she cannot return to his or her 
country of origin or country of former habitual residence as a result of an 
environmental catastrophe (…)” (Finlands Aliens Act, 2004:88a). 
Further, in Denmark, which don’t have an explicit recognition of such displacement in 
their legislation, there was a presumption from 2001 to 2006 that families with young children 
should not be returned to Afghanistan due to the draught there (Kolmannskog, 2009:20) . This 
can be linked to the principle of non-refoulment, included in the Refugee Convention, which 
states that: 
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion”(UN General Assembly, 1951:Article 33(1)).  
In human right law non-refoulment is an absolute ban on sending a person to places where 
he/she risks certain rights violation (Kolmannskog, 2009:18). Kolmannskog (2009:19) argues 
that in some cases one could claim that the return itself could constitute the ill treatment and 
perhaps even torture. He illustrate with an extreme example: “how should we consider a case 
where a public official leaves a person to cope by himself with hardly any means in the 
middle of the desert?” (Kolmannskog, 2009:19).  
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The Aliens Acts of Sweden and Finland is an alternative other states could follow. 
However, the Swedish law had not been applied by 2009
35
 according to Kolmannskog and 
Myrstad (2009:323). The presented alternatives that follows in this chapter have their focus 
on an international or regional level, while the Swedish and Finnish is an example of what 
states can do to respond to people that are unable to return to their homeland due to 
environmental disruptions. I will first present convention-related alternatives, then move on to 
regional alternatives, a proposal of proportionate migration, global climate change insurance 
and community relocation. Every alternative presented will be looked at in relation to human 
rights and sovereignty. 
6.1 Convention-Related Solutions 
There are several who argue for the creation of a new convention or implementation of 
protection of people displaced by climate change into the Refugee Convention or the 
UNFCCC. Conisbee and Simms (2003) argue for the inclusion of “environmental protection” 
in the Refugee Convention. Cooper (1998) claims that people fleeing because of climate 
change already fit definition of refugees and hence should have refugee status. Biermann and 
Boas (2010) propose a Protocol on Recognition, Protection and Resettlement of Climate 
Refugees (“Climate Refugee Protocol”) to the UNFCCC, while Docherty and Giannini (2009)  
propose a whole new convention.  
6.1.1 Could the Definition of Refugees cover People Migrating Because of the 
Environment?  
There are two obvious ways in which people who migrates due to climate change could be 
offered protection under the Refugee Convention. The first is to expand the convention, which 
could be done by adopting an optional protocol, and secondly it is also possible to argue that 
“climate refugees” already fit the definition in the Refugee Convention.  
Delegates at a meeting organized by the government of the Maldives in 2006, 
including representatives of governments, environmental and humanitarian organizations and 
UN-agencies, on the issue of protection and resettlement of “climate refugees”, proposed an 
amendment to the Refugee Convention to include “climate refugees” (or “environmental 
refugees”)  (see Biermann and Boas, 2008, Renaud et al., 2007).  
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 I have not been able to find any information on whether it has been applied later, and if it has, how many 
people it have concerned. 
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Along these lines, Conisbee and Simms (2003) argues that Refugee Convention should 
be expanded to incorporate a new category of “environmental persecution”. Their argument is 
that the environment can be used as an instrument of harm (Conisbee and Simms, 2003:30).  
They define harm as intentional when a set of policies is pursued in full knowledge of its 
damaging consequences. The causes and consequences, who is responsible and who gets hurt, 
of climate change should now be sufficiently understood. When states increase their emission 
of greenhouse gases, that is an intentional behavior which will result in “environmental 
refugees” (Conisbee and Simms, 2003:30). Granting “environmental refugees” status as 
refugees would provide them with internationally assured protection, independent and 
separate from the actions of their own governments (Conisbee and Simms, 2003:33).  
Conisbee and Simms (2003:27) further argue that one should not expect that people will be 
relocating inside their own home country, and hence be the states responsibility. There are 
two reasons for this. The first is that the governments of the countries in context might be the 
direct cause of the displacement, for example in dam projects (environmental), and as such 
they constitute a poor source of protection. Secondly, the countries themselves, or large parts 
of them, might disappear or become uninhabitable (Conisbee and Simms, 2003:27).  They 
emphasize that this is not only concerning Pacific island states, but millions of people in 
Bangladesh, the Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand, Egypt, China and Latin America. If the 
UNHCR should not manage this transition or inclusion, they argue that a new convention 
should be written.  
Cooper (1998), on the other hand, look closer at the two main elements of the 
definition in the Refugee Convention, “persecution” and “for reasons of”, and claims that 
environmental refugees do meet the requirements of the 1951 definition of refugees, and they 
deserve the help and protection that traditional refugees receive.  
According to Cooper (1998:501) there is actually a way for environmentally displaced 
persons to achieve refugee status without expanding the text of the Refugee Convention of 
1951. In the first element of the refugee definition, persecution, it is a government’s 
involvement in environmental crises that brings “environmental refugees” within the reach of 
current international refugee law and provides the strongest argument for stretching the 
refugee definition to cover their situation (Cooper, 1998:502). Disasters require decisions by 
governments, and failure to decide or negligent decision-making on the part of a particular set 
of authorities is common in the face of environmental disasters.  When governments are 
playing such an important role in handling, and the occurrence of, environmental crises, 
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refugees seeking refuge from the resulting environmental degradation are effectively seeking 
refuge from their governments as well, Cooper(1998:502) claims. Cooper (1998:519) points 
to desertification of the African Sahel, the rise of sea level due to global warming, and the 
Chernobyl disaster as examples of environmental crisis that have generated “environmental 
refugees” in satisfaction of the persecution requirement for official refugee status under the 
Refugee Convention. In other words, persecution occurs when government action harms 
individuals. Wijkman and Timberlake (1984) stresses the role of human agencies in 
populations vulnerability to disasters, and could support Cooper’s claims.  
When it comes to the second element, “for reasons of”, Cooper (1998:521) argues that 
the broadest of the five bases of persecution, “social group”, is the one people fleeing because 
of environmental or climate disasters could fit into. She writes that this social group is 
composed of persons who lack the political power to protect their own environment.  
6.1.2 Protocol to the UNFCCC 
On the other hand, Biermann and Boas (2010, 2008) propose a “Protocol on the Recognition, 
Protection and Resettlement of Climate Refugees”
 36
 to the UNFCCC. They argue that such a 
protocol could build on the political support from almost all countries as parties to the climate 
convention (Biermann and Boas, 2008:12). It could draw on widely agreed principles such as 
common but differentiated responsibilities, and it could aid climate refugees by linking their 
protection with the overall climate regime, including future advances in climate science in 
defining risks for people in certain regions. 
They first address five core principles which a separate regime for the recognition, 
protection, and resettlement of “climate refugees” must build on (Biermann and Boas, 
2010:75). The first is the “Principle of Planned Re-location and Resettlement”. It is argued 
that the governance of “climate refugees” can be better organized and planned than in the case 
of victims of political turmoil or war, and can be carried out in planned, voluntary relocation 
and resettlement programs (Biermann and Boas, 2010:75). Thus, the core of a regime on 
“climate refugees” is not focused on programs on emergency response and disaster relief, but 
rather on planned and voluntary resettlement over longer periods of time. The second 
principle is the “Principle of Resettlement Instead of Temporary Asylum”, the argument being 
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 They define “climate refugees” as “people who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near future, 
because of sudden or gradual alterations in their natural environment related to at least one of three impacts of 
climate change: sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity” (Biermann and Boas, 
2010). See chapter 4. 
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that in the long term most “climate refugees”, and especially the victims of sea-level rise, will 
not be able to return to their homes (Biermann and Boas, 2010:75). Therefore, the instrument 
(the proposed protocol) must recognize (most) “climate refugees” as permanent immigrants to 
the countries that accept them. The third is the “Principle of Collective Rights for Local 
Populations”. Biermann and Boas (2010:75-76) argues that a “climate refugee regime”, would 
need to be focused on collectives of people, such as populations of certain villages, cities, 
regions, provinces or of entire nations, as in the case of small island states. The fourth is the 
“Principle of International Assistance of Domestic Measures”. Since “climate refugees” in 
principle is protected by their own state, and since climate change impacts will affect only 
part of a country in many cases, an international regime will have the main focus on 
supporting governments, local communities, and support to protect people within their own 
country (Biermann and Boas, 2010:76). The challenge of protecting and resettling “climate 
refugees” is therefore fundamentally about international assistance and funding for the 
domestic support and resettlement programs of affected countries that have requested such 
support  (Biermann and Boas, 2010:76). The last one is the “Principle of International 
Burden-sharing”.  Climate change is a global problem, but the industrialized countries bear 
most of the moral responsibilities for its victims (Biermann and Boas, 2010:76).  
Theoretically, Biermann and Boas (2010:76) writes, governments could agree on a 
new treaty based on these principles. However, they argue that an independent convention 
could require a lengthy negotiation process on core principle and would weaken the link with 
the climate policy process and its particular agreements on equity, responsibility, and 
international cooperation. A protocol to the UNFCCC would, on the other hand, garner 
support more easily from state parties to the convention. 
When it comes to procedural operationalization, Biermann and Boas (2010:77) argues 
that the protocol could provide for an executive committee on the recognition, protection and 
resettlement of “climate refugees”. Such a committee could function under the authority of 
the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. This executive committee would maintain a 
list of administrative areas (such as villages, islands, districts) under the jurisdiction of 
member states whose population is determined to be in need of relocation or threatened by 
having to relocate (Biermann and Boas, 2010:77). 
Further, dealing with the resettlement of a large number of “climate refugees” will 
require not only a new legal regime, but also one or several international agencies to deal with 
this task (Biermann and Boas, 2010:79). Biermann and Boas (2010:79) look to UNDP, the 
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World Bank, UNEP and UNHCR for help with this. When it comes to funding, they argue 
that the best option appears to be the creation of an separate regime for the financing of the 
protection of “climate refugees”, such as a “Climate Refugee Protection and Resettlement 
Fund” (Biermann and Boas, 2010:81). 
6.1.3 A New Convention 
Another suggested proposal is a new convention. Docherty and Giannini (2009) start by 
laying out a “climate change refugee instrument”, this has nine components, divided in three 
categories. The first category is “Guarantees of Assistance”: the keys here are standards for 
“climate change refugee”
37
 status determination, human rights protection and humanitarian 
aid. The instrument should guarantee basic assistance for the class of people that it defines, it 
should ensure both that “climate change refugees” receive human rights protection as they 
move from one state to another and that their essential humanitarian needs are met (Docherty 
and Giannini, 2009:373).  
The next category is “Shared Responsibility”, this include host state responsibility, 
home state responsibility and international cooperation and assistance. Host states should bear 
the primary burden of implementing guarantees, since “refugees” relocate to host states. 
Home states should in particular focus on preventing or preparing for climate-induced 
migration which “flows” from their territory (Docherty and Giannini, 2009:379). The rest of 
the international community should support these efforts through obligatory in-kind or 
financial assistance proportional to states’ contribution to climate change and capacity to pay.  
The last category, “Administration of the Instrument”, includes a global fund, a 
coordinating agency and a body of scientific experts. The global fund should collect and 
distribute financial assistance, the coordinating agency should help oversee human rights 
protection and humanitarian aid programs, and the body of scientific experts should make 
determinations related to the instrument’s definition and the division of financial 
responsibility (Docherty and Giannini, 2009:384).  
Further, Docherty and Giannini (2009:391) claims that the current regimes, the 
Refugee Convention and the UNFCCC, was not created for the purpose of protecting this kind 
of migration/displacement and sometimes clash with some of the essential components of the 
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 Docherty and Giannini (2009) defines “climate change refugee” as “an individual who is forced to flee his or 
her home and to relocate temporarily or permanently across a national boundary as the result of sudden or 
gradual environmental disruption that is consistent with climate change and to which humans more likely than 
not contributed”. See chapter 4.  
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“climate change refugee” instrument that they outlined. Instead of trying to fit the instruments 
into already existing conventions they argue for the creation of a new convention, specially 
targeted on migration/displacement due to climate change. A convention devoted to “climate 
change refugees” offers several advantages over protocols to existing instruments, according 
to Docherty and Giannini (2009:392). A new treaty would stress that this emerging problem 
deserves serious attention independent of other framework. It would establish that this 
problem is a multidisciplinary one that needs to blend different legal and normative 
principles, in doing so it would maximize the availability of tools for crafting a solution to this 
complex situation. Creating an independent treaty requires a new process that offers 
opportunities to promote, and benefit from, the involvement of civil society and affected 
communities (Docherty and Giannini, 2009:392). 
 Docherty and Giannini (2009:400) admits that there might be some reluctance to 
develop a new treaty given the existence of two seemingly relevant conventions. However, 
they still claim that there are good reasons to believe that states, as well as civil society and 
affected communities, will embrace an international instrument. States directly affected by a 
“climate change refugee” situation would receive assistance to address it, and host states 
would benefit from support for implementation of human rights protection and humanitarian 
aid, for which they would not be eligible if they were not party to the treaty (Docherty and 
Giannini, 2009:400). Host countries will, treaty or not, be unable to halt migration because 
refugees and migrants have historically found ways to cross borders despite state efforts to 
stop them (Docherty and Giannini, 2009:400-401). A convention like this will provide 
assistance for both remedial and preventive measures, and sufficient prevention might even 
avert refugee flows and hence keep communities intact, which further would preserve 
exposed or vulnerable states’ cultural and in some cases national integrity (Docherty and 
Giannini, 2009:401). For states that are not that vulnerable to climate change, humanitarian 
needs might be a motivation for signing such a convention. Given the close link between 
economic growth and emission reduction, it might be easier to come to a conclusion or 
agreement about humanitarian assistance than it has been to do the same about emission. 
Further, it might be easier to get states to ratify a convention that emphasizing assisting 
vulnerable states with preventing flows of refugees, rather than to take in refugees themselves 
(Docherty and Giannini, 2009:401). 
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6.1.4 Is Convention-Related Alternatives Workable Solutions? 
So far I have considered three convention-related alternatives. However, one may ask if these 
are workable solutions. Biermann and Boas (2010:74) argues that “climate refugees” requires 
a different kind of protection than “traditional refugees”. Climate-related migration can be 
planned and organized, and unlike the political or religious persecution faced by “traditional 
refugees” this migration can be coordinated with the support of their governments and public 
agencies. It would also be hard to get state parties to the Refugee Convention to agree to this 
inclusion. The problem of “climate refugees” is at its core a problem of development policy 
(Biermann and Boas, 2010:74). Warner (2010:404) argues that even if the Refugee 
Convention were expanded to include “climate refugees”, the institutions that currently 
address asylum issues would not be sufficiently equipped to manage the issue. In the context 
of population movement due to climate or environmental stressors a wider range of issues 
including disaster risk management, development, natural resource management, and social 
policy will be needed to address the needs of those migrating.   
Coopers (1998) argument does not receive much support either. Williams (2008:508) 
admit that the argument might have some academic merit, but emphasize that the situation the 
Refugee Convention were created for and the situation in the context of environmental or 
climate induced disasters will be quite different from each other. Even though government 
involvement in environmental crises might lead to claims of contributory negligence or 
liability in respect of the refugee issue, it remains unlikely that such behavior could be 
equated to and categorized with traditional legal notions of persecution provided for by the 
Refugee Convention, Williams (2008:508) argues. As shown above, Docherty and Giannini 
(2009:391) argues that the Refugee Convention was not created for migration/displacement 
due to climate or environmental changes. And while they see positive features of 
implementing climate or environmental issues in the already existing framework of the 
Refugee Convention, they argue that this framework is too restrictive to embrace the essential 
components of the “climate change refugee instrument” they set out. In this sense, Docherty 
and Giannini’s argument is more in the context of their own presented alternative, than in the 
context of Cooper’s claim.  
Kolmannskog (2008:25) emphasize that persecution itself cannot define the social 
group and that such interpretation of the “generally underexplored and unclear ‘social group’ 
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ground is highly controversial”.
38
 Cooper (1998:522) also take this in to account, but claims 
that persons lacking the political power to protect their environment constitute a concrete 
social group even outside of the 1951 refugee definition. 
A new protocol or a new convention will in theory pose no greater threat to 
sovereignty than any other convention or protocol. If we are to follow Krasner (1999:125), 
conventions can be inconsistent with what he refer to as Westphalian Sovereignty, however, 
he also emphasize that Westphalian Sovereignty has never been an absolute principle in 
practice. Including people fleeing from environmental or climate disasters in the already 
existing framework of the Refugee Convention might, on the other hand, lead states to protest 
on the ground that it is a breach with sovereignty. One of the reasons for Dauvergne 
(2004:597) to argue that the Refugee Convention does not impinge on state sovereignty is that 
states make efforts, legally, publicly and politically, to limit the number of people who will be 
protected under the convention. If the Convention where to include an even greater number of 
people, it is not far-fetched to assume that states party to the Convention will oppose this. In 
theory, Cooper’s proposal does not mean that it will be a new group included in the Refugee 
Convention, she rather argue that there is a group of people who have the right to protection 
under this convention. However, in practice it would probably be perceived as giving rights to 
a new group, and this might be hard for state parties to accept.  
A convention or protocol dealing with climate change and displacement, although 
supposed to be an alternative to implementing this aspect in the Refugee Convention, would 
probably be similar to the Refugee Convention than any of the other human rights 
conventions. Both alternatives open up for people migrating/fleeing across borders, but in the 
end, the states themselves chose whether they would sign and ratify protocols and 
conventions, the decision is a sovereign act as pointed out by Dauvergne (2004:597).  
When it comes to human rights, a protocol or a convention could fill a legal gap and 
give protection to people displaced due to climate change. Biermann and Boas (2010:75-76) 
argues that a “climate refugee regime” would need to be focused on collectives of people, 
such as populations of certain villages, cities, regions, provinces or of entire nations, as in the 
case of small island states. This would be a marked difference from many of the other UN-
conventions on human rights, which mainly focuses on individual rights. The Refugee 
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 For more  discussion of  “social group” in the Refugee Convention and environmental disruptions see for 
example Kozoll (2004). For a more general discussion on “social group” in the Refugee Convention, see for 
example Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) and Parish (1992).  
72 
 
Convention applies to persons, not people.
39
 That is not to say that collective human rights is 
unusual, newly independent African countries in the aftermath of decolonization framed 
human rights as “peoples” right rather than individual rights (DeLaet, 2006:78). Further, the 
right to self-determination as set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966a) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966b) is a collective right. There are good 
arguments for the use of both collective and individual rights (for a discussion, see DeLaet, 
2006:80-81), and according to DeLaet (2006:80) it all boils down to how to protect the rights 
the best; by prioritizing individual rights first or by ensuring basic rights protections for 
groups. Linking climate change and migration to collective rights makes sense seeing that 
whole villages, regions and in some instances nations are likely to be affected, their right to 
self-determination states that “all peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, 
and cultural development” (see UN General Assembly, 1966b:Article 1, UN General 
Assembly, 1966a:Article 1). According to DeLaet (2006:82) the placement of this right, in the 
beginning of these treaties, separate from and prior to the other human rights, indicate the 
great importance states attach to this right. Further, the right to self-determination receive 
such a prominence because states must be able to realize this collective right in order to 
promote and protect basic rights (DeLaet, 2010:82).  
How effective a protocol or convention would be in enforcing those rights is another 
question. If we go back to Dauvergne’s claim that states take action to limit the people 
protected under the Refugee Convention, it might be assumed that there may be a danger for 
seeing the same trend in relation to a new protocol or convention as well. After all, if we 
follow Dauvergne’s (2004) argument about Western states cracking down on both refugees 
and “illegal migration”, which occupy the same space in the collective imagination, then it 
will be logic to assume that “climate change refugees” will be a part of that collective 
imagination as well. This brings us to the question of whether states will ratify such a protocol 
or convention or not.  
Hugo (2010) argues that provision for the protection of and providing assistance to 
“climate change-forced migrants” through a treaty or convention is a worthy and useful long 
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 In the short term, Hugo (2010:31) claims, there will appear to be 
significant barriers to the formulation and widespread acceptance of such a treaty or 
convention. The reason for this includes that there are considerable difficulty in identifying 
“climate changed-forced migrants” and separating them from other migrants, and hence 
establishing their status, it’s politically unlikely that destination countries will open up another 
category (the first being refugees under the Refugee Convention) for those seeking asylum. 
The countries of the Asia-Pacific region have not been among the most ready to sign key 
international migrant instruments (Hugo, 2010:31). Hugo (2010:31-33) emphasize the 
importance of the search for an international treaty on “climate change-forced migrants” as a 
medium to long-term goal, but in the short and medium-term it is important to find ways  to 
assist people who are (or who are likely to become) displaced. Williams (2008:518) also 
argue that it would be hard to garner support for a new international agreement. She claims 
that at present it would be unlikely that states would agree to a globally binding treaty that 
requires recognition of the existence of climate change displacement and that depends upon 
agreement to provide support and protection to those affected. The reason for this is the 
“general reluctance of states to voluntarily commit to obligations that may impact on 
economic, social, and political policy” (Williams, 2008:518). And as shown in chapter 5 
Hathaway (2007) argues that states with robust domestic politics might be reluctant to ratify 
conventions, seeing that they can make a difference.  
What is important to keep in mind is that the protocol proposed by Biermann and Boas 
(2010) and the convention proposed by Docherty and Giannini (2009) is not only focused on 
cross-border migration. They emphasize that in many cases people will migrate, or need 
assistance, inside their own country. Helping people that are still located inside their home 
states territory might be easier for Western states to agree to, as Docherty and Giannini 
(2009:401) points out. While 87 percent of those asked in a survey in 2010 was positive to 
Norwegian development aid (Wilhelmsen, 2011), another survey from 2011 shows that 44 
percent of the asked believes that it should be harder for refugees and asylum seekers to get 
permission to be granted residence in Norway (SSB, 2012). Although these numbers cannot 
be generalized to other Western countries, and it is the politicians, not the general population, 
that makes these kind of decisions, it still gives us an idea of the Norwegian populations 
attitudes. In this context it’s possible that the ratification of a protocol or convention that 
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 Hugo (2010) uses Burton and Hodgkinson (2009) draft treaty for people displaced by climate change as an 
example, but the critique is on more general on the making of a new convention/treaty.  
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opens up for helping people in their homelands will have more support than a protocol or 
convention that only focuses on external migration.  
6.2 Regional Alternatives 
There are also those who favor regional alternatives, based on existing networks between 
states. Both Williams (2008) and Hugo (2010) emphasize that an international convention 
could be the result of these agreements, but they both claim that the first step is to use existing 
frameworks. 
6.2.1 Regional Agreements 
Williams (2008) propose an alternative where a regional system of collaboration rather than 
an international agreement is favored.  Williams (2008:517) see two issues with creating a 
new international agreement. The first one is a sovereignty issue,  
“[t]he notion of attributing international rights and responsibilities in respect of 
displaced persons cuts to the very heart of state sovereignty and thus would likely 
prove a contentious issue upon which to achieve universal (or as close to universal so 
as to make worthwhile) agreement” (Williams, 2008:517).  
Williams points to the solution proposed by Byravan and Rajan (2006)
41
 as an example of 
such an international agreement, and argues that when taking into consideration the 
unwillingness of states to compromise their sovereignty and recognizing the reluctance of the 
United States to agree to the most basic of commitments in the Kyoto Protocol, it would seem 
unlikely that a new global agreement could be reached specifically in relation to climate 
change displacement (Williams, 2008:517). The second reason is related to the 
conceptualization of “climate change refugees”. Although it might be possible to identify 
displacement as a direct result of climate change, attempts to conclude a new international 
agreement on “climate change refugees” would be problematic given the present international 
legal terminology that distinguishes between transborder (refugees) and internal displacement 
(IDPs) (Williams, 2008:517).  
Therefore, Williams (2008:518) suggest that an alternative system for addressing the 
plight of those displaced by climate change may be better coordinated by regional 
agreements, operating under an international umbrella framework. Regional cooperation and 
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bilateral agreement building on existing geopolitical and economic relationships and that 
allow states to create responsive policies in a timeframe appropriate to the relative capacity of 
the countries involved, appears a model better suited to climate change displacement, 
Williams (2008:518) argues. Regional agreements are more likely to be able to achieve a 
greater level of commitment from participating states than might otherwise be achieved at the 
international level. Williams (2008:518) argues that this was demonstrated when refugee 
terminology was drafted so as to conceivably extend to “environmental refugees” in regional 
agreements for both Africa and Central America. However, as discussed in chapter 3, the the 
OAU convention and the American Cartagena declaration does not specific mention 
“environmental refugees”. Williams (2008:518) further argue that the use of regional 
initiatives is already commonplace within the international legal system and regional and 
international agreements are used to complement and strengthen one another. An example is 
the Regional Seas Programme which operates under the United Nations Law of the Sea 
Convention.  
The regional agreements on “climate change refugees” can be put into frames of 
already existing regional agreements, such as the African Union, the Organization of 
American States, and the European Union (Williams, 2008:520-521). Regional agreements 
could also be enforced where no regional organization currently exists, but where the 
evidence of strong regional cooperation is apparent, like the South Pacific. Whether inside the 
frames of already existing regional organizations or where inside areas where regional 
cooperation is existing, this would allow states to deal with climate change displacement 
specifically in that region (Williams, 2008:521).  
Williams (2008:521) see several possible advantages with regional agreements. The 
first one is that such a structure represents an opportunity to further implement the framework 
on IDPs into discussion on climate displacement. Second, a structure where good practice can 
be demonstrated and exchanged between regional groups can be established, gives states the 
opportunity to both demonstrate new initiatives and to analyze how programs are operating in 
other regions (Williams, 2008:521). Third, a regional agreement could easier take into 
account the individual capacity of each state involved and the severity of the problem in that 
area. And, finally, in the long term, the conclusion and acceptance of various regional 




As discussed in chapter 4, Williams (2008:522) leaves the regional associations with 
the responsibility of concluding on a definition or understanding of the term “climate change 
refugee”. However, Williams argue that it still would be possible to propose one definitional 
approach that allows for a certain degree of flexibility. This could be secured by a continuum, 
where climate change refugees are identified along a graduating scale that allow for differing 
degrees of protection to be accorded depending on the severity of the situation (Williams, 
2008:522). Williams (2008:503) emphasize that it is not within the scope of the article to 
address issues of responsibility or specific rights and entitlements within the proposed 
framework. 
6.2.2 Modification of Existing Migration Networks 
On the other hand, Hugo (2010) focuses on migration in the Asia-Pacific region, arguing that 
no region of the world is expected to be affected more by climate change than this region, and 
at the same time countries of the Asia-Pacific region have not been among the most ready to 
sign international migration instrument.  
The first strategy that needs to be initiated, according to Hugo (2010:33), is to 
accommodate climate change-related migration as far as possible within existing international 
migration mechanisms. According to Hugo (2010:33), this option have several advantages: it 
is immediately available to “climate change-forced migrants”, since the migration visa 
category already exist; it overcomes the manifest suspicion of host/destination country 
governments and societies towards existing, and expanded, refugees categories; there is no 
need to set up new institutions, structures and mechanisms; many states have a number of 
different categories for migration which provide a range of ways which people displaced by 
climate change could be accommodated; and it would be possible to make use of existing 
migration networks (where they exist) to facilitate migration and to assist settlement at the 
destination. As an example he points to New Zealand, that have a range of temporary and 
permanent migration categories, which could provide some corridors for Pacific Islanders 
forced to migrate as a result of climate change. New Zealand have both permanent settlement 
schemes, included in the New Zealand Immigration Program (NZIP), and temporary 
migration schemes (Hugo, 2010:34). The first category include, among others, skilled 
migrants and business immigrants, “Pacific Access Category” (which is an annual quota of 
settler selected from Tonga, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Fiji), and international humanitarian 
migration (Refugee Convention) (Hugo, 2010:34). The temporary options includes a “Work 
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Permit Scheme”, which allows New Zealand employers to recruit temporary workers from 
overseas, and “Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE) Scheme”, which allows agricultural 
employers to bring in workers for an agricultural season (Hugo, 2010:34).  
For example, the RSE-Scheme allows temporary work immigration from several of 
the Pacific islands. Each year it allows 8000 seasonal workers to come to New Zealand and 
work for 7 months during a 11 month period, and employers can request the same workers to 
return for more than one season (Thornton, 2011:85). While all Pacific Island states are 
eligible to participate, the implementation of the RSE scheme varies between countries,  with 
the terms for each set out in inter-agency understandings, usually between the New Zealand 
Department of Labour and the respective ministry of labor in the island state (Thornton, 
2011:86). This scheme has had mixed results, with New Zealand being the biggest benefiter, 
and Thornton (2011:86) points out that if migration was to aid the development of adaptive 
capacity to climate change in the Pacific island states, then the development component of the 
RSE scheme will probably have to be employed with greater care. Thornton (2011:88) lay out 
measures to consider to make this agreements more fit for coping with climate change and 
migration. It will be important to ensure maximum uptake, by proactively identify skills and 
attributes of sending states workers that are in demand in destination labor markets, and by 
providing opportunities for training of migrants to match the destination labor markets 
demands (Thornton, 2011:88). Further, to decrease vulnerability it should be facilitated for 
labor migration from places most vulnerable to climate change, the flows of remittances and 
return migration should be facilitated through channels that ensure that they assist with 
climate change adaptation goals, and it should be recognized that labor migration might have 
a positive influence on adaptive capacity to climate change in sending states by helping to 
enhance human, social and financial capital (Thornton, 2011:88). Some mechanisms must be 
improved, like the development of appropriate transport links and immigration procedures 
that facilitate migrants travel to destination labor markets, the establishment of regional 
cooperation mechanisms and the establishment of appropriate governance and regulatory 
systems in both sending and receiving states (Thornton, 2011:88). Thornton (2011:88) argues 
that if these measures are implemented migration might influence positively on the quality of 
life for many individuals, families and communities. It might permit more people to stay 
longer, “whilst facilitating the gradual expansion of communities and network abroad, aiding 




While the visa categories available at present in countries like Australia and New 
Zealand, are not necessarily easily available to “climate change-forced migrants”, they can be 
made so with relatively little change, according to Hugo (2010:33). The bottom line is that 
such modification of existing channels of migration is a more achievable immediate objective 
than the introduction of a new migration regime.   
6.2.3 Is Regional Alternatives a Workable Solution? 
Although a convention, treaty or protocol on climate change and migration would not 
interfere more or less with sovereignty than other conventions, treaties or protocols, Williams 
(2008) have a point when arguing that it could be hard to garner support for a new 
international agreement. Seeing that the United States are unwilling to agree to the most basic 
agreements in the Kyoto Protocol, while Canada announced its withdrawal from the protocol 
in December 2011, it might be hard getting states to actually sign and ratify an international 
agreement on climate change and migration.  
However, even on a regional level there might be fear of loss of sovereignty, or 
unwillingness to cooperate. Gain and Bari (2007) show how the conflict between India and 
Bangladesh is illustrated with a 2,5 meter high and 2,100 mile (about 3380 kilometers) long 
iron border fence, and arguing that previous migration from Bangladesh to India has been a 
factor in violence in the region. India has not ratified the Refugee Convention, has a large 
population, and according to NRC (Haldorsen, 2011) there were perceived to be almost 1,5 
million newly internally displaced in 2010 due to natural disaster (including both 
environmental disasters and climate disasters). How would a regional agreement be shaped 
when both India and Bangladesh faces difficulties relating to environmental and climate 
change?  
There might be needed a lot of modifications in already existing institutions in the 
Asia-Pacific region if they are to fit people migrating because of climate change as Hugo 
(2010) propose. Warner (2010:404) argues that in the current governance structure, the 
country interests (and especially the interests of industrialized countries) and the implicit 
system of mutuality in international negotiations “provides few incentives for active 
leadership in reshaping governance for human mobility and environmental change”. There are 
several laws, norms and recommendations established by the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and other organizations to protect migrants who are workers. However, as 
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Warner (2010:404) points out, member states to the ILO, and especially destination states, 
have not widely subscribed to such conventions.  
Further, throughout the 1990s, Australia’s earlier pro-climate change stance began to 
weaken, so much that by the late 1990 Australia was refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
(Barnett and Campell, 2010:107). All in all, the years of the Howard government in Australia, 
from 1996 to 2007, were notable for the unwillingness of the Australian government to take 
any action on climate change, and there was even reluctance to admit that climate change was 
a problem, according to Barnett and Campell (2010:107). When Australia announced its 
Pacific Seasonal Workers Scheme, similar to New Zealand’s RSE-Scheme, there had been a 
shift in politics. With the election of the Australian Labour Party in 2007 Kevin Rudd, the 
new Prime Minister, ratified the Kyoto Protocol at COP13 in Bali, as he promised in the 
campaign (Barnett and Campell, 2010:108). Despite the change in politics there were much 
discussion about the consequences of implementing seasonal employment schemes. And 
some of the objections to these kinds of schemes, for example fears of overstaying or 
“stealing” Australian jobs, gained significant media attention (Mares, 2007).   
At the other hand, it would probably be easier to modify existing agreements and 
institution, than creating new ones. After its announcement in 2008 the implementation went 
slow, however, the scheme seems to be perceived positive in the Pacific island states, 
according to Ritchie (2009). Ritchie (2009:17) argues that a strong reason for this is that a 
season work scheme is a significant mark of Australia’s willingness to engage in a mutually 
responsive manner with the region. Further, it is hoped that an engaged Australia will be more 
likely to be there to assist Pacific island states if they face severe economic and environmental 
challenges (Ritchie, 2009:17). However, what Australia’s politics in the 1990s and 2000s 
shows is how fast the political climate can change, and further, how important the timing will 
be when trying to modify these already existing institutions.    
6.3 Proportionate Migration 
Another proposal is by Byravan and Rajan (2006, 2009, 2010) who propose that people living 
in regions/areas that are likely to be uninhabitable due to climate change should have the 
option of migrating to other countries, in numbers roughly proportionate to the host countries’ 
cumulative greenhouse gas emission. What is interesting is that  they recommend that an 





 will be able to find homes well in advance of the actual emergency (Byravan and 
Rajan, 2010:242). They argue that the alternative, to ignore potential victims until after they 
become “environmental refugees”, is morally indefensible as well as impractical. Byravan and 
Rajan’s (2010:243) essential argument is that humanity carries a special obligation to “present 
and future generations of people whose homes, means of livelihood and memberships in 
states will be lost specifically as a result of sea-level rise caused by climate change”.  
Their fundamental argument is that “humanity carries a special obligation to present 
and future generations of people whose homes, means of livelihood, and membership in states 
will be lost specifically as a result of sea-level rise caused by climate change” (Byravan and 
Rajan, 2010). They draw upon the principle of intergenerational equity, which they explains 
as meaning that each generation is collectively responsible for protecting and using natural 
resources in a sustainable manner so that future generations are not unduly harmed by their 
present misuse (Byravan and Rajan, 2010:243). 
6.3.1 Is Proportionate Migration a Workable Solution? 
McAdam and Saul (2010:14-15) criticize this alternative for not accounting for the 
complexity of contributory causes in any given displacement solution, and ignoring the role of 
intervening factors and other human actors in determining how the effects of climate change 
manifest themselves in a particular place. Further, they claim that “such a blunt approach” is 
unlikely to garner genuine political support (McAdam and Saul, 2010:15).  Byravan and 
Rajan (2009) tries to change this, by encouraging the US to be the one to initiate this. They 
write that “[c]limate migrants and exiles pose a unique challenge that requires a special 
international strategy, which only the United States, with its well-established and transparent 
regimes for legal immigration, has the experience and capacity to develop” (Byravan and 
Rajan, 2009:19). They might have a point; the US could have the experience and capacity to 
develop such a strategy. However, as argued above in relation to regional agreements, it 
would be unlikely that the US would agree, not to mention initiate, such a strategy, seeing that 
the US has been unwilling to agree to the most basic agreements in the Kyoto Protocol. And, 
further, although the Refugee Act of 1980 incorporates the basic terms of the Refugee 
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 Definition of «climate migrants» and «climate exiles»: “the victims of SLR [sea level rise] attributed to 
climate change. The former [climate migrants] includes all those who are displaced because of the effects of 
climate change, while the latter [climate exiles] refers to a special category of climate migrants who will have 
lost their ability to remain well-functioning members of political societies in their countries, often through no 
fault of their own (…) while most climate migrants will be internally displaced people, or have the opportunity 
of returning to their countries or regions of origin if adequate adaptation measures were taken, climate exiles will 
be forced to become permanently stateless in the absence of other remedies” (Byravan and Rajan 2010:242-243). 
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Conventions refugee definition (Fullerton, 1993:513), the US have not ratified the Refugee 
Convention (Globalis, 2012b). 
Another immediate visible problem is that Byravan and Rajan (2006, 2009, 2010) 
leaves the details of who should be considered for immigration rights, which countries should 
absorb exiles, how the rights could be exercised, how and whether internal displacement needs 
to be considered as part of the international treaty and what institution should established to 
reduce the risks of massive humanitarian crisis as climate impacts become more severe, to the 
international society. This is understandable, as it is most likely not something that can be 
solved by one paper, but it is also unlikely that it could be solved as an agreement between 
states in the near future.  
Further, this could be seen as a threat to states sovereignty. The wishes of the states in 
danger of being severely affected by climate change are not accounted for. Climate exiles 
should have the right to at least a limited menu of to where they wish to resettle (Byravan and 
Rajan, 2010:253), but what about the state who wishes to continue functioning as a state? 
Byravan and Rajan (2010:252) claims that the  
“climate exiles will be stateless persons, individuals who are stripped for rights, but 
what is exceptional with them is that this will be a permanent condition (…) since the 
original state and its territory will either no longer exist or will be rendered unviable 
for all practical purposes” (italics in original).  
However, as discussed in chapter 5 it still remains unclear whether people who lose their state 
because of climate change, such as citizens on “sinking” island states, will be considered 
stateless, since the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless People don’t include de 
facto statelessness. But, as McAdam (2010a:120) argues, the people concerned might be 
considered as stateless by the UNHCR. UNHCR (2009) argues that the population in this 
extreme scenario would be likely to find themselves in a situation that is similar to a situation 
where the statehood have ceased.  
As discussed in chapter 5, Paskal (2007) point out that legally speaking a country’s 
ocean territory is determined by its land territory, as set out in the UNs Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UN General Assembly, 1982). Meaning that legally speaking there will be no 
territory should all the island and atolls of an island state actually sink, this further breaks with 
the crucial link between statehood and territory (see McAdam, 2010a:112). However, as 
McAdam (2010a:128) emphasize, state practice suggest that there is likely to be a 
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presumption of a state’s continuity for a while, even after the legal indicia of statehood wanes. 
Although she argues that this will probably change after a while, and states might gradually 
withdraw their recognition of a state, it is not said when this will happen.  
Further, when linked to human rights, one could claim, as McAdam and Saul (2010:9) 
does, that the fundamental right to self-determination is threatened. A breach of the link 
between people and the state makes it difficult to maintain the standards of popular self-
determination.
43
 The continuing for sovereign states to be sovereign is not considered in 
Byravan and Rajans proposal, and there is a chance that sovereign states which are likely to 
be affected by climate change would be skeptic to this alternative.  
On the other hand, this proposal represents an alternative in which humans are more 
important than states. That Byravan and Rajan open up for people being relocated before the 
island states “disappear”, should they “disappear”, is only logical seeing that it would be 
unreasonable to demand that people should wait until after the island is no longer inhabitable. 
As discussed in chapter 5 in relation to governments in exile, most of the population would 
probably already have left before the situation becomes this emergent.   
6.4 Global Climate Change Insurance 
Penz (2010) proposes a global climate change insurance scheme. A global climate change 
insurance would be an inter-state system providing compensation to affected states for 
climate-related damage (Penz, 2010:167). The insurance pay outs in this scenario would be 
for different kinds of adaptation measures, not only migration. All adaptation projects should 
be assessed and approved on the basis of appropriate analysis that take account of harm, risks, 
cost and benefits (Penz, 2010:170). When the adaptation strategy is migration, Penz envision 
differences between external migration and internal migration. Internal, funds may go to 
migrants themselves, to migrant-receiving communities for their accommodation, to 
resettlement projects and to expand urban infrastructure to absorb additional people moving 
into cities without making condition worse (Penz, 2010:170). When it comes to cross-border 
migration, Penz (2010:171) emphasize that the funds may need to go to receiving states, both 
as an incentive to accept migrants and as compensation for expenses incurred in 
accommodating and integrating them.   
The level of the premiums that each state would have to pay to the scheme would be 
based on the predictions of periodic payouts, and further, past emission (Penz, 2010:167-168). 
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 See chapter 5. 
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An initial fund could also be established on the basis of an assessment of past emission. In 
this scenario, levies for the initial fund would need to be determined on the basis of a formula 
that take the following considerations into account: 1) The global ecosystem’s absorptive 
capacity (atmosphere, oceans, forests) already used up by the past emissions of particular 
countries; and 2) The period of ignorance about climate change (the negligence criterion, see 
chapter 5), counterbalanced by the benefits obtained from relatively unrestrained emission 
during this earlier period (the benefit criterion, see chapter 5) (Penz, 2010:168). 
The payouts should be for the costs of adaptation to deal with climate change damage 
(Penz, 2010:168). This could, however, be complicated by the fact that adaptation not only is 
reactive to specific harmful events, but also preventive and therefore anticipatory. Further, 
slow-onset or gradual disasters require action to be anticipatory as well as reactive. 
Determining to what extent preventive adaptation is legitimate and warranted will involve 
considerable discretion, but Penz (2010:168) claims that inserting staff with appropriate 
expertise and professional impartiality between claimant states and payer states will serve to 
contain conflict over such discretion.  
Another significant issue would probably be to determine what is due to climate 
change and what to treat as due to other causes. However, Penz (2010:168) argues that this 
distinction should not be taken to strict, and that even in the absence of climate change, there 
is a strong case to be made for global insurance against natural or environmental disasters. 
When in doubt the scheme should focus on the side of inclusion rather than exclusion of 
disastrous events and compensation for them (Penz, 2010:168).   
Another problem that Penz (2010:170) point to is that a global insurance scheme could 
create incentives for corruption on the part of irresponsible governments, and further create a 
dilemma in a system of sovereign states. However, conditions that involves a certain 
compromise with sovereignty already exists in international agreements, treaties and 
institutional memberships. Sovereign states agree to enter such arrangements, and they enter 
them with all the conditions that they involve and these constrain future actions by the states 
(Penz, 2010:170). Based on this, and the increasingly accepted doctrine of sovereignty as 
responsibility, in addition to the doctrine of sovereignty as right, Penz (2010:170) argues that 
it is not inappropriate for participation in the global insurance scheme to require 
accountability of how funds are spent and how closely they conform to the objective of 
genuine adaptation measures that save lives and livelihoods. Accountability and correlative 
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monitoring by the global insurance agency could deter both corruption and prevent major 
incompetence.  
According to Penz (2010:168-169), this insurance approach has the advantageous 
features of the tort-based approach, while at the same time avoiding some of the difficulties of 
it. The insurance approach provides for corrective justice and compensation to countries 
harmed by climate change, as an tort-based approach also would have done, but the advantage 
of the insurance approach is the avoidance of expensive litigations and the complicated 
assessment of complicated causal links (Penz, 2010:169). Such avoidance of costs not only 
contributes to global efficiency, but also avoids that states with limited resources have to incur 
additional costs to finance litigation under the tort model and risk losing.  
6.4.1 Is a Global Climate Change Insurance a Workable Solution? 
Pnez (2010) focus on sovereignty is far greater than many of the other alternatives to 
protection or adaptation strategies. Penz could be right in claiming that this insurance scheme 
does not seem to pose greater threat to sovereignty than other international agreements, 
however, treaties, convention and other international agreements often lack the control 
mechanism that this insurance scheme proposes. Conventions to the UN often lack control 
mechanisms all together, but in some instances optional protocols gives the opportunity to 
individual complaint procedure.
44
 In this sense the proposed insurance scheme might be closer 
to the International Criminal Court (ICC) when it comes to sovereignty issues.  The Rome 
Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction to investigate and try individuals accused of serious war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. In 2009 and 2010 the ICC issued arrest 
warrants for the sitting Sudanese leader al-Bashir, the warrant included among other the 
accusation of genocide, despite the fact that Sudan was not a member state of the ICC 
(Human Rights Watch, 2010). The question to consider in that case is whether human rights 
are more important than sovereignty. Further, even though ICC has 120 member states there 
are still a lot of states that are not members, and non-member states includes influential states 
like the US, India and China. How to get these states, and states with high degree of emission 
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 Examples of conventions in international law which contain rights of individual complaints procedure (or has 
adopted an optional protocol that includes this) includes the International Convenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966a), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (UN General Assembly, 1984), the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (UN General Assembly, 1965), and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (UN General Assembly, 1979) (see OHCHR, 2010).The individual 
complaints procedure allows individuals to bring complaints of violations of their rights by a particular state 
before an independent UN-committee, but only after all domestic legal remedies have been exhausted.  
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but that are not in immediate danger to be exposed to climate change related disasters, to 
agree to the insurance scheme is a question that should not be neglected.  
Further, it might be hard finding enough states being neutral both in relations to 
claimant states and payer states, for every case, to determine to what extent preventive 
adaptation is legitimate and warranted.  
While Penz argues that there is a strong case to be made for global insurance against 
natural or environmental disasters, and hence that the distinction between what is due to 
climate change and what is due to environmental changes is not to be taken so strict, there is a 
difference when it comes to the conception of harm. In this insurance scenario, Penz propose 
to use the level of emission to determine the level of premiums states should pay, and this is 
where the conception of harm comes in. It is not the states that are in the greatest danger of 
needing the insurance that pay the most, but the states that has contributed to the problems. 
The causal link is already pretty complicated, which is one of the reasons to favor the 
insurance scheme, but when it comes to environmental disasters it could be argued that the 
causal link is missing altogether. Penz might be right in that there are good arguments for a 
environmental disaster insurance, but there are also a lot of problems connected with mixing 
these two forms of disasters. Why should the biggest polluters pay more for disasters they did 
not create? Having a strict focus could maybe benefit the insurance scheme more, on the other 
hand, Penz is probably right that it would be more effective to be inclusive rather than 
exclusive. That meaning that when in doubt, one should err on the side of inclusion.  
6.5 Community Relocation 
Relocation of whole communities, even states, has been presented as an alternative to 
migration and displacement caused by climate change. Both Kiribati and Tuvalu have raised 
this alternative, and it has been embraced by the President of the Maldives, who has stated 
that he is seeking to buy land in India or Australia to which to relocate his nation (McAdam, 
2010a:122). On the other side of the specter, the Indonesian Maritime Minister has announced 
that Indonesia is considering renting out some of its islands to “climate change refugees”, 
although it is unknown if this was a response to the President of the Maldives  statement 
(McAdam, 2010a:122). As I will show in the case of Alaska there is also the more common 
option of moving communities inside the state. 
In Shishmaref, Alaska, most of the 600 inhabitants voted to relocate the village by 
2015 (Chomette, 2010:22). 2015 is supposed to be the last chance before Sarichef (the island 
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on which Shishmaref is located) becomes uninhabitable, according to geologists, 
meteorologists and other experts that have looked into the island's future. Alaska is getting 
warmer at a fast rate, and at the same time storms have increased in frequency and strength. 
Shishmaref's permafrost is thawing and no longer has its usual “rock-like strength”, and can 
therefore not withstand the battering of waves and wind during storms (Chomette, 2010:20). 
As a result large pieces of permafrosted land breaks off and fall into the sea. Erosion is 
spreading as well, over the past 20 years four levees were built in an attempt to contain 
erosion, but the levees quickly sank into the sand and the effort failed (Chomette, 2010:20-
21). 
Where the Shishmaref community will be located is yet to be determined, but two 
options have emerged (Chomette, 2010:22). The first option involves moving the community 
to small towns around Nome and Kotzebue, about 322 kilometers to the south and east. This 
is the less expensive solution and the one favored by the state of Alaska and federal funding 
agencies. The second option, estimated to cost the doubled of that of the first option, is to 
relocate the community to the mainland only about 20 kilometers from Sarichef.  This second 
option includes that the community would be recreated in an uninhabited area called Tin 
Creek that would be safe from erosion. 
 Chomette (2010) found, by interviewing the inhabitants of Shishmaref, that the second 
alternative, relocation to Tin Creek is the preferred option for the people it affects. In Tin 
Creek the people will be able to continue living the way they do, and the community will be 
able to stay together and continue functioning like a community. There are great fear for loss 
of way of living, unemployment and assimilation if they were to be moved to another village 
(Chomette, 2010:26-28). Some of the inhabitants in Sishmaref Chomette is talking to say they 
will relocate to Tin Creek themselves, without help from the state, as they put it “[t]his shore, 
this lagoon, these rivers – this is our home, you understand? We have deep roots here. And, as 
you well know, there's no place like home” (Chomette, 2010:28).  
6.5.1 Community Relocation: A Lesson from the Pacific? 
Campell (2010) looks closer at community relocation as an option to, or result of, climate 
change. What he finds is that the ideas of relocation fails to account for the extremely 
important losses that dislocation from the land will bring about (Campell, 2010:78). This goes 
for internal relocation as well as international relocation. 
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Campell (2010) uses the term relocation to refer to the permanent (or long-term) 
movement of a community (or a significant part of the community) from one location to 
another. Important characteristics of the original community are still retained, the community 
stays together at the destination in a social form that is similar to the way it was in the place of 
origin (Campell, 2010:58). Relocation is distinctively different from evacuation, displacement 
and migration. 
Using the Pacific Island states as a case for looking at relocation, Campell (2010:60) 
emphasize that land has multiple meanings in the majority of Pacific Island states. In many 
cases the land cannot be separated from those who «belong to it». Further, many migrants, 
even long-term ones, still consider themselves to belong to their land, even if they are 
physically dislocated from it (Campell 2010:63).
45
  
Many Pacific Islands have a great history of migration, and migration should not be 
seen as a new thing. The difference is, according to Campell (2010:64-65), that this 
“traditional” migration and the rapid urbanization that is ongoing does not mean that the link 
to the land is broken. It does not involve moving a whole community, and the migrant can 
stay in contact with remaining family and friends. 
Campell looks at two specific cases, in-country relocation, from the Carterets to 
Bougainville, and international relocation, from Banaba (now a part of Kiribati) to Rabi (a 
Fijian island). In the in-country case, all the families who were relocated there in 1984 had 




The relocation of the people of Banaba to Rabi is an example of international 
relocation, and although not because of climate change, it is used here to illustrate some of the 
problems surrounding this kind of relocation. The relocation of the community of Banaba to 
Rabi happend as a consequence of environmental degration, in the form of phosphate mining. 
From around 1900 Banaba became important for the the Gilbert and Ellice island Protectorate 
as the British Phosphate Cooperation (PBC) started to extract phosphate (Campell 2010:74). 
As the extraction of phosphate continued, the utility of Banaba as a home for the Banabas was 
declining, and by 1940 the protectorate government was encouraging the people to relocate to 
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 It might be argued, however, that this is not limited to migrants from the Pacific Island states. In an White 
Paper discussing Norwegian citizenship it is argued that “[i]t must be assumed that even if a person speaks 
Norwegian well and has extensive Norwegian contacts, he or she will preserve a factual and emotional 
attachment to their country of origin” (my translation)  (NOU, 2000:32 ). 
46
 Some went home before 1989, others left as a civil conflict started in Bougainville in 1988. 
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another site (Campell 2010:74). The population had mixed opinions about this, some were 
keen to move, others were concerned that if they did relocate they would lose the sovereignty 
over Banaba. Plans were put on hold when Banaba was occupied by Japanese forces in 1942, 
shortly after the phosphate company staff and colonial officials abondoned the island. The 
Japanese relocated many of the Banabans to other locations in Micronesia. After the war, 
Australian forces reclaimed Banabas and the British colonial government resettled the 
Banabans on Rabi, and island in Fiji, because of the war damage in Banabas. 
Those who relocated were given two years to decide whether they would stay on Rabi 
or return (Campell 2010:74). The majority of Banabans were opposed to relocation, but 
eventually accepted it as a result of compulsory land expropriations and concerns that an 
alternative environment would be necessary to sustain future generations, according to 
Campell (2010:74). Funds accumulated from phosphate royalties were used for the purchase, 
which was facilitated by the British colonial service in the form of the Western Pacific High 
Commission and the Governor of Fiji. When the Banabans set about reproducing a Banaban 
society in a new setting a paradoxical condition ensued, Banabans set out to confirm both 
their status as the rightful inhabitants of Rabi as well as retaining autonomy over Banaba 
(which was promised to them when the agreement to relocate to Rabi was settled). Seeking 
sovereignty over Banaba was a major way in which the link to land could be sustained, but 
despite a long struggle the Banabas did not succeed and when Kiribati got its independence 
the Banaba became a part of Kiribati (Campell 2010:75). 
6.5.2 Is Community Relocation a Workable Solution? 
In the case of Alaska the relocation is internal, and there are several examples of internal 
relocations for different reasons.
47
 The relocation of Lateu on Tegua Island, Vanuatu, is said 
to be the first case in the world of the formal community relocation because of climate 
change. A group of hundred residents were relocated further inland due to storm damage and 
erosion (see Burton et al., 2011, Panda, 2010).That is not to say that relocation inside the 
home state is unproblematic. Barnett and Webber (2010:53) argue that community relocation 
                                                          
47
 Another example is the relocation from Alenville to Hopeville in Arizona, USA, (see Perry and Lindell, 1997). 
Campell (2010:59-60) writes that in some jurisdictions (mostly in developed countries) local government bodies 
encourage people that are living in hazardous sites to relocate through voluntary acquisition schemes, in which 
vulnerable properties are purchased (generally by the government), which enables the owners to purchase 
properties in a safer place. Further, there are several examples of Pacific island communities that have relocated 
to sites that are believed to be less vulnerable (see Campell, 2010:60).This examples are examples of voluntary 
relocation, Perry and Lindell (1997:49) argues that the bulk of forced relocations have been either temporary, as 
in the case of Darwin (Australia), or relative short-term and appropriate classified as evacuations.  
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should be a strategy of last resort. The first reason for this claim is that even in the case of 
highly exposed populations the full extent of adaptation responses, and their barriers and 
limits, has not been adequately assessed. Further, the empirical record of involuntary 
resettlement points to the risk of landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, 
food insecurity, loss of access to common property resources, increased morbidity and 
community disarticulation (Barnett and Webber, 2010:53). The impacts of resettlement on 
communities imply that it leads to increased vulnerability to climate change; moving 
communities in anticipation of climate change may therefore accelerate vulnerability more 
than it avoids it (Barnett and Webber, 2010:53). Barnett and Webber (2010:53) further argues 
that if community relocation is absolute necessary, its social and political costs can be 
minimized by allowing adequate time for community consultation and planning. In the 
context of community relocation in Alaska, the inhabitants of Shishmaref themselves voted on 
whether or not to relocate the village, while the state government of Alaska funds the 
relocation. However, there seem to be fear for the same situations as Barnett and Webber 
(2010) lists, especially way of living and unemployment.   
 Further, Warner (2010:409-410) points at critical “governance gaps” that need 
attention if the relocation of Shishmaref and other relocations in the US/Alaska is to occur: no 
government agency has the authority to relocate communities, no funding is designated for 
relocation, and no criteria are defined for identifying relocation sites. Warner (2010) argues 
that governance in developing countries might face even more challenges than the US in 
trying to resettle people.  
The big question here is of course if it would be possible to relocate an entire state, 
and hence keeping the states sovereignty. According to McAdam (2010a:121) there is nothing 
in international law that would prevent the reconstruction of a state such as Kiribati or Tuvalu 
within an existing state, for example Australia, although the political likelihood for this kind 
of relocation happening seems highly unlikely. Theoretically it would be possible for a state to 
“lease” territory from another, although there might be some questions about the extent to 
which power could be freely exercised in a manner sufficient to meet the other requirements 
of statehood in such a case (McAdam, 2010:122). 
Relocation, however, means more than just securing territory, the acquisition of land 
alone does not secure immigration or citizenship rights, but is simply a private property 
transaction (McAdam, 2010:123). Even when legal issues are solved, relocation may still not 
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be a popular option, as concerns about the maintenance of identity, culture, social practices 
and land tenure are very real to those whose movement is proposed (MmcAdam, 2010:123). 
Campell (2010:77) claims that the case of Banaba/Rabi should be of considerable 
relevance to those looking at community relocation in Pacific Island countries as a response to 
climate change. According to Campell (2010:77) climate change-induced degradation may be 
even more profound, and the implications for those relocated even more devastating. In Rabi, 
the Banabans still try to keep the «mud-blood linkage», 60 years after the relocation. By 
looking at the Alaskan case, I would argue that this «mud-blood linkage» and relationship to 
land is not only important when dealing with relocation is Pacific island states. The people 
living in Shishmaref do not want to leave their land either, and fear that their way of life is 
under threat if they should be relocated (Chomette 2010).  



















Chapter 7 - Summary, Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
The goal of this paper is to look at how the world community can offer protection to “climate 
refugees”. Although migration in the face of natural or human made disasters is not a new 
trend, there are signs of increases in natural disasters (Kolmannskog 2009:5), and further, 
estimations of a high number of people being forced to move due to the effects of climate 
change (see for example Myers, 2002, Tegart et al., 1990). Today, there are no international 
regime for the protection of those who flee due to the effects of environmental or climate 
change. To figure out how “climate refugees” can best be protected I first looked at 
definitions of “climate refugees” and terms linked to this concept, seeing that there are no 
universal accepted definition of either “climate refugee”, “environmental refugee”, “climate 
migrant” or “environmental migrant”.  
Although the goal is not necessarily to find room for this kind of displacement in the 
Refugee Convention, the definition of refugees in the convention is indirectly used as a 
reference point. As discussed in chapter 3, the definition of a refugee in the Refugee 
Convention has at least three aspects; there must be a well-founded fear of persecution; the 
reason for the persecution must be for the reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion; and the person must be outside the country of 
his/her nationality or unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country. 
However, most of the definitions of “environmental refugees” and “climate refugees” include 
both cross-border and internal movement. Further, while the reason for the movement is the 
effects of environmental or climate change in all the definitions in chapter 4, how this is 
defined varies from definition to definition. There might be advantages and disadvantages 
with both approaches. A definition which includes both environmental and climatic 
disruptions, like Myers and Kents (1995) and El-Hinnawis (1985), include a large group of 
people, on the other hand, too restrictive definitions might exclude large groups of people in 
dire need of help or protection. 
Further, chapter 4 shows how different terms are used in the same context. This is 
illustrated by figure 1, where terms are placed on a continuum after how they are defined by 
the authors; those who define the movement as forced is located at the right side, described as 
“Forced/involuntary”, while the terms that do not include an element of force at all are placed 
at the left side of the continuum. As the figure shows, the same term are located at different 
places in the continuum, due to being defined in different ways. Further, I use the definitions 
presented earlier in the same chapter and the typology of forced versus voluntary migration to 
92 
 
show how the terms could be defined based on what people are moving from (climate change 
or environmental change), whether or not the movement is internal or cross-border, and the 
extent of force involved in the movement (as summed up in figure 2). There are several 
components which must be considered here. The use of the term “refugee” to describe the 
movement in the context of climate or environmental related effects as a push factor might not 
be the right one, however, it is used to emphasize that the movement is forced, that it is 
external and that help or protection is needed.  
Seeing that climate change can have impact on the implementation of several human 
rights, and that one of the consequences of the effects of climate change might be population 
movement chapter 5 moves on to discuss human rights. As there is no protection mechanisms 
for people forced to move cross state borders due to climate or environmental change, it could 
be argued that there is a human rights “gap”. Further, I have shown that there is a discussion 
on whether or not human rights have an impact on states sovereignty. While DeLaet (2006) 
argues that sovereignty always trumps human rights, Mills (1998) claims that part of states 
sovereignty has been eroded if they can be bound by international agreements. However, how 
much “power” or impact the ratification of a human rights convention has is not agreed upon. 
As Keith (1999) points out, the implementation mechanisms of conventions are often weak, 
and she argues that states aware of these shortcomings conclude that there is little risk of their 
sovereignty if they ratify a convention, in this case at the ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. On the other hand, Hathaway (2007) argues that states 
with a robust domestic politics might be reluctant to ratify human rights conventions, simply 
because the conventions can make a difference.  This leads the discussion on to whether or 
not the Refugee Convention leads to sovereignty issues, and more general if cross-border 
movement leads to sovereignty issues. Dauvergne (2004) argues that the Refugee Convention 
impinges very little on sovereignty; the most important argument being that states ratifies the 
convention as a sovereign act. Both Mills (1998) and Dauvergne (2004) argues that western 
states tries to limit the number of refugees/asylum seekers, and that is one of the other reasons 
Dauvergne has for claiming that the Refugee Convention does not impinge on states 
sovereignty. Illegal immigration, on the other hand, is an “affront” to states sovereignty, 
because it makes it evident that the state cannot control its borders. Further, Bhabha (1996) 
argues that refugees crystalize the conflict between two founding principles of modern 
society, the belief in human rights and the sovereignty of nation states. By scrutinizing asylum 
application cases she shows how important the origin states sovereignty is, sometimes so 
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important that asylum applications are denied based on arguments grounded in the “sending” 
states sovereignty. There is also another aspect of “sending” states sovereignty; according to 
McNamara and Gibson (2009) ambassadors at the UN form Pacific island states resist the 
category of “climate refugees”, arguing that it is geopolitical damaging to the Pacific island 
states. The ambassadors envision a future as self-determining states, and therefore resist the 
media/policy discourses that legitimize their possible future displacement en masse. It is this 
discussion that lay the formation of the analysis of proposed alternatives in chapter 6.  
Chapter 6 presents a broad range of proposed alternatives: convention-related 
alternatives, regional alternatives, proportional migration, a global insurance scheme, and 
community relocation. As the chapter shows it is not the lack of proposed alternatives for 
“climate refugees” that is the problem. It is hard to say which one would offer the best 
protection. It is especially hard because of the different effects of climate change; there might 
be need of other mechanisms to cope with slow-onset disasters than what is needed in the 
context of sudden-onset disasters. As discussed in chapter 3, it seem like it is harder to 
estimate numbers of people affected by slow-onset disasters (such as drought). Furthermore, 
Kolmannskog (2009:25) argues that the way the movement happens differs in these two 
scenarios. The causal link is more blurred than in sudden-onset disaster, and further, in 
conflicts and sudden-onset disasters, entire families are often forced to move, while droughts 
might be characterized by family separation, with one or two in the household leaving in 
search of work (Kolmannskog, 2009:25). This illustrates the importance of how the concepts 
are defined. For example, Docherty and Giannini (2009) and Biermann and Boas (2008, 
2010) propose convention-related alternatives, and both the alternatives are coined on climate 
refugees. However, despite using the same term, the alternatives are not necessary targeted at 
the same kind of movement, and hence not the same group of people. Docherty and Giannini 
(2009) includes only those who cross state borders in their definition of climate refugees, 
while Biermann and Boas (2010) also include internal movement. Further, while Biermann 
and Boas have a list of what should be regarded as climatic reasons for flight, Docherty and 
Giannini argues that there could be advances in science and for that reason it is best to leave 
open what should and should not be regarded as effects of climate change. Further, Byravan 
and Rajan (2006, 2009, 2010) only focuses on those who have to move due to sea-level rise. 
To make generalizations of which alternative would give the best protection in all situations 
would therefore be hard, seeing that different components underlie the definitions and the 
proposed alternatives.  
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The generalization problem could, however, be an argument for claiming that regional 
alternatives could best address the issue. In Williams (2008) proposal of regional agreements 
the definition of “climate change refugees” is left open to the regional associations to define. 
That way the regional associations can evaluate what threats linked to the effects of climate 
change they are up against, and further, what kind of help or protection is needed. 
Additionally, Williams (2008:521) argue that an regional agreement could easier take into 
account the capacity of each state involved and the severity of the problem in that era. 
Solutions could in other words be “tailored” after the situation.   
The problems surrounding the alternative of regional agreements should not be 
ignored, as discussed above there might be fear of loss of sovereignty, or unwillingness to 
cooperate, on regional level as well as on an international level. Further, there are calls for 
several modifications if already existing migration institutions are to be used, as Hugo (2010) 
proposes. Warner (2010) argues that not only are modifications needed; the current 
governance structure, the country interests, and the implicit system of mutuality in 
international negotiations provides scarce incentives for active leadership in reshaping 
governance for human movement and environmental change.  
Further, I will argue that there are some alternatives that are less likely to come into 
existence than others. Byravan and Rajan’s (2006, 2009, 2010) proposal of proportional 
migration raises important questions about who should be held responsible for climate change 
and the consequences, in this context migration, and hence who should take responsibility. 
Nevertheless, this alternative raises more questions than answers. And the most important 
question of them is why “sending” states and “receiving” states should agree to the proposal. 
It is not unreasonable to assume that it will be in the best interest of the “sending” states to 
remain to function as a sovereign state, and seeing that states already try to limit the number 
of “traditional refugees” (as discussed in chapter 5) it is unlikely that they would sign up for 
an agreement that open up for more “refugees”. The climate change insurance proposed by 
Penz (2010) has some of the same issues; why would “big polluters” join an agreement where 
they have to pay without necessary being in direct danger themselves?  
7.1 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research  
There are no clear-cut answers to the research question. But, as discussed above, there are 
some alternatives for protection that are less likely to come into existence, and further some 
that might be easier for states to agree on. This paper gives a broad view of the field, and there 
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are several aspects that might deserve closer scrutiny. Each “part” could with some 
modification be a thesis in itself. This can be seen as one of the weaknesses of the paper; the 
study gives a broad view of the topic, but might leave out important details. It would be 
possible to look closer at one or more of the proposed alternatives presented in chapter 6, and 
for example do a case study to see if it would be a suitable solution in different contexts. 
Another interesting and important topic that might have received too little focus here is what 
states can do to prevent that people are forced to move cross-border due to the effects of 
climate change. Warner (2010) argues that the efficacy of governance plays a critical role in 
whether those displaced because of environmental disruptions will return, or whether they 
will become environmentally motivated or environmentally forced migrants (see chapter 4).  
In relation to human rights linked to climate change and population movement one 
could look closer on litigations and rights movements, with or without the element of 
sovereignty.   
As discussed in chapter 3, Myers (2002) argues that “when global warming takes 
hold” there could be as many as 200 million people “overtaken by sea-level rise and coastal 
flooding, by disruptions of monsoon systems and other rainfall regimes, and by droughts of 
unprecedented severity and duration”. We must therefore begin to prepare how states and the 
















Adcock, Robert & Collier, David (2001) "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for 
Qualitative and Quantitative Research". American Political Science Review, 95(3), 
529-546. 
Adger, W.N., Agrawala, S. , Mirza, M.M.Q. , Conde, C. , O’Brien, K. , Pulhin, J. , Pulwarty, 
R. , Smit, B.  & Takahashi, K. (2007) "Assessment of adaptation practices, options, 
constraints and capacity. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability" In Parry, M.L. , et al. (Eds.) Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  717-743. 
Agostino, Ana & Lizarde, Rosa (2012) "Gender and Climate Justice". Development, 55(1), 
90-95. 
Americas - Miscellaneous (1984). Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the 
International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36ec.html. [Retrieved: 19.05.2012]. 
Amin, Samir (1974) Modern Migration in Western Africa, London, Oxford University Press. 
Aminzadeh, Sara C. (2007) "A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights Implications of Climate 
Change". Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev., 30(2), 231-265. 
Barnett, Jon & Adger, W.Neil (2003) "Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries". Climatic 
Change, 61, 321-337. 
Barnett, Jon & Campell, John (2010) Climate Change and Small Island States. Power, 
Knowledge and the South Pacific., London and Washington, DC, Earthscan. 
Barnett, Jon & Webber, Michael (2010) "Migration as Adaptation: Oppurtunities and Limits". 
In McAdam, Jane (Ed.) Climate Change and Displacement. Multidisciplinary 
Perspectives. Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing.  37-55. 
Bates, Diane C. (2002) "Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by 
Environmental Change". Population and Environment, 23(5), 465-477. 
Beckerman, Wilfred & Pasek, Joanna (2001) Justice, Posterity, and the Environment, USA, 
Oxford University Press  
Bell, Derek R. (2004) "Environmental Refugees: What Rights? Which Duties?". Res Publica, 
10, 135-152. 
Benhabib, Seyla (2007) "Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitian Norms? 
Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times". Citizenship Studies, 11(1), 19-36. 
Bhabha, Jacqueline (1996) "Embodied Rights: Gender Persecution, State Sovereignty, and 
Refugees". Public Culture, 9, 3-32. 
Biermann, Frank & Boas, Ingrid (2008) "Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global 
Protocol". Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 50(6), 8-17. 
Biermann, Frank & Boas, Ingrid (2010) "Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global 
Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees". Global Environmental Politics, 
10(1), 60-88. 
Black, Richard (2001) "Fifty Years of Refugee Studies: From Theory to Policy". IMR, 35(1), 
57-78. 
Burton, D. , Mustelin, J. & Urich, P. (2011) Climate Change Impacts on Children in the 
Pacific: A focus on Kiribati and Vanuatu. Advocacy Paper, commissioned by 
UNICEF. 
Burton, Tess & Hodgkinson, David (2009) Climate Change Migrants and Unicorns: A 
discussion note on conceptualising climate change displaced people. 1-14. 
97 
 
Byravan, Sujatha & Rajan, Sudhir Chella (2006) "Providing new homes for climate change 
exiles". Climate Policy, 6(2), 247-252. 
Byravan, Sujatha & Rajan, Sudhir Chella (2009) "Warming Up to Immigrants: An Option for 
the US in Climate Policy". Economic & Political Weekly. 
Byravan, Sujatha & Rajan, Sudhir Chella (2010) "The Ethical Implications of Sea-Level Rise 
Due to Climate Change". Ethics & International Affairs, 24(3), 239-260. 
Campell, John (2010) "Climate-Induced Community Relocation in the Pacific: The Meaning 
and Importance of Land". In McAdam, Jane (Ed.) Climate Change and Displacement. 
Multididciplinary Perspectives. Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing.  57-79. 
Caney, Simon (2010) "Climate Change, Human Rights, and Moral Thresholds". In Gardiner, 
Stephen, et al. (Eds.) Climate Ethics. Essential Readings. Oxford University Press.  
163-177. 
Chomette, Guy-Pierre (2010) "United States. Alaska, the Kigiqtaamiut in jeopardy". In 
Collectif Argos (Ed.) Climate Refugees. Paris, MIT Press and Dominique Carré 
éditeur.  18-51. 
Conisbee, Molly & Simms, Andrew (2003) Environmental Refugees. The Case for 
Recognition, London, New Economics Foundation. 
Cooper, Jessica B. (1998) "Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the 
Refugee Definition". Environmental Law Journal, 480-529. 
Dabwido, Sprent (2011) Statement by H.E. The Hon. Sprent Dabwido M.P. President of the 
Republic of Nauru on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States (Pacific 
SIDS). United Nations Framework Climate Change Convention Seventeenth 
Conferece of Parties. Durban, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Nauru to the 
United Nations. 
Dauvergne, Catherine (2004) "Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times". 
The Modern Law Review, 67(4), 588-615. 
de Moor, Nicole (2011) "Temporary Labour Migration for Victims of Natural Disasters: The 
Case of Columbia". In Leighton, Michelle, Shen, Xiaomeng & Warner, Koko (Eds.) 
Climate Change and Migration: Rethinking Policies for Adaptation and Disaster Risk 
Reduction. Bonn, Druckerei Leppelt/United Nations University Institute for 
Environment and Human Security.  90-101. 
DeLaet, Debra L. (2006) The global struggle for human rights : universal principles in world 
politics, Belmont, CA, Thompson Wadsworth. 
Docherty, Bonnie & Giannini, Tyler (2009) "Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a 
Convention on Climate Change Refugees". Harvard Environmental Law Review, 33, 
349-403 
El-Hinnawi, Essam E. (1985) Environmental refugees, Nairobi, United Nations Environment 
Programme. 
Feinberg, Joel (2009) "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations". In Sofier, Eldon 
(Ed.) Ethical Issues: Perspectives for Canadians. 3rd. ed.   
Finlands Aliens Act (2004) Aliens Act (301/2004, amendments up to 458/2009 included). 
Retrieved 01.05.2012 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b4d93ad2.html.  
FMO (2012). What is forced migration? http://www.forcedmigration.org/about/whatisfm. 
[Retrieved: 24.04.2012]. 
Freeman, Michael (2002) Human Rights. An interdisciplinary approach, Cambridge and 
Malden, Polity Press. 
Fullerton, Maryellen (1993) "A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution 




Gain, A.K. & Bari, M.A. (2007) "Effect of Environmental Degradation on National Security 
of Bangladesh". Asia Pacific Environment and Development, 14(2), 35-54. 
Gemenne, François (2011) "Why the numbers don't add up: A review of estimates and 
predictions of people displaced by environmental changes". Global Environmental 
Change, 21(Supplement 1), S41-S49. 
Globalis (2012a). Avtaler. http://www.globalis.no/Avtaler. [Retrieved: 12.03.2012]. 
Globalis (2012b). Avtaler - Flyktningkonvensjonen. 
http://www.globalis.no/Avtaler/Flyktningkonvensjonen. [Retrieved: 12.03.2012]. 
Globalis (2012c). Kiribati. http://www.globalis.no/Land/Kiribati. [Retrieved: 27.03.2012]. 
Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. & McAdam, Jane (2007) The Refugee in International Law, 3rd 
edition, United Kingdom, Oxford University Press. 
Grønmo, Sigmund (2004) Samfunnsvitenskapelige metoder, Bergen, Fagbokforlaget. 
Haldorsen, Kaja (2011). 42 million displaced by sudden natural disasters in 2010 
http://www.nrc.no/?did=9570125. [Retrieved: 28.04.2012]. 
Hartmann, Betsy (2010) "rethinking climate refugees and climate conflict: rhetoric, reality 
and the politics of policy discourse". Journal of International Development, 22, 233-
246. 
Hathaway, Oona A. (2007) "Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?". Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 51(4), 588-621. 
Hugo, Graeme (1996) "Environmental Concerns and International Migration". International 
Migration Review, 30(1), 105-131. 
Hugo, Graeme (2010) "Climate Change-Induced Mobility and the Existing Migration Regime 
in Asia and the Pacific". In McAdam, Jane (Ed.) Climate Change and Displacement. 
Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing.  9-35. 
Human Rights Council/OHCHR (2008) Resolution 7/23. Human rights and climate change. 
Retrieved 1.5.2012 
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_7_23.pdf.  
Human Rights Council/OHCHR (2011) Resolution 18/22. Human rights and climate change. 
Retrieved 01.05.2012 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/A.HRC.RES.18.22.pdf.  
Human Rights Watch (2010). Sudan: ICC Warrant for Al-Bashir on Genocide. 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/07/13/sudan-icc-warrant-al-bashir-genocide. 
[Retrieved: 27.02.2012]. 
Jacobsen, Jodi L. (1988) Environmental Refugee: A Yardstick of Habitability. Worldwatch 
Paper 86. 
Keane, David (2004) "The Environmental Causes and Consequences of Migration: A Search 
for the Meaning of 'Environmental Refugees'". The Georgetown Int'l Envtl. Law 
Review, 16, 209-223. 
Keith, Linda Camp (1999) "The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Does It Make A Difference in Human Rights Behavior?" Journal of Peace 
Research, 36(1), 95-118. 
Kibreab, Gaim (1997) "Environmental Causes and Impact of Refugee Movements: A Critique 
of the Current Debate". Disasters, 21(1), 20-38. 
King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O. & Verba, Sidney (1994) Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research., Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press. 
Klein, R.J.T. , Huq, S. , Denton, F. , Downing, T.E. , Richels, R.G., Robinson, J.B.  & Toth, 
F.L. (2007) "Inter-relationships between adaptation and mitigation" In Parry, M.L. , et 
al. (Eds.) Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution 
99 
 
of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press 745-777. 
Kolmannskog, Vikram (2009) Climate Changed: People Displaced. Norwegian Refugee 
Council, 1-40. 
Kolmannskog, Vikram & Myrstad, Finn (2009) "Environmental Displacement in European 
Asylum Law". European Journal of Migration and Law, 11, 313-326. 
Kolmannskog, Vikram Odedra (2008) future floods of refugees. A comment on climate 
change, conflict and forced migration. Norwegian Refugee Council, 1-40. 
Kozoll, Christopher (2004) "Poisoning the Well: Persecution, the Environment, and Refugee 
Status". Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Politics, 15, 271-
307. 
Krasner, Stephen (1993) "Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights". In Mayer, Peter & 
Rittberger, Volker (Eds.) Regime theory and international relations. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press.  xix, 470 s. 
Krasner, Stephen (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press. 
Lohmann, Larry (2008) Carbon Trading, Climate Justice and the Production of Ignorance: 
Ten examples. Development, 51, 359-365. 
Loughry, Maryanne (2010) "Climate Change, Human Movement and the Promotion of 
Mental Health: What Have We Learnt from Earlier Global Stressors?". In McAdam, 
Jane (Ed.) Climate Change and Displacement. Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Oxford 
and Portland, Hart.  221-238. 
Mares, Peter (2007) "Objections to Pacific Seasonal Work Programs in Rural Australia". 
Public Policy, 2(1), 68-87. 
McAdam, Jane (2010a) "'Disappearing States', Statelessness and the Boundaries of 
International Law". In McAdam, Jane (Ed.) Climate Change and Displacement. 
Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing.  105-129. 
McAdam, Jane (2010b) "Introduction". In McAdam, Jane (Ed.) Climate change and 
displacement: multidisciplinary perspectives. Oxford an Portland, Hart.  1-8. 
McAdam, Jane & Saul, Ben (2010) "An Insecure Climate for Human Security? Climate-
Induced Displacement and International Law". Sydney Centre for International Law. 
Sydney Centre Working Paper 4. , 1-25. 
McGregor, JoAnn (1994) "Climate change and imvoluntary migration: implications for food 
security". Food Policy, 19(2), 120-132. 
McLeman, R. & Smit, B. (2006) "Migration as an Adaptation to Climate Change". Climatic 
Change, 76(1-2), 31-53. 
McNamara, Karen Elizabeth & Gibson, Chris (2009) "'We do not want to leave our land': 
Pacific ambassadors at the United Nations resist the category of 'climate refugees'". 
Geoforum, 40, 475-483. 
Meron, Theodore (1986) "On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights". The American 
Journal of International Law, 80(1), 1-23. 
Mills, Kurt (1998) Human rights in the emerging global order : a new sovereignty?, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
Montgomery, John D. (2002) "Sovereignty in Transition". In Montgomery, John D. & Glazer, 
Nathan (Eds.) Sovereignty under Challenge: How Governments Respond. New 
Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Publishers.  3-30. 
Morsink, Johannes (1999) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: origins, drafting, and 
intent, Philadelpia, University of Pennsylvania Press. 
100 
 
Myers, Normann (2002) "Environmental refugees: a growing phenomenon of the 21st 
century". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 357, 609-613. 
Myers, Normann & Kent, Jennifer (1995) Environmental Exodus: An Emergent Crisis in the 
Global Arena, Washington DC, Climate Institute. 
Naik, Asmita (2009) "Migration and Natural Disasters". In Laczko, Frank & Aghazarm, 
Christine (Eds.) Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the 
Evidence. Geneva, Switzerland, International Organization for Migration.  247-317. 
NOU (2000). Lov om erverv og tap av norsk statsborgerskap 
(Statsborgerloven).http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dok/nouer/2000/nou-2000-
32.html?id=143396. [Retrieved: 11.03.2011]. 
NRC/IDMC and OCHA (2009). Monitoring disaster displacement in the context of climate 
change. Findings of a study by the United Nations Offi ce for the Coordination of 





OHCHR (2010). Human Rights Bodies - Complaints Procedures 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm. [Retrieved: 02.05.2012]. 
Organization of African Unity (1969). Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa ("OAU Convention"), 10 September 1969. 1001 U.N.T.S. 
45. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36018.html. [Retrieved: 04.06.2012]. 
Panda, Architesh (2010) "Climate Refugees: Implications for India". Economic & Political, 
XLV(20), 76-79. 
Parish, T. David (1992) "Membership in a Particular Social Group under the Refugee Act of 
1980: Social Identity and the Legal Concept of the Refugee". Columbia Law Review, 
92(4), 923-953. 
Paskal, Cleo (2007) How Climate Change is puxhing the boundaries of security and foreign 
policy. Energy, Environment and Development Programme. Chathman House. 
Penz, Peter (2010) "International Ethical Responsibilities to 'Climate Change Refugees'". In 
McAdam, Jane (Ed.) Climate Change and Displacement. Multidisciplinary 
Perspectives. Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing.  151-174. 
Perry, Ronald W. & Lindell, Michael K. (1997) "Principles for Managing Community 
Relocation as a Hazard Mitigation Measure". Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 5(1), 49-59. 
Reisman, W. Michael (1990) "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International 
Law". The American Journal of International Law, 84(4), 866-876. 
Renaud, Fabrice, Bogardi, Janos, Dun, Olivia & Warner, Koko (2007) Control, Adapt or 
Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration?, Paffenholz, Bornheim, Germany, 
Publication Series of UNU-EHS. 
Ritchie, Jonathan (2009) "Pacfic Solutions? The Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme as a 
Symbol of Australian Relations with the Pacific Islands". Social Alternatives, 28(4), 
14-19. 
Roy, Dulal Chandra (2011) "Vulnerability and Population Displacement due to Climate-
induced Disasters in Coastal Bangladesh". In Leighton, Michelle, Shen, Xiaomeng & 
Warner, Koko (Eds.) Climate Change and Migration: Rethinking Policies for 
Adaption and Disaster Risk Reduction. Bonn, Druckerei Leppelt/United Nations 
University Institute for Environment and Human Security.  22-31. 
101 
 
Sartori, Giovanni (1970) "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics". The American 
Political Science Review 64(4), 1033-1053  
Sassen, Saskia (1996) "Beyond Sovereignty: Immigration Policy Making Today". Social 
Justice, 23(3), 9-20. 
Sikkink, Kathryn (1993) "Human-Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in 
Latin-America". International Organization, 47(3), 411-441. 
Siyoum, Aschale Dagnachew (2011) "Food Insecurity and Environmental Migration in 
Drought-Prone Areas of Ethiopia". In Leighton, Michelle, Shen, Xiaomeng & Warner, 
Koko (Eds.) Climate Change and Migration: Rethinking Policies for Adaption and 
Disaster Risk Reduction. Bonn, Druckerei Leppelt/United Nations University Institute 
for Environment and Human Security.  61-71. 
Speare, A (1974) "The Relevance of Models of Internal Migration for the Study of 
International Migration.". In Tapinos, G (Ed.) International Migration: Proceedings of 
a Seminar on Demographic Research in Relation to International Migration. Paris, 
CICRED.  84-94. 
SSB (2012). Holdning til flyktningers og asylsøkeres adgang til å få opphold i Norge. Bør den 
bli lettere, vanskeligere eller som i dag? 
http://statbank.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/Default_FR.asp?PXSid=0&nvl=true&PLangua
ge=0&tilside=selectvarval/define.asp&Tabellid=08783. [Retrieved: 08.04.2012]. 
Suhrke, Astri (1993) Pressure Points: Environmental Degradation, Migration and Conflict. 
Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
Swain, Ashok (1996) "Environmental migration and conflict dynamics: Focus on developing 
regions". Third World Quarterly, 17(5), 959-973. 
Swedish Aliens Act 2005:716 (2005). Chapter 4. Refugees and persons otherwise in need of 
protection. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b50a1c.html. [Retrieved: 
04.06.2012]. 
Tegart, W.J. McG. , Sheldon, G.W.   & Griffiths, D.C. (1990) Policymakers' summary. In 
Tegart, W.J. McG. , Sheldon, G.W.   & Griffiths, D.C. (Eds.) Report prepared for 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change by Working Group II. Camberra, 
Australia, Australia Government Publishing Service.   
Thornton, Fanny (2011) "Regional Labour Migration as Adaptation to Climate Change?: 
Options in the Pacific". In Leighton, Michelle, Shen, Xiaomeng & Warner, Koko 
(Eds.) Climate Change and Migration: Rethinking Policies for Adaptation and 
Disaster Risk Reduction. Bonn, Druckerei Leppelt/United Nations University Institute 
for Environment and Human Security.  81-89. 
Tyssing, Ylva Torilsdotter (2010) Miljø,flukt og internasjonal samhandling, Oslo, University 
of Oslo. 
UN General Assembly (1948). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) - 
Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 
1948. http://www.un.org/events/humanrights/2007/hrphotos/declaration%20_eng.pdf. 
[Retrieved: 02.05.2012]. 
UN General Assembly (1951). Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html [Retrieved: 02.05.2012]. 
UN General Assembly (1954). Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 28 
September 1954, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 360, p. 117. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3840.html [Retrieved: 02.05.2012]. 
102 
 
UN General Assembly (1965). International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 
195. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3940.html [Retrieved: 02.05.2012]. 
UN General Assembly (1966a). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 
December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html [Retrieved: 02.05.2012]. 
UN General Assembly (1966b). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3 . 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36c0.html [Retrieved: 02.05.2012]. 
UN General Assembly (1967). Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html [Retrieved: 02.05.2012]. 
UN General Assembly (1979). Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3970.html. [Retrieved: 02.05.2012]. 
UN General Assembly (1982). Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dd8fd1b4.html. [Retrieved: 02.05.2012]. 
UN General Assembly (1984). Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 1465, p. 85. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a94.html 
[Retrieved: 02.05.2012]. 
UN General Assembly (1989). Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38f0.html. [Retrieved: 02.05.2012]. 
UNESCO (1997). Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards 
Future Generations, adopted on 12 November 1997 by the General Conference of 
UNESCO at its 29th session 
http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/generations.pdf. [Retrieved: 05.05.2012]. 
UNFCCC (1992). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 
May 1992, entred into force 21 March 1993) 1771 UNTS 107. 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. [Retrieved: 05.05.2012]. 
UNHCR (2009). Climate Change and Statelessness: A Overview. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a2d189d3.html. [Retrieved: 13.04.2012]. 
UNHCR (2011). Internally Displaced People. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html. 
[Retrieved: 30.11.2011]. 
Warner, Koko (2010) "Global environmental change and migration: Governance challenges". 
Global Environmental Change, 20, 402-413. 
Weiss, Edith Brown (2008) "Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity, and International 
Law". The Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 9, 615-627. 
Westing, Arthur H. (1992) "Environmental Refugees: A Growing Category of Displaced 
Persons". Environmental Conservation, 19(3), 201-207. 
Wijkman, Anders & Timberlake, Lloyd (1984) Natural disasters. Acts of God or acts of 
Man?, Nothingham, UK, International Institute for Environment and Developement. 
Wilhelmsen, Marit (2011). Holdninger til norsk bistand. 2010.Statistisk sentralbyrå 
http://www.ssb.no/emner/00/01/30/rapp_uhjelphold/rapp_201113/rapp_201113.pdf. 
[Retrieved: 08.04.2012]. 
Williams, Angela (2008) "Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in 
International Law". Law & Policy, 30(4), 502-529. 
103 
 
 
 
 
